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Abstract 
The thesis provides a systematic understanding of the media- government relationship In 
the conduct of foreign policy and a rigorous approach of the media's role and Impact on 
decision - making processes. It particularly covers a deficiency In the existing literature, 
with regard to the media's potential to Influence decision outcomes and cause policy 
changes. The thesis Is a theory-based Investigation while a case study Is employed for 
Illustration purposes. 
The thesis approaches the media within the context of an Interaction with the 
government that reflects a complex Interconnection of the media and politicians' 
decisions and Is here explored with the employment of rational choice and game theory. 
The thesis develops a game - theoretic model, which Identifies the media as a 
purposeful actor rather than a mere Instrument In the hands of politicians; and provides a 
rigorous interpretation of the media - government relationship as one between two profit 
- maximising actors. It examines the payoffs and costs entailed In their decisions within 
this Interaction, and concentrates on the potential Influence that media decisions have 
on the government's payoffs. 
In this model, the media Influence Is conceptuallsed as an outcome of their ability to 
frame information according to their self-interests, which are tied to their organisational 
structure and lead to the production of audience - driven news stories. With the 
Introduction of framing theory the thesis demonstrates the power Inherent In the media's 
content to affect the recipient's perception of a given situation; and with the aid of 
prospect theory, It Incorporates media frames Into the decision-making process and 
exhibits their potential Implications on perceptions of the risk entailed In political decision 
- making. The model develops a strategic cause - effect relationship between media 
frames and governmental decisions that Is applied to and tested through the press 
coverage of two Greek - Turkish territorial crises. The Investigation of the two events 
within the game - theoretic framework draws upon the media's power to create 
conditions of domestic/national cost for the government that can trigger apparently 
irrational and risky decisions. The findings suggest a strategic media Impact on decision- 
making processes and highlight the media's role as an actor plausible to affect decision 
outcomes and cause policy changes Independent of the policy at hand. 
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Introduction 
Introduction 
'The media today are Indeed part of the policy process... but the government has also 
become part of the media process' (O'Heffeman, 1991: 82). The observation of Patrick 
O'Heffernan encapsulates the wider Interconnection and Interdependence between the 
media, the government and the political process. The media have admittedly turned Into 
central components in politics In democratic states Impinging on both the areas of 
domestic and foreign affairs, This thesis Is primarily concerned with the latter and 
reflects an attempt to provide a better understanding of the media's power to generate 
effects on policyrnaking processes. The thesis approaches the media within the context 
of their relationship with the government and seeks to highlight their Influence and 
significance In foreign policyrnaking processes by exhibiting the weight that governments 
themselves accord to the media when planning policies. Although this observation has 
already been discussed In the literature, the present thesis provides a more systematic 
demonstration of the media's Involvement In the governmental decision-making. 
The search for a systematic framework, within which to locate and explore the media's 
behaviour and influence In relation to foreign policy, Is driven by a primary deficiency 
with regard to their role In the process of foreign policyrnaking, as opposed to the 
process of domestic politics. There is a certain degree of dissimilarity between the 
media-government Interaction In the areas of domestic and foreign affairs that can result 
In different media effects and Is where the thesis places the emphasis on. There Is 
actually a degree of uncertainty In the reporting of foreign affairs that concerns both the 
officials and the media. On the one hand, an example offered by Leon Slgal Is that 
International politics complicates the tacUcal use of the media by officials. Officials In one 
government might rely on the media as a source of Information, which might make 
officials In another government use the news as a medium to transmit Information to 
them. But at the same time, the media might also be used as channels of 'disinformation' 
and for misleading purposes. which would ultimately Increase the uncertainty Inherent In 
the media's use as channels and sources of Information (Sigal, 1973: 151). On the other 
hand, journalists are also faced with more complicated newsgathedng procedures for the 
coverage of foreign affairs. The fewer available sources, the lack of knowledge about 
specific International events and therefore the greater complexity In producing In depth 
analyses would ultimately add to the uncertainty In their job as well. With both officials 
and the media acknowledging this uncertainty, their Interaction becomes more complex 
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and less straightforward than the dynamic relationship and Interdependence they share 
In the domain of domestic politics. In the coverage of foreign affairs both officials and the 
media need to adjust their roles to circumstances and parameters that affect their stakes 
but have been left largely unexplored. For the officials, such parameters Involve the 
coordination of the national and International Interests and the risk that governments run 
In a foreign policy case; and for the journalists, It Is the Interrelation of the media's 
economic Interests and motivations with their roles as guardians of the country's national 
Interest that defines their action and Impact on the making of foreign policy. 
These are dynamics that Increase the complexity In understanding the media - 
politicians' Interaction and the degree of media Influence on governmental decisions, yet, 
they have received Insufficient consideration so far. The objective of the thesis lies in 
identifying a different dimension of the media- politicians' Interaction by closely looking 
Into the forces that shape this Interaction In the arena of foreign policy and how they 
result In a more radical media role and Impact than the one Identified In the literature so 
far. 
The medla-foreign policy relationship 
Patrick O'Heffernan has focused on the daily, complex, multilevel transactions that occur 
between the media and politicians as an aspect of the media's behaviour that needs to 
be comprehended In order to analyse toda)(s media-foreign policy relationship (1991: 
82). His'Insider model' Incorporates the significance of the media's own motivations and 
Interests that have turned the media-politiclans' relationship Into a co-evolution. In this, 
the media develop as actors whose role expands much further than their mere tactical 
use by politicians. O'Heffernan highlighted these motivations as a driving force In the 
media's role as Independent entities that resembled policy agencies In the sense that 
news production was the outcome of a number of Interactions among Individuals and 
Institutions, which aimed at meeting self-interests (1991: 82). He therefore drew upon 
the media's purposeful action creating scope for the present thesis to elaborate on this 
action and on how It shapes the media-politiclans' relationship In the domain of foreign 
policy; more Importantly, how the relationship Itself grows to be significantly more 
complicated than the existing literature suggests. 
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The main research gap that the thesis alms at covering lies In the actual media role In 
and Impact on the foreign policy process. Despite the attention given to the media's 
potential to affect foreign policy decisions, their Involvement Is still confined to a largely 
Instrumental role and more Importantly, one that Influences the process of decision. 
making, rather than the decision outcomes. The study of the media In the conduct of 
diplomacy (Gilboa, 2002; Cohen, 1986, Davison, 1974), In conflict situations (Wolfsfeld, 
11997; Seib, 1992, Hallin, 1986) and humanitarian Interventions (Gilboa, 2002; Robinson, 
2001; Livingston, 1997) demonstrates fully the media's participation In the making of 
foreign policy but leaves an obvious deficit of evidence with regard to their ability to 
Influence political outcomes. Hence, a primary objective of this thesis Is to uncover the 
media's power to Influence the making of foreign policy to the extent of affecting decision 
outcomes and even causing policy changes. And for the achievement of this end, a 
better understanding of the media - government Interaction Is required In order to shed 
light on the complexities that the media's relationship with politicians Incorporates and to 
ultimately define their Impact on decision outcomes. 
An additional deficiency In the existing literature lies In the absence of a 'compound' 
media role and Impact, one that recognises dimensions of the media's role as an actor 
that Is constantly present and Is constantly likely to affect decision-making processes, 
independent of the contextual factors that are adjacent to a given situation. The existing 
literature provides a framework that Identifies the media's role in the foreign policy 
process as a conditional one that Is tied to and dependent on specific parameters. These 
parameters can function as a starting point for the setting of hypotheses, which the 
present thesis will attempt to test, verity or disprove; and based on which It will create a 
more accurate profile of the media's role In Its Interaction with the government In the 
conduct of foreign policy. 
Such parameters are firstly related to geographical limitations, which are reflected In the 
respective political systems as well. With the largest part of the research having focused 
on the US media, a question that emerges Is to what extent the media's potential to 
Influence decision - making processes, depends on the geographical and political 
context within which a media organisation operates. In response to this question, the 
thesis employs a different example, the conflict between two traditional enemies, Greece 
and Turkey. The conflict unravels within a geographical, political and social context that 
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differs from the cases studied so far, and It features two media- government Interactions 
different from the relations between the US media and the respective administration. It 
therefore alms at Identifying the existence of elements that the specific example 
embodies and that permit or prohibit a potential media Impact on the policies of the two 
countries. And most Important, it Is essential to Identify a) whether the Greek - Turkish 
case reproduces the same conditions that permit - or prevent - media effects as In the 
cases the existing literature features, b) whether It Invokes new circumstances on which 
the media influence decision outcomes and If so c) whether these new circumstances 
are characteristic solely of the Greek - Turkish conflict or can apply to other cases as 
well. 
Secondly, the existing literature suggests that media effects depend on conditions 
related to official policies and governmental decisiveness. The CNN Effect debate 
recognises policy uncertainty as a pre-requisite for media effects to take place; while In 
situations of conflict Hallin (1986) and Wolfsfeld (1997) rule out any media Influence In 
circumstances of elite consensus and governmental agreement on a single political 
frame, with regard to the conflict at hand. The example of the Greek-Turkish conflict will 
be Investigated In two Individual crises that occurred within a span of nine years and 
offer two diverse policy contexts within which the respective media operated. The two 
crises can therefore provide scope for the study of the media within policy variations In 
the same two countries. These variations will allow for comparlsons that may offer a 
more accurate Identification of whether specific policy conditions are required for media 
effects to occur and if so, what the nature of these conditions Is. Moreover, the CAses 
would also reflect the changes and developments that occurred In the media. 
government relations In Greece and Turkey within those nine years. A possible 
correlation of different media systems with different media effects will also contribute In 
identifying whether a media Impact can only take within specified contextual conditions 
or not. 
Thirdly, the media's Influence on the making of foreign policy has been largely explored 
and demonstrated through Interviewing foreign policy officials, while In relatively few 
cases has the foreign policy process been Investigated closely with the media content 
The thesis seeks to identify the media's potential to produce effects on decision 
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outcomes through an examination of their content and particularly the frames they 
employ In pursuit of their self-interests and motivations. 
Hence, In relation to the existing literature and In response to the limitations mentioned 
here, the present thesis firstly seeks to offer a better understanding of the complexities 
embodied In the media- politicians Interaction, In the domain of foreign policy. Secondly, 
It seeks to explore and demonstrate the media's profile as an actor that operates based 
on own motivations and self-interests and becomes Integrated In the decision-making 
processes Independent of contextual parameters. These are the two main objectives 
that will be tackled with the development of a new theoretical framework that locates the 
media In the domain of foreign policy and particularly In situaVons of conflict as a 
strategic actor. Within this framework, the thesis sets new hypotheses that will guide the 
Investigation. 
Theoretical objectives and questions 
The Inquiry of the thesis Is primarily a theoretical one and Its contribution lies In providing 
a detailed and as rigorous as possible an explanation of the media-government 
interaction. The thesis seeks to develop a new media-government interaction theoretical 
model that offers Insight Into the complexities embodied In this Interaction and highlights 
some new dimensions of the media's potential to Influence decision outcomes. The 
thesis employs the paradigm of the Greek - Turkish conflict as a case study that serves 
Illustration purposes and functions as a foundation for the application and evaluation of 
the theory. 
A more detailed and thorough analysis of the media-government Interaction In the area 
of foreign policy Is attained firstly by locating and examining the media In a rigorous 
political context of decision-making. Such a context can be Introduced with the process 
of bargaining and negotiations In conflict situations. Precisely, It Is the process of 
bargaining that offers a new ground for the examination of media roles and the 
Investigation of their effects on political outcomes. With the exchange of Information 
being a vital process of bargaining situations, the media's role as sources of informavon 
automatically acquires a new dimension. Lockhart describes the root of bargaining as a 
sedes of three processes: Information Interpretation, decision-making among constraints 
and search for a satisfactory strategy (1979: 86). These processes can ultimately set the 
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basis for the development of a rigorous and consistent theoretical framework that will 
bring out different aspects of the media roles and will highlight what I describe In this 
thesis as a 'strategic' Impact In the conduct of foreign policy. The assumption here Is that 
the media cannot only supply Information to the Involved parties, but they can also frame 
it In ways that reduce or Increase uncertainty, modify belief systems and even 
manipulate Information. 
The 'novelty' of such a framework and the Idea of the strategic Impact lies In the 
'borrowing' of a theory rooted traditionally In Economics, namely Rational Choice and 
Game Theory. Game theory In particular, has been selected for providing an analytical 
tool for the investigation of Interactions among players and Is therefore expected to offer 
a thorough explanation of the Interaction between the media and the government. The 
employment of the theory aims at overcoming the existing gap with regards to the 
media's power to affect decisions and political outcomes. It does so by exploring their 
behaviour as a domestic constituent that Interacts with other 'players' and behaves 
according to own motivations and Interests, and particularly by placing the media In the 
decislon-making process and In a strategic Interaction with the government In which both 
actors are after the maximisation of their own profit. 
The model focuses on media and politicians' decisions as the outcomes of strategic 
planning and of their desire to maximise their benefit. The objective Is to define a) the 
extent to which the media frame situations according to profit maximisation and more 
Importantly, b) the way In which this affects the government, which also alms to 
maximise its own payoff. Approaching the media-goverriment Interaction as one that 
evolves around profit-maxlmlsation helps In Identifying points at which the decisions of 
one player may affect the payoff of the other, and In this context the media's Impact on 
the government's decisions could be hidden In a subtle, unseen Influence that a decision 
made by the media can have on the government's payoff. Therefore, through this 
Interaction, the aim Is to Investigate a) If and to what extent the government's decisions 
can be associated with and affected by the media frames, b) If and to what extent It Is 
sensible to expect that the government will ultimately respond to the media by adjusting 
Its decisions to their frames and c) if and to what extent the model Itself provides a 
realistic explanation of the media's role and Influence on decislon-making processes. 
Consequently, the model should be able to demonstrate whether the media can be 
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perceived as strategic actors In theory and whether the game-theoretic approach can 
explain the media-government Interaction In a realistic manner. 
Once the above theoretical questions are answered, a profile of the media as an actor In 
decision-making processes will be created, addressing their power to Involve In and 
affect political decision-making processes. This profile Is completed with two 
complementary theories, framing theory and prospect theory. The two theories are 
associated with the power embedded In the media content to affect policy decisions, 
which as mentioned earlier, has not received much attention so far. The assumption 
made here Is that the media's strategic role and Impact on the making of foreign policy Is 
largely a resultant of their ability to convey news and Information through specific 
frames, which journalists define according to their own motivations, and a resultant of 
the Implications that such frames have on the perceptions of Individuals about a given 
situation, Le. an International conflict. 
The power the media's content can enclose Is therefore examined through the theory of 
frames, focusing on the media's control over a process of selection that concerns not 
just the stories that become news but also the aspects of the story that journalists 
choose to elevate In salience. This power Is associated with the Implications that the 
process of framing Information In general may have on the perception of the receiver 
about a given situation, particularly In terms of decision-making processes. The thesis 
demonstrates how similar Implications can stem from media frames as well, by linking 
the process of media framing with the psychological aspect of framing and Its Impact on 
perceptions and decision-making. For this purpose, the thesis Introduces prospect 
theory In an effort to Identify the stages In the decision-making process In which media 
frames could transform into sources of Influence on Individuals. The objective Is to 
identify a mechanism of media Influence on perceptions of risk In particular and how this 
can cause decision changes. The main Idea Is to understand a) the extent to which the 
selection of frames In the shaping and crafting of news relates to an alleged media 
power to Influence perceptions and b) the Impact that media content Is likely to have 
particularly on the perceptions of the public. which comprises a key component In the 
process through which the media may affect politicians. Although this Is not the first time 
that the media-audience relationship has been tackled, here the objective Is to provide a 
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cause-effect relationship that is supported by a valid theoretical framework, provided by 
prospect theory. 
A logical question to follow is concerned with the way in which governments also 
perceive the media frames and the extent to which frames could equally influence their 
perception and their policy decisions. If prospect theory can help justify the impact of 
media framing on individuals' perception of a given political situation, would that 
automatically justify an equally decisive impact on politician's perception as well? The 
thesis suggests that media frames do not have to alter officials' perceptions to influence 
their decisions. Their effect on audiences alone provides a powerful component for the 
development of a theoretical model that highlights the power inherent in the media's 
content. The cause-effect relationship of media frames and recipients of these frames 
will then be located in the game-theoretic model that will provide a clear and accurate 
view of the government's understanding of and reaction to the media content. The 
game-theoretic approach will help conduct an analysis that does not simply investigate 
the reaction of governments to frames but also their conception of frames as part of a 
multifaceted media behaviour shaped by their motivations and interests and of course by 
their interaction with the audience as well. As a result of the above, the model will define 
the role of the media as a strategic actor and the process through which the interactions 
that develop among the different components of this model can bring about media 
effects and policy changes. 
The validity of the model will be tested empirically with its application on the press 
coverage of the two Greek-Turkish territorial crises and the investigation of the media- 
government interaction through the prism of the respective countries and crises. The two 
crises represent suitable bargaining examples, ideal for decision-making analysis since 
they offer scope for investigation and evaluation of decisions with reference to the 
players' stakes, expected gains and risks. They are therefore expected to provide an apt 
case for the investigation of the relevance of the media coverage in the governmental 
decisions, based on the hypotheses developed in the theoretical chapters. 
This empirical material, which consists of the game-theoretic analysis of the two crises 
and the content analysis of the press coverage, is put together and analysed through a 
correlation between the media framing the crises received and the moves and decisions 
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the two governments made. The objective is to identify whether the two elements are 
interconnected in a way that corresponds to the media-government interaction described 
in the theoretical part. On the basis of this empirical data, the thesis interprets the 
media-politicians' interaction developed in the two crises based on the game-theoretic 
framework. It also addresses the media's power to affect decision-making in a strategic 
manner and the degree in which the game- theoretic model represents a realistic 
approach to the media's role in foreign policy and conflict situations. As the findings 
suggest, the game theoretic approach sheds light on the dimensions of the media's 
action as purposeful players and on the subtle effect this action has on their interaction 
with the government. Their framing procedure is systematically analysed as part of the 
decision-making process bringing to light their power to impose a domestic, or else, 
audience cost on the government by forcing them into strategically 'irrational' decisions. 
The approach ultimately demonstrates their capacity to influence not just the policy 
process but the policy outcomes as well. 
Overview of the thesis 
The discussion over the media-foreign policy relationship begins with a literature review 
of existing theories and debates with regard to the media's role in the making of foreign 
Policy. Chapter one presents a model of the media-politicians relationship, which reflects 
a systematisation of the various elements that compose and explain the function of this 
relationship. The relationship is discussed basically in the context of domestic politics; 
and of foreign policy but from a rather general standpoint at first. The chapter continues 
With examining specific areas of foreign policy in order to identify the degree in which the 
model of the media-politicians relationship is being reproduced. The main objective of 
the chapter is to provide a theoretical background of the media's role in the domain of 
foreign policy, which locates the thesis within a broader framework of the literature. It 
also identifies the deficiencies in the existing theories, with regard to the media's impact 
on the making of foreign policy that the thesis will seek to overcome. 
Chapter two introduces a more specific discussion of the media's roles, focusing 
particularly on their role as a political actor. The example of the political institution serves 
in Providing one of the most detailed descriptions of the media's active role in the 
Policyrnaking process. The discussion draws upon the degree of media independence 
from the state and the impact it has on the selection and crafting of news stories, as an 
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indicator of the media's power to define what news is and the implications of this process 
on political decision-making. It is particularly this process of media selectivity the chapter 
tackles and introduces the theory of frames as a more efficient way to explain the 
shaping of news frames and their implications on the recipient. Framing theory is 
explained in relation to prospect theory, which emphasises the implications of frames 
particularly on decision-making processes. 
Prospect theory is discussed mainly within the context of politics and international 
relations and with reference to historical examples that have demonstrated the crucial 
role of framing in decision-making processes. By connecting these two approaches, the 
chapter aims to offer a methodical interpretation of the impact that frames can exert on 
recipients, especially during processes of decision-making. The concept of public 
opinion is also introduced as a linking point between media frames and decision-makers 
that helps in creating a cause-effect relationship between the media and politicians. The 
chapter reflects the first stage in the formulation of the wider theoretical model of the 
strategic media-government interaction that is completed in chapter three. 
Chapter three introduces the leading theories in this thesis, Rational Choice and Game 
Theory, and offers a justification for the selection of the specific theories stressing the 
advantages for the investigation of the media-government interaction within the context 
of a conflict situation. It proceeds with explaining the function of political interactions, Le. 
conflicts, as games and employs the example of the Cuban Missiles Crisis as a 
demonstration of the political game. One of the chapter's purposes is to introduce the 
concepts, terminology and procedures that will be employed in the development of the 
game-theoretic model and the investigation of the Greek-Turkish conflict. The 
introduction of the concept of games in multiple arenas and the merging with the 
concepts discussed in chapter two leads to the formulation of a 'nested game' that 
represents the media-government interaction and embodies the media's strategic role 
and impact in decision - making processes. 
Chapter four continues with the analysis of the research design and the methodology the 
thesis will employ for the investigation of the Greek-Turkish conflict. Having already 
discussed and demonstrated the theoretical part in chapters two and three, chapter four 
introduces the method of case study as an instrument for combining and applying the 
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theory to the empirical cases as well as the process through which research questions 
are formed and answered and hypotheses are proved or disproved. 
Following the description of the research design and methodology, chapter five 
introduces the historical background of the Greek-Turkish conflict. The chapter describes 
the political, social and cultural context within which the two territorial crises were 
escalated and resolved; as well as the position that the media hold in the Greek and 
Turkish socio-political environment, focusing on the relationship that journalists and 
government share in the two countries. It also presents a chronology of the events and 
the coverage they attracted by the Greek- Turkish press. Chapter five provides the 
information that shapes the foundation on which the game-theoretic analysis of the 
crises and the press coverage will be built and prepares the ground for the strategic 
analysis of the media-government relationship in the two Greek-Turkish crises. Chapter 
six reflects an attempt to put the theory into practice and demonstrates how the strategic 
media role becomes a reality, through the press coverage of the Greek-Turkish conflict. 
Chapter six is followed by a discussion and final remarks on the strategic nature of the 
media-government relationship and the media's power to shape official decisions in the 
making of foreign policy. The thesis concludes emphasising the contribution of this 
research in the understanding of the relationship between media and the government 
and the media's strategic input in the making of foreign policy. 
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I Media - Government Relationships and the Reporting of 
Foreign Policy 
1.1 Introduction 
'The making of foreign policy begins with the gathering and interpreting of information 
about international affairs - with the media having an obvious function' (Cohen, 1986: 9). 
The statement of Yoel Cohen indicates the indispensable role of information and 
communication in the shaping of foreign policy that would ultimately render the media's 
function equally vital. The objective of the present chapter is to provide a critical 
discussion of the dominant theories and approaches of the media's function in the 
domain of foreign policy. This will assist in providing a clearer identification and 
understanding of the goals the thesis aims to achieve and the research gaps it aims to 
overcome. 
The reporting of politics and the influence it can exert on political outcomes can be 
understood as a resultant of a relationship the media develop with the government. The 
significance of the relationship lies in the exchange of information that occurs between 
the two sides and that serves their publicity interests, and in the 'competition' between 
media and politicians over the construction of news and the selection of the political 
problems and issues to be promoted publicly (Wolfsfeld, 1997). Within this context, the 
media's power to influence the political process depends on the government's 
dependency on the media for the achievement of publicity. It is therefore understandable 
that the discussion of the media's function in foreign policy in the literature unravels 
within the framework of the media's interaction with officials, which ultimately defines the 
degree of influence the media exert on the shaping of foreign policy. Within this 
framework, the media's role is examined in terms of its employment and use as a 
Political instrument; in terms of it's increasing power due to the constant development of 
communications technologies and through its relation to and impact on the public's 
perception of foreign affairs. The different approaches indicate the development of 
Competing hypotheses with regard to the media's impact on the foreign policy process 
and create scope for further investigation. 
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The present chapter is organised in two parts. The first part presents the three models 
available in the literature with regard to the nature of the relationship between the media 
and the government. The discussion serves in providing an introduction of the 
constituents that tie the media with politicians in the reporting of politics and which help 
in the Understanding of the development of the media's function in the political process. 
It will describe the media-politicians relationship manifested as a symbiotic, an 
adversarial and a dynamic one, explain their advantages and weaknesses and reach the 
conclusion that to conceptualise the media-politicians relationship as a complex one that 
involves cooperation and conflict appears to be the most realistic approach. 
Aspects of this relationship will then be reflected in the second part and the discussion of 
the media's role in foreign policy putting together the media's profile as a player in the 
shaping of foreign policy. The discussion will start off with some general theories of the 
construction of foreign news as an outcome of the media's interaction with politicians 
and the way in which this interaction defines the media's role as a participant in the 
making of foreign policy. The studies of Bernard Cohen and Robert Berry of the 
gathering and reporting of foreign news provide in this case some general observations 
about the media's interaction with officials in the conduct of foreign policy; while Patrick 
O'Heffernan provides a more systematic model of this interaction and brings in the 
media's own interests and motivations as a fundamental factor in their relationship with 
officials and in the construction and dissemination of news. The relationship between the 
media and politicians is here a starting point to present the way it develops in the area of 
foreign policy. It is through this relationship that the media's influence on foreign policy 
emerges. 
The discussion will proceed with more specific examples and aspects of foreign policy In 
which the media's impact has been studied. Section 1.3.2 presents the concept of media 
diplomacy highlighting the media's role as a diplomatic instrument and its contribution to 
the conduct of diplomacy. Particular attention is paid to the role of advanced 
communication technologies and the drastic changes they have brought in foreign policy 
decision-making. In section 1.3.3 the discussion draws upon the study of the media 
particularly in conflict situations as another aspect of the diplomatic process. The section 
explains the media's potential to produce policy changes, defined within their 
relationship with the government and in relation to the degree of political control in the 
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hands of politicians during a crisis. The last section presents the media coverage of 
humanitarian crises as a more exclusive form of conflict situations. The section 
introduces the CNN Effect debate and underlines the significant changes brought about 
by real-time coverage in the reporting of crises, as well as the media's power to cause 
policy changes under the pressure imposed on politicians through the exposure of the 
public to humanitarian crises. The chapter will close with an attempt to identify the 
deficiencies of the discussed approaches, which the thesis will seek to overcome. 
1.2 Media and Politicians 
The relationship between the media and politicians becomes important for the reason 
that it reflects a media-source balance that helps conceptualise the role of the media in 
the process of policy formation and their impact on political outcomes. In this section, I 
will present three available models of the media-politicians interaction: the adversary 
model, the exchange or symbiosis model and the dynamic relationship model. The third 
model will be discussed with reference to Blumler & Gurevitch's (1995) expanded 
framework. The processes, objectives and interactions encompassed in the relationship 
as reflected in these models determine the various dimensions of the media's role in the 
Political process and more specifically in the making of foreign policy. 
The adversarial relationship between politicians and journalists is rooted in the opposing 
objectives the two parties pursue within the political communication realm. On the one 
hand, politicians aim at maximising their voters and would therefore want to influence the 
information disseminated by the media in order to promote desirable situations and 
definitions. On the other hand, journalists aim at maximising their audience by pursuing 
newsworthy stories that attract the public's attention. As Doris Graber notes, 'This often 
means prying into conflict, controversy or ordinary wheeling and dealing -matters that 
government officials would like to keep quiet' (2002: 272). Within this framework, the 
media acquire the role of the watchdog protecting the public from governmental 
manipulation and keeping politicians accountable. However, as Blumler and Gurevitch 
argue, the adversarial model is narrow and fails to provide a normative guide to 
journalists' behaviour towards their sources. It actually appears to include no regulations 
for instances about the access rights of government spokespersons and critics or 
willingness to offer praise where it is appropriate. It also fails to acknowledge the amount 
Of cooperation between the media and the government. Moreover, given that to produce 
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political messages a collaborative interaction is essential, it is impossible for mutually 
adversarial positions to maintain (1995: 28-29). 
The exchange model appears to overcome the above weaknesses focusing on precisely 
that interdependence, which is built upon the common interests of journalists and 
politicians in the construction of the news and the advantage that each side expects to 
gain through the cooperation with the other. The model draws upon the mutual benefits 
the two sides gain from political reporting. Also, as Blumler and Gurevitch state, 'the 
model seems more sensitive to the fluid nuances of the political advocate-professional 
communicator relationship' (1995: 30). It manages to explain the variations in the degree 
of cooperation between the two sides, which increases or declines according to the 
respective benefits inherent. However, for Blumler and Gurevitch, the exchange model 
suffers from weaknesses as well since it appears to overstress the personal and informal 
relationship between media and politicians neglecting the regularities and structure it 
embodies and therefore rendering the relationship unpredictable. At the same time, it 
fails to mention the rules, which define what is acceptable and what is not in this 
exchange relationship (1995: 30-31). 
The assertion takes us to the third model that describes the media-politicians 
relationship as a dynamic one. This model has been discussed by Dan Berkowitz 
(1992), who suggests that role theory can provide a more accurate approach of the 
relationship. The focal point in this case is a common culture the two parties share, 
formed basically by their social environment. On the one hand, the roles of the media 
are largely defined by forces, such as the norms of the journalistic profession or the 
media organisation (1992: 93). On the other hand policyrnakers too are influenced by 
Political parties they belong to, or by ideological functions (1992: 94), based on which 
they develop respective roles. With defending the role theory, Berkowitz does not negate 
the cooperative or adversarial nature of the media-politicians relationship. He suggests a 
rather dynamic relationship that can be both cooperative and adversarial always 
depending on specific conditions of the interaction. 
Berkowitz's suggestion is more explicitly explained through Blumler and Gurevitch's 
$expanded framework' (1995). The authors suggest an interaction between two sets of 
mutually dependent actors that pursue opposing, yet overlapping objectives. Both sides 
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aim at realising certain objectives vis-b-vis the audience, for which a certain degree of 
cooperation and adaptation to each other's ways is required, without excluding some 
tension as well. The relationship of the two parties is also role regulated. On the one 
hand journalists gather and report news through specified daily routines. On the other 
hand, politicians operate within a government or department of state representing its 
interests and responding to the expectations of colleagues. At the same time, both 
actors are expected to behave according to certain roles towards each other and their 
behaviour is shaped by expectations of how each will behave towards the other. A vital 
consequence is that the authodty of these roles not only does define the interaction and 
the degree of exchange between the two parties, but it also renders the relationship 
predictable. 
This ultimately gives rise to a shared culture that defines how the two parties should 
behave towards each other. This culture may include criteria of objectivity and fairness in 
the coverage of politicians and political parties, as well as a number of news values that 
define what issues should be treated as newsworthy. It is also important to note that a 
shared culture often emerges through a process in which the two sides try to influence 
one another for their own benefit and also through controversies that might rise between 
the two actors. 
The grounds of this shared culture are also open to conflicting interpretations that may 
give rise to agenda setting questions regarding who should determine which definition of 
Political problems the public should think about; and responsibility questions with regard 
to the failure of political communication. ' Conflicting interpretations entail potential 
disruption that is controlled by mechanisms of conflict management. These mechanisms 
may include hierarchically structured procedures for dealing with complaints about the 
Violation of rules, forums for reviewing existing rules or even the establishment of 
institutions that would socialise the members of one party to the needs of the other 
(Blumler & Gurevitch 1995: 32-42). 
1 'The process of political communication includes two sets of institutions- political and media 
organizations- which are involved in the course of message preparation in much 'horizontal' 
interaction with each other, while on a 'vertical, axis, they are separately and jointly engaged in 
disseminating and processing information and ideas to and from the mass citizenry' Blumler & Gurevitch, (1995: 12). 
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The dynamic relationship, and more specifically the expanded framework represent the 
most detailed and explicit approach to the medla-politicians Interaction. It encompasses 
the principle Ideas of the exchange and adversarial model and draws upon the various 
Interconnected constituents that tie the media with their sources In the reporting of 
politics. More precisely, the expanded framework reflects a media-government 
Interaction that Involves cooperation, conflict, mutual exploitation and mutual Influence 
between the two actors. More Importantly, It Is a relationship that Is constantly evolving 
and fluctuating according to a given situation, which creates scope for further 
Investigation and Identification of its Implications In the wider political environment and 
political decision-making processes Including the domain of foreign affairs. The media's 
role In the conduct of foreign policy has been studied within a similar framework and the 
existing theories represent aspects of this dynamic relationship between media and 
politicians. The studies discussed In the following sections offer an overview of the 
media's function In the making of foreign policy that demonstrates the various 
dimensions of the media-politicians Interaction as described above. The studies are 
organised in terms of different foreign policy sections with each section providing a 
different viewpoint of this relationship. 
1.3 Media and Foreign Policy 
1.3.1 The Media. Politicians' Interaction In the domain of foreign policy 
In this first section It is Important to obtain an understanding of how the dynamic 
relationship between media and politicians as described above. manifests Itself In the 
area of foreign policy. At this stage one might query whether and to what extent the 
media-politicians relationship develops differently In the domain of foreign policy than In 
the domain of domestic affairs. The specific question has been tackled by Nicholas Berry 
(1990), who emphasises the difficulties In accessing Information sources and the limited 
knowiedge of journalists about particular International events. This results In the greater 
dependency of journalists on what officials do and say and therefore In a limited effect of 
the media on the making of foreign policy. On this respect, Berrys argument contradicts 
the Idea of the dynamic relationship described above and highlights the governmental 
use of the media for Its own purposes. His observation lies In the press' Inability to 
Interpret and evaluate foreign policy Initiatives In their eady stages as It focuses mainly 
on getting the story and turning It Into news. He claims that contrary to the reporting of 
domestic politics, In the coverage of foreign policy the press' task Is to Inform the public 
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and it becomes critical only when the foreign policy Is at the stage when the outcome Is 
known and Is a failure. This Is also the only case when the administration will seek to 
manage the news In an attempt to play down the loss and reduce the domestic cost 
(1990: xiii). 
In order to support his hypothesis, Berry conducted a research of the American press 
coverage of the US policy actions In Vietnam, Cambodia, and Lebanon, and It Is through 
a comparative analysis with Linksy's (1986) findings of the press coverage of domestic 
policy Issues that he demonstrates the differences In the reporting of domestic and 
foreign affairs, and through which he highlights the media's dependency on officials. He 
calls the policymaking process a 'formulation stage' and In that media Influences are 
diminished as the reporting remains In line with the official policy. Conversely, In what he 
describes as the 'outcome stage' reporters are In the position to evaluate the success or 
failure of policies abroad, they can produce more in depth analysis and provide opinions 
from opposition sources that could generate more critical and hostile coverage (1990: 
140). 
Berry's main argument lies In the fact that the press will become critical and question 
policies that appear uncertain because - within the role relationships It develops with the 
government - It expects some coherence from the administration In order to report 
foreign affairs. He cites the example of the media coverage of the Vietnam War stressing 
that when journalists reported on the failing US policy they did not aim at undermining 
the government's power or the soldiers' moral. The reporting was merely reflecting the 
divided officials and uncertain policies (1990: xiv-xv). He ultimately recognises a limited 
Impact of the media In the foreign pollcymaking process as In all Instances the press will 
await and accept the presidential decision. Its Independent role In the foreign 
policymaking process Is therefore minimal. 
Berrys argument is however contradicted by one of the early and pioneering studies In 
the literature of the media and foreign policy that 13 Bernard Cohen's 'The Press and 
Foreign PolW. Cohen draws upon a so-called 'symbiosis' between the media and their 
sources, a term that Is primarily in line with the exch3nge model described In the 
previous section, and he addresses the question about 'the consequences for the 
foreign policy making environment, of the way the press defines and performs Its job and 
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the way that its output Is assimilated by the participants In the process' (Cohen, 1993: 4). 
The study tackles the Issue of the role the media play In foreign policymaking and 
administration and Identifies three media roles within the framework of their symbiosis 
with politicians: the observer, the participant and the catalyst. The argument Cohen 
makes Is that the three roles define what the press does In the foreign policy-making 
process and help understand the Implications of a press behaviour that the press Is often 
unaware of (1993: 5). 
This becomes most obvious In the explanation of the press' Interaction with 
policymakers that develops on a give and take basis and renders the press a participant 
In the foreign policymaklng process. Cohen describes the officials' contributions to the 
press through processes such as 'handouts' and formal statements, Informal channels 
that keep the reporters Informed about what Is happening In crucial areas or even 
feeding Information to newspapers about particular Issues. He recognises that the 
Incentive behind such contributions lies In achieving policy and personal promotion or 
even In testing the reaction to certain policy suggestions. However, In this discourse 
between officials and correspondents, 'the Initiative often rests with the reporter, the 
official has to make the best of his opportunities to achieve the *mbe of Interests that 
seems reasonable to him' (1993: 206). This In combination with the Information 
Interpretation and analysis that officials can extract from the press turns the press Into 
more than an observer In the foreign policymaking process. As Cohen puts It drawing 
on the press' usefulness to foreign officials, it Is also a political actor of tremendous 
consequence (1993: 268). 
Cohen's analysis of the press' role In the foreign policymaking process Is a rigorous one 
that addresses the determinants that shape the foreign policy coverage and the 
mechanisms through which this coverage Is used by pollcymakers and ultimately has an 
impact on the processes of policymaking. However, he atttibUtC3 the media's role as 
a actors' mainly to their helpful cooperative role In a symbiosis with officials that looks 
reasonable given the minimal public Interest In foreign policy at that Ume (O'Haffeman, 
1991: 81); but this Is an Idea that refers to a rather Instrumental role and provides no 
compelling understanding of the media's active participation In the foreign policy 
process. 
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The studies of Cohen and Berry proceed with analysis of the media's role In the process 
of foreign policymaking In terms of a media-govemment Interaction that draws upon the 
efforts made by both actors to do their jobs. However, they represent two relatively 
contradictory and Incoherent approaches to the media's role and Impact on the process 
of foreign policy. On one hand, contrary to Cohen's argument about an actor of 
tremendous consequence, Berry does not recognise a media Impact on the process of 
foreign policy. At the same time, even If Cohen himself refers to the media's role as a 
political actor, he does not provide sufficient evidence of an active and Independent 
media role. In other words, both studies draw upon a media. politicians Interaction that 
entails a certain degree of media dependency on the government and a rather limited 
Impact on the making of foreign policy. 
A third study that offers a systematic approach of the Interaction between media and 
politicians In the domain of foreign policy Is Patrick 0' Heffernan's Insider model of the 
media's role in American foreign policy (1991). O'Heffernan provides a model of the 
media-government relationship focusing on the roles the media play In the shaping of 
foreign policy as an outcome of this relationship. Particular emphasis Is placed on the 
media's role and impact on the process of foreign policy as resultants of the media's own 
Objectives and motivations. His theoretical framework manages to capture the media's 
Integration In policy formation and their relationship with officials, as one that goes 
beyond the symbiotic, exchange or adversarial models and develops on the same lines 
as the expanded framework described in the previous section. 
O'Heffernan's conception of the media. government relationship In the domain of foreign 
policy is one of co-evolution. This derives from the co-development of the worldwide US 
foreign policy and the global media Industry that requires understanding the effect of 
, various complex transactions and that Incorporates a mutual exploitation between the 
two sides. What O'Heffernan alms at is demonstrating how It Is not just the media that 
are part of the policy process but also the government has become part of the media 
process (1991: 82). 
According to the Insider model, the media operate Inside the foreign policy process as a 
tool of the Involved governmental players and they operate outside, as part of the 
environment, shaping policy. O'Heffernan refers to Graham Allison's study of foreign 
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policy process, 'Essence of Decision' and particularly to Allison's observation of the 
media acting as an observer with what O'Heffeman calls a 'diffused' Input (199 1: 96). He 
therefore develops his model In contrast to Allison's theory and recognises the media's 
role both as an Input to the shaping of foreign policy and an output that Influences 
decision-makIng from the outside and according to their own Interests. 
The model Is specified as follows: as an Input, the media Influence the making of foreign 
policy through processes such as supplying Information. defining acceptable 
performance, drawing attention to parVcular goals and setting the pace and time for 
decision-making (1991: 98-99). In this case, the media operate as sources of Information 
and lend themselves to the various players' uses. Therefore, their Impact Is mostly the 
outcome of the Intentions of policy makers. As an output. some of the techniques the 
media operation Includes are press conferences, leaks, background meeUngs, press 
briefing books etc. Contrary to their role as Input, In this case media coverage is not 
necessarily the result of the policy makers' Intentions. 'Media output by government 
requires the cooperation of a separate set of Independent and powerful enbtles- 
newspapers, networks and wire services' (1991: 102). The significance of the role of the 
media as outside players lies In the insertion of their own bias In the final output which 
renders the media not just a neutral communication channel. O'Heffernan Identifies their 
Influence on the foreign policy process as an outside one because It results from own 
motivations and Is Independent of the policies at hand. Most Important. these 
motivations define the frames through which they present an Issue; and given that such 
frames define the way In which the public perceives the Issue as well, they ultimately 
influence policy making by defining the Issues that have to be dealt with by 
governmental players. 
The Insiders' model Integrates the media In the foreign policy process and reflects their 
Interrelation with politicians In a more effective way. Contrary to Barry and Cohen's 
observations, It appears to Identify an Influence of the media on the foreign policy 
process; and it does so as an outcome not just of their employment as political tools but 
of their own incentives and Interests as well. The Insiders' model encompasses aspects 
of Blumler and Gurevitch's expanded framework In the foreign policy domain as It 
emphas1ses the mutual exploitation and Influences between the two actors as well as the 
constantly evolving Interaction between media and politicians. It also provides a 
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demonstration of more strategic aspects In the media-politicians Interrelation and 
evidence that officials do take the media Into consideration as an Information Input in 
their process of decision-making. It could be described as a more accurate and complete 
representation of the media-politicians' Interaction In the foreign policy domain. when 
compared to Berry and Cohen's concepts. These three studies demonstrate an effort to 
Identify the media's position In the making of foreign policy In relation to their relationship 
with the government. The following sections will discuss some of the key findings In the 
literature, and how the study of the media In the different areas of foreign policy 
develops within this framework of media-politicians Interaction. 
1.3.2 Media, Diplomacy and International negotiations 
A considerable body of the literature Is concerned with the media's role in the conduct of 
diplomacy and International negotiations. The study of the media within the context of 
diplomacy focuses a) on the Instrumental employment of the media by policyrnakers for 
the achievement of diplomatic goals, leading to what has been described as media 
diplomacy (Gilboa, 2002; Cohen, 1986), and b) on the Impact that media and 
communication technologies have on the way foreign policy Is shaped. The present 
section will present an overview of the observations made in the literature with regard to 
the development of the media's role as a diplomatic Instrument and its Impact on the 
conduct of diplomacy and international negotiations. 
The Media and the conduct of Diplomacy 
The term 'diplomat' refers to foreign policy officers and other agencies concerned with 
foreign policy (Davison, 1974: 175). As Suzanne Keller states, 'diplomats It Is generally 
agreed, must do at least three things, 1) represent their countries In foreign countries, 2) 
Inform their home offices about trends and conditions In countries to which they are 
assigned; and 3) negotiate International agreements' (1956: 176-177). These are three 
diplomatic missions that depend greatly on communication and the transmission of 
messages, Impressions and Interpretations from one party to the other. The formulation 
here Is that In order to accomplish their missions and gain access to the political 
situation of a country, diplomats often use the Information obtained from the local media. 
One of the early studies on media roles In the conduct of diplomacy and International 
negotiations was carried out by Philips Davison (1974). In his article 'News Media and 
International Negotiation' he discusses the contribution that the press can make to 
International agreement, after having conducted a series of Interviews with diplomats 
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and journalists In Washington, New York and Western Europe. Davison argues that the 
fact that negotiations In democratic countries are semi-public makes it hard to maintain a 
negative hypothesis about the media's role In such processes (1974: 178). Among the 
various ways In which the news media can facilitate the diplomatic process. Davison 
recognises how the media can offer a basis for negotiation among states by being 
employed by the government to find out whether other governments are Interested in 
negotiating as well as by fostering Informal negotiations (1974: 179). He also Identifies 
the media's positive role In keeping agencies within a single government Informed of 
each other's thinking and ensuring that diplomats are Informed about the posit. ions of 
their governments; as well as their function as a linkage between negotiators and the 
public and a communication channel for the exchange of diplomatic messages between 
states (1974: 181-184). 
Davison does not overlook the negative implications that publicity and the mass media 
can cause to negotiations processes. He recognises that publicity might harm the 
diplomat's public Image and leaks can similarly damage the trust that Is essential for 
reaching an agreement. However, he does emphasise the contribution of the media In 
the conduct of successful negotiations, which Is also verified given the degree of 
dependency of foreign policymakers on the news media. He concludes by stating that 
the way for diplomats to minimise the dysfunctions of the publicity the media provide. Is 
by carefully weighing the positive and negative effects of exposing negotiations In 
progress and by finding the right balance in the degree of publicity required (1974: 190). 
Later studies on the media's diplomatic funcUons have elaborated on the main media 
roles described In Davison's article. In his book 'Media Diplomacy Yoel Cohen 
Investigates the role of the British media In the formation of foreign policy and describes 
the media and diplomacy as two different types of communication, which however 
overlap at certain points. Cohen recognises that this overlap Is partial and Identifies 
Issues such as crises, war and peace as the ones that both journalists and diplomats 
share. He also distinguishes media diplomacy from public diplomacy clarifying that while 
the latter encompasses all public aspects of foreign policy - speeches. trips, public 
appearances - the former Includes aspects of diplomacy that are not associated with the 
public, such as governmental use of the media for the exchange of signals (11986: 7). 
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Cohen explains the concept of media diplomacy through the development of different 
types of relationships between media and diplomacy. The media can become sources of 
Information to members of diplomatic missions abroad, while, particularly In situations of 
crisis, the media may even be the only available source. He describes how during the 
refugee disaster In East Bengal, Pakistan In 1971, the British High Commission in 
Calcutta relied upon the local press for their Information rather than sending any 
diplomats to the area (1986: 22). Other roles Include the media's function as channels 
of communication among policymakers and they can even be used to gain public 
support for policy as well. 
Cohen particularly examines the media's Impact on the shaping of foreign policy In 
relation to their Impact on their audiences - MP's, Interest groups and the wider public - 
and the extent to which governments are responsive to any pressure from them. In this 
case the media's Impact Is described as horizontal, connecting groups In a forum of 
discussion (1986: 66). On a vertical level, he Identifies the Parliament as the key means 
for the media to be Influential; It Is basically pressure from the government's supporters 
that can result to policy change (1986: 52). This Is an Indirect media Impact on the 
shaping of foreign policy, which Is more likely to be felt at the planning stage of a policy 
decision. 
'In considering which policy to adopt In a particular situation the likely reaction of the media will be 
taken Into account and It will be In the domestic Interest of the government not to decide on a 
policy which will produce a negative reaction' (11986: 64). 
In relation to the media's role as channels of communication. attention has also been 
drawn on their employment, or even manipulation. by officials for the leaking of 
Information, which can again result In Indirect Influence on foreign policy sh3ping. As an 
example, Seib refers to the advanced skills of President Nixon's National Security 
Adviser and Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, In using the media for such purposes. 
He describes how during his Middle East subtle diplomacy Kissinger would report the 
story from his plane, being the primary and even sole source of Information for the 
media. (1992: 85- 86). 
The media's contribution in the conduct of diplomacy has also been examined by Eytan 
Gilboa who defines media diplomacy as follows: 
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'It refers to uses of the media by leaders to express Interest in negotiation, to build Confidence 
and to mobilise public support for agreements, Media diplomacy 13 pursued through various 
routine and special media activities Including press conferences, Interviews and leaks. visit by heads of state and mediators In rival countries, and spectacular media events org3nised to usher in a new era'(2002b: 741). 
Gilboa refers to Kissinger as well to whom he attributes the Initiation of media diplomacy, 
In his effort to achieve an agreement between Israel, Egypt and Syria (2002a: 195). He 
describes how Kissinger developed an Intimate relationship with the American 
correspondents giving them Information 'mostly Intended to amplify his positions In the 
negotiations' (2002a: 195). The specific example serves In demonstrating the extent to 
which leaders use the media as a significant Instrument to advance negotiation with 
other states and strengthen their Influence over certain decisions. Gilboa refers to the 
media's employment for signalling purposes as well, especially when states are unsure 
how another state might react to proposals for negotiation or conflict resolution. and 
when no other adequate communication channel Is available (2002b: 741). 
In relation to the media's use by officials, Dyan and Katz explain how diplomats often 
Intend to exploit the publicity and drama offered to a certain Issue to gain public support 
and create a favourable climate for a given decision. Media events can prove particularly 
effective In such situations since live coverage of certain Issues can attract large 
audience attention. Such media events can often tdvlalise the role of ambassadors, 
break diplomatic deadlocks and create a climate conductive to negotiations (1992: 204- 
205). The Involvement of the media In the diplomatic process as described above, 
signifies a relationship with politicians that Includes elements of Interdependence and 
mutual exploitation. Of course, one might argue that It Is basically officials that employ 
the media for their own objectives. However, politicians also have to face new 
circumstances created by the media In the conduct of diplomacy. The following section 
describes the new reality the media have forced diplomats In, as a resultant of advanced 
communications technologies. 
The role of communications technologies In the diplomatic process 
The media's diplomatic function has been studied In relation to the advanced 
communication technologies that have led to the allocation of a more far- reaching role 
to the media In the conduct of diplomacy. Cohen Identifies the Importance of technology 
In this media role stating, 'portable cameras and satellites enable the viewer to watch an 
event as It is happening ... giving It an added dimension 
In the form of public pressure. 
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The new diplomacy has replaced the old diplomacy (1986: 6). At the same time, Gilboa 
(2002c) associates the Impact of media technologies with the emergence of a 'new 
diplomacy'. He claims that the new media diplomacy stems not just from the 
employment of the media as communication channels and the exposure of diplomatic 
processes, but also from the faster pace of diplomatic exchanges and the additional 
drama brought In by global television systems. The role of the development of mass 
communications and communication technologies Is obvious especially with regard to 
the public! s exposure to related news events. This observation Is further enhanced by 
the conceptuallsation of the media and global communications as what Gergen calls a 
I perceived constraint', that Is the belief of US officials that 'successful policies must first 
and foremost please the Great God of public opinion' (Gilboa, 2002c: 93). According to 
Gilboa, the development of global communication technologies have turned the media 
Into just a constraining actor In the sense that while global news coverage may disrupt 
the routine policy making process, politicians do not feel forced to follow a particular 
policy Implied by the media. Their Impact Is basically reflected In the high speed of 
transmitting Information (2002b: 736). 
The power inherent In the visual Images to move public opinion and through this, 
government policy as well, has been discussed by Entman too (2000: 23). He 
particularly Identifies the end of the Cold War as a departure point for the transformation 
In communications technologies and empowerment of the media, and also the 
emergence of a less trusting and more hostile public, that has enhanced the media's 
power on policy, In the name of 'public opinion' (2000: 22). On a similar basis, Nacos, 
Shapiro & Insernia refer to the'Vietnam Syndrome' or theCNN Effect' as examples that 
reflect the power inherent In the television Images and networks to 'Involve' In foreign 
policy decision-making; that Is mainly due to the Increased Impact on the public! $ views 
of certain problems and Issues, that Is then translated Into pressure exerted on officials 
(2000: 2). 
The contribution of communication technologies In diplomatic processes has been 
studied by Robert Kruz who describes how the Increased public availability of technology 
to acquire and disseminate Information has weakened the officials' ability to monopolise 
information (1991: 75). He refers particularly to the media's Impact In USA policy and 
focuses on the shift of the power balance between the President and the Congress on 
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foreign policy Issues. But, what Is significant In this case Is how such shifts result from 
the Increasing media power. The contribution of the media technologies lies also In the 
amount of time available to politicians to evaluate and reflect on certain Issues before a 
decision is made, and as Kurz claims, ultimately the media have altered the terms of 
policy debate. He refers to the Cuban Missiles Crisis as an example of a case where the 
absence of today's satellite communications would allow the President to control and 
manage the crisis before It was put In the public domain (1991: 76). 
The study of the media as diplomatic actors as a result of the power allocated to them 
Vith the arrival of advanced communication technologies has not been without criticism. 
Neuman argues the media technologies have not changed the power equation between 
media and politicians. They have rather transformed diplomacy by providing officials with 
new tools to employ for the achievement of their own objecOves. (Gilboa, 2002c: 104). 
As for the alleged pressure that the media can generate by exposing diplomatic 
processes to the public, Nacos, Shapiro and Insernia recognise the emergence of further 
complexities In the new world order, that Increase the degree of public opinion 
manipulation by the world leaders (Nacos, Shapiro, Insemla 2000: 3). On a similar b3SIS, 
Zaller and Chlu (2000) argue that, especIally In times of crisis, the media show a 
tendency to support government foreign policy, therefore acknowiedging difficulties In 
the media's effort to 'escape' the governmental news control and report critically. 
Referring to the American media, Zaller and Chlu suggest that despite their tendency to 
become more Independent of Congress and the President especially since the end of 
the Cold War, the media remain generally dependent on government officials (2000: 61). 
This Is an Inference the two scholars have drawn from a study of forty-two foreign policy 
cases. from the Soviet takeover of Poland In 1945 to the Kosovo conflict 1999. 
The study of the media In the conduct of diplomacy develops within the framework of the 
media-politiclans relationship, which In this case focuses on the mutual exploitation that 
prevails In this Interaction. Although It appears that the media are primarily used by 
governments to promote their goals. this form of exploitation provides journalists with 
Information that assists In the pursuit of their own objectives as well. while officials are 
also compelled to adapt to the speed that now communication technologies have added 
to diplomatic processes. There Is a degree of collaboration that serves the objecVves of 
both sides. Moreover, It becomes obvious from the present discussion that the media's 
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role In the diplomatic realm Involves regular references to the media's role In 
International negotiations during times of conflict, which offers the Incentive to look Into 
the media's role In situations of crisis more closely. 
1.3.3 Media and conflict 
A considerable part of the literature, which Investigates the media's function In diplomatic 
processes, focuses on conflict situations and International crises. Philip Seib (1992) has 
conducted a study of the media coverage of a number of International crises from the 
American-Spanish war In the close of the nineteenth century until the Persian Gulf War 
and the US intervention In Somalia where he examined the Interaction between the 
American government, the media and the public. Seib draws upon Issues of national 
security and the public's right to know In an attempt to explore and offer Insight Into the 
Incompatible jobs of policyrnakers and JOUM311SIS and the way they shape the media's 
role and degree of Influence on policy decisions. He recognises the fact that 'by 
revealing - or sometimes not revealing - what Is going on In distant places, joumalists 
help to shape public opinion which In turn helps to shape policyrnakers' behavioue, 
which explains the media being among those factors that affect foreign policy decisions 
(1992: 139). He concludes that the degree of this media Influence on American foreign 
policy depends on the competence of political leadership stressing that the more realistic 
and focused an administration's foreign Policy 13, the more minimised the media's Impact 
Is as well. On the contrary, a tenuous foreign policy Is more likely to lead to greater 
reliance of the public on the media's version of events (1992: Ax). 
The media's role In situations of International conflict has been viewed and studied by 
Gadi Wolfsfeld more specifically within the context of the media's relaVonship with their 
sources. Within this framework, Wolfsfeld has developed his political conlost modol 
arguing that 'the best way to understand the role of the news media In polifts Is to view 
the competition over the news media as part of ... a contest among political antagonists 
for political control' (1997: 3). The Idea he promotes Is that the media's Impact on 
political conflicts depends on the governmental control over the political environment and 
associates this control with the promoUon of a singlo official frame of the conflict that Is 
available to be adopted by journalists. In contrast, the availability of multiple frames that 
differ from one another Is more likely to be perceived by journalists as lack of a carefully 
planned policy and control over a given situation. 
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Wolfsfeld explains that the power of the media to Influence the political process during 
situations of conflict Is tied to the degree of Independence from their sources. He 
Identifies their Independence as the media's willingness and ability to make genuine 
choices about how to collect, process and distribute Information, but he also recognises 
that during unequal crises between what he calls authoritids and challongors, the 
authorities are more likely to have the control of the press (1997: 5MO). 
An Interesting argument that Wolfsfeld raises Is that during situations of conflict, the level 
of political control changes and can Instigate media Influences on the progress of the 
crisis and the decision-makIng processes. This can occur In situations when the media 
manage to raise the political standing of the challengers, that Is the weaker side, and 
bring third parties Into the conflict In their support. Similarly, the media can also lower the 
political standing of the authorities and therefore change the balance of power. On this 
basis, the media play the most Independent role In International conflicts where they 
become 'advocates of the underdog by amplifying the claims of challengers against the 
authorities' (1997: 69). He therefore explains that when the weaker party In the conflict 
receives a significant amount of space and time In major news media, this can work as 
an Indicator of the media's Influence on the progress of lnteM30onal crises and the 
altering of the balance of power (1997: 72). However, after conducting a study of the 
media coverage of the Gulf War, the Palesfinlan InUfada and the Oslo Accords, Wolfsfeld 
concludes that despite the power often attributed to the media during times of 
International crises, journalists mostly reflect and respond to the political decisions and 
events created by political actors, rather than Initiate them. 
Daniel Hallin's'The Uncensored War' provides another example of the media's position 
In International crises and the degree In which media coverage Is affected by the 
government's existing or non-existing control over the political environment. Contrary to 
President Nixon's allegations of the media being responsible for the Isedous 
demoralisation of the home front' (1986: 3), Hallin provides evidence that the 
administration's problems with the media resulted mostly from the domestic political 
divisions. He explains that despite the lack of censorship and restrictions of access, the 
administration had still managed to control the news, even when the public had started 
to react strongly against the government's foreign policy (1980: 163). On that basis, he 
states, 'the collapse of America's will to fight In Vietnam resulted from a political process 
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of which the media were only one part' (1986: 213). The fact that America was Involved 
In an unsuccessful limited war was the real root of the deep division caused to the 
country. 
With regard to the media's role in political conflicts, Hallin concludes that the way the 
media report the news Is strictly related to the degree of elite consensus. The media 
tend to 'become more active when the administration falls to maintain the Initiative on a 
major public Issue' (11986: 169). This Inference Is consistent with both Seib's observation 
and Wolfsfeld's political contest model that also relate the media's power to affect the 
progress of conflicts with the lack of a realistic and focused official policy as well as the 
lack of a single, common official frame being available for the media to adopt. When the 
frame begins to break down, the coverage becomes progressively critical and more 
difficult to be controlled. 
1.3.4 Media and Humanitarian Crises: Tho CNN Effect 
A third aspect of the foreign policy realm where study of the media has focused Is that of 
their ability to instigate Interventions of the world powers In crises taking place In third 
countries. Seib attributes the Initiation of the phenomenon to the media's search for 
newsworthy stories that will attract the public! s aftention and that leads journalists to the 
selection of dramatic stories, hoping that the Information WlI also be useful. He explains 
how sometimes a cause-and-effect relationship can be actually seen between such 
news stories and urging governments to do something. This Is largely related to the 
exposure of the public to humanitarian crises and the creation of emotional responses 
that forces governments to relief efforts (1992: 89-90). A commonly quoted example Is 
the response of the Clinton administration to the media coverage of the attack on a 
Sarajevo market In February 1994. 
News coverage of humanitarian crises has been Investigated within the context of the 
CNN Effect debate, what Gilboa calls the 'controlling actor theory' (2002b) that aims at 
highlighting the impact of new global, real-time media on the conduct of US foreign 
policy. The primary objective of the related research Is to establish the degree of media 
Influence on policy makers when they are considering Intervention during a humanitarian 
crisis. The media's power derives to a large extent from the Impact of advanced 
communications technologies on the flow of Information and the 'ability of the first truly 
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global television network to Inform the public Instantly and continuously of news from 
anywhere In the world' (Nacos, Shapiro, Insemla 2000: 2). The most extreme version of 
the theory Implies that policymakers do not make decisions on the basis of Interests but 
of public sentiments stimulated by television pictures (Gilboa, 2002: 100). The CNN 
Effect concerns mainly situations of media Influence on third-party humanitarian 
Interventions In distant crises and has focused on military operations conducted by USA 
and NATO for the resolution of crises that have arisen abroad and have attracted media 
attention. 
In an attempt to clarify whether the CNN Effect actually exists, Steve LMngston Identifies 
three different approaches. The first one defines the media as a Pliftal agenda-seWng 
agent, which argues thatthe choices and selections of national Interests are too heavily 
weighted In favour of what happens to be covered by CNN and other media' (1997.6). 
The second approach Is that of the media as an accelerant that emph3sises the 
shortening of response time for decision -making as an effect of global real-Ume media 
coverage (1997: 2). The last approach Identifies the media as an Impediment that Is 
related both to the effects of emotional coverage, operating through the Impact of public 
opinion, and to the power of global real-time media to jeopardise operational security 
(1997: 4). Livingston clarifies that these three effects are associated with different types 
of policy while each different policy has different objectives. costs and operational 
requirements. He concludes that media effects are therefore condibonal and vary 
accordingly, raising questions about the actual existence of the CNN Effect. 
Piers Robinson Identifies two US Interventions - In northern Iraq and Somalia - as the 
point of departure for a major debate over the media 'Intrusion' In the policy process 
(2002: 10). This was a debate that continued throughout the I 990s and was revisited by 
Freedman (2000) and Wheeler (2000) who offered a more careful evaluation of the 
media power. Although they recognIsed the limits of the theory, they maintained that the 
media do play a significant role In facilitating intervention (Robinson, 2002: 11-12). After 
a reconsideration of the cases In Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosn13 and Kosovo. Robinson 
defines policy uncertainty and empathy-framed media coverage as those principle 
conditions for the CNN Effect to take place. He states that evidence Is confined to the 
use of airpower and not the deployment of ground troops (2002: 128). Ultimately, the 
media's power In this case lies In facilitating Western responses to war, which however 
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are limited to humanitarian objectives, rather than attempts to resolve a conflict 
(Robinson, 200 1: 189). On a similar basis, Fachot argues that even If television Images 
force govemments to consider a possible Intervention, It Is the perceived threats and 
expected risks that will drive the decision to Intervene (2001: 52). On the whole, studies 
on the CNN Effect present mixed and contradictory results. Although Shaw (1994) and 
Cohen (1994) conclude that media coverage did force US policy makers to the 
Intervention In Northern Iraq In 1991 In order to save the Kurds, as well as to the 1992 
intervention In Somalia, Gowing (1994) argues that CNN coverage might draw attention 
to crises but policy makers would mostly resist the pressure to act only In response to 
media coverage. 
Gilboa argues that the theory was basically developed by officials being haunted by the 
Vietnam syndrome (2002c: 101). He explains how the war In Vietnam has been the 
reason why since then and despite evidence to the contrary, many have viewed the 
media as enemies to the governmental policies, but he expresses doubts about the 
degree In which humanitarian Interventions are actually Initiated by the media coverage 
of atrocities. (2002b: 735). Gilboa concludes that the theory suffers from a research gap. 
Although it has been defined very broadly, to test it the researcher must apply It In a very 
narrow way, and when this Is done, It becomes easier to disprove many of its claims and 
Implications. This would ultimately make It not a valid theory of the media-government 
relations and the media Influences In foreign policy (2002c: 102). 
The study of the media In situations of crisis and humanitarian Interventions 
demonstrates that the degree of political control available to politicians during times of 
crisis Is determined within the context of certain roles that governments act out, which 
would ultimately affect their relationship with the media. The way the media operate in 
situations of conflict Is therefore to a large extent determined by their relationship with 
the government, as explained In the expanded framework. In the examples described 
above, officials' political control Is related to expectations the media have of the 
government, according to which journalists define their role and response as well. When 
the media develop a critical stance, they act according to a role that Is Cod to the 
government's action and to the expectations the public has of the media as well. The 
critical coverage would ultimately add to the development and shaping of the shared 
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culture, as another component of the relationship within which media and politicians 
operate. 
1.4 Conclusion 
The existing theories demonstrate a media-government relationship that Incorporates 
the media's role In the shaping of foreign policy. This role varies according to the 
situation at hand and the relationship can be understandably described through 
O'Heffernan's definition of co-evolution between the two parties, which resembles 
Blumler and Gurevitch's expanded framework but focuses particularly on the dedication 
of the two sides to create and promote their own version of reality around the world and 
their Inclination to support, manipulate or attack the other for their own purposes (1991: 
82). The paradigms of media diplomacy, and the media's role In international crises and 
humanitarian Interventions provide the context to justify the emergence of such a 
relationship. 
The question that arises next Is, within the framework of this relationship. when media 
effects on the foreign policy process occur, how do they manifest themselves and under 
what circumstance do they emerge? As the present chapter has demonstrated, the 
literature provides mixed evidence. Bernard Cohen Identifies their participation and 
Influence on policymakers as an outcome of their Input in terms of Information, analysis 
and Interpretation as well as being the primary source of Information and knowledge for 
the public. In media diplomacy, their Impact Is embedded In their Instrumental use and In 
facilitating the diplomatic process, mainly as a communication channel, but also through 
Imposing time constraints to and altering decision-making processes. In the case of 
conflict situations their power to Influence policy making Is associated with the loss of 
political control on behalf of the government that yields critical coverage, yet without 
solid evidence that such criticism can lead to policy changes. While In humanitarian 
crises and Interventions, the CNN effect does not appear to provide a convincing 
argument of the media's potential to drive policy. Lastly, although O'Heffernan's model 
provides a systematic account of the media role and Identifies their Influence as an 
outcome not just of their employment as diplomatic tools but of their own Incentives and 
Interests, the Insiders' model does not provide evidence of an actual Impact of the media 
on policy decision outcomes. 
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The above observations lead to the Identification of three main deficiencies In the 
existing theories. Firstly, the media's Impact on foreign policy Is mostly recognised In 
terms of the policymaking process rather than on policy outcomes. Their role lies In 
either facilitating or constraining the making of foreign policy, which although signifies an 
active media role, it demonstrates no mechanism through which policy decisions are 
shaped. The media are therefore seen mostly as technological devices that carry 
messages with the focus being placed on the process of transmission and the element 
of speed and drama embodied In them. Although the Impact of their content has 81SO 
been considered with regard to the criticism they disseminate and the pressure this can 
generate, it occurs on the basis of the govemment's failure to provide a solid and 
coherent political frame of a given situation, while even In that case, there 13 Scarce 
evidence that the criticism might lead to policy changes, This all indicates the need for 
more analytical, detailed and In depth study and evaluation of the media content and the 
way It Is perceived by officials. A more rigorous study can offer Insight Into more subtle 
media Influences produced by a strategic media-government Interaction In the making of 
foreign policy and Is what the present thesis endeavour3 to achieve. 
In order for this objective to materialise, a second deficiency of the existing theoretical 
framework needs to be overcome, this time In relation to the geographical boundaries 
within which the study of foreign policy and the media has been confined. The 
paradigms described earlier unveil the lack of a meticulous study of the media's 
relationship with governments other than In USA. where a large part of the research has 
focused so far. The relationship of the American media with the respective 
administration constitutes a single example of media - government relationships In 
democratic states and consequently, of the potential Impact that the media may have on 
governmental decision-making processes. The absence of a more diversified framework 
suggests that a variety of parameters that could assist In the extraction of more accurate 
conclusions are left unexplored. It Is therefore essential that the media be studied In 
foreign policies pursued by governments outside the United States, which will provide 
not just a diverse geographical contexi. but a methodological one as well. 
A third and final remark to be made, In relation to the observation made above, regards 
a particular area of foreign policy where study of the media has focused and which Is of 
Interest In the present thesis as well. Looking at the media's role In conflict situations as 
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presented in the existing literature one observes that the crises Investigated In relation to 
the media, are ones of unequal nature. This Is again related with the research having 
focused on the American media and the coverage of US operations In the form of 
Intervention in crises between third countries significantly less powerful than the former. 
The suggestion made here Is that to examine the media's role In the escalation and 
resolution of conflicts among states that fight over Issues of national sovereignty without 
military Interventions from third actors, should add to the diversified framework In which 
the media should be studied. A significant contribution In this case can also be made by 
the study of the media coverage and potential media Influence on both sides of the 
Interaction, unlike the existing cases and theories that are built on one-sided media 
Investigations. 
To conclude, the overview of the existing literature that examines the media In the 
making of foreign policy, demonstrates the necessity for a more In depth Investigation of 
the media content as a product of specific media motivations and Incentives that officials 
are also aware of. Focus on media interests as a force that shapes their content and 
coverage of foreign policy, can lead to the detection of frames that reduce or Increase 
uncertainty, modify belief systems and even manipulate Information for the media's 
benefit. Such Inferences can then assist In the detection and systemaUsation of media 
Influences on the making of foreign policy. 
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2 Media Roles In Political Decision-Making. The Contribution of 
Framing Theory 
2.1 Introduction 
The present chapter comprises the first stage In the development of the theoretical 
model that will Integrate the media In foreign policy decision-making as a strategic actor. 
The understanding of the media as an active player In the political process Is not new, of 
course. In this perspective, the first section presents the concept of the media as a 
political Institution, a theory that approaches the media as an active political player 
systematically. Although In principle it deals with the media's domestic political action 
through the practices of the news construction, It serves as a 'passage' to the 
conceptualisation of the media as International, strategic actors too. 
The starting point for the Investigation of the strategic role Is the Introduction of framing 
theory, which Is here portrayed both as a process of decision-making and as a process 
of media selectivity and news construction. The contribution of frames Is approached 
more extensively through the norms of prospect theory. Prospect theory examines 
closely the Importance of framing Information In decision-making processes. The 
employment of prospect theory for the analysis of past political cases has provided a 
consistent understanding of the role that framing has on decisions. It therefore provides 
grounds to Integrate media frames In the political decision-making and Identify 
dimensions that Introduce a more systematic understanding of their Impact on official 
decisions and their role as political actors. The position of the media In the political 
domain as conveyors of frames Is strengthened with the Introduction of public opinion. 
The dependence of the public's views, about foreign policy Issues. on framed 
Information creates conditions for a media shaped public opinion. which Increases the 
competence of media frames to shape official decisions as woll. 
The last section Is an attempt to define theoretically the dimension of the frame In the 
media coverage of a certain political Issue and conceptualise It as the Instrument with 
which the media play their part In the political decislon-making. It Is also an attempt to 
formulate a methodological pattern for content analysis to apply to the press coverage of 
the Greek-Turkish crisis that serves as a case study. The chapter serves In offering 
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Insight Into the key components, which are Incorporated In the media coverage of foreign 
policy Issues and comprise the core In the media's strategic action In the political game. 
2.2 Media Roles In the Political Process: the Political Actor 
Journalists' political roles have been discussed In the literature with Bernard Cohen 
(1986) being among the first scholars who developed a framework of media roles and 
separated the 'neutral' role from the 'participant' role. In terms of the former, the media 
primarily Inform the government, they Interpret Information and disseminate judgements 
as well as they lend themselves to the hands of the government. As for the latter, the 
media are Involved in an act, ive Interaction with the government, they act as 
representatives of the public, as cdtics of the government and advocates of policy. 
Cohen's typology of media role concludes with Identifying the media as a policy maker, 
an actor that tries to Influence both the public and the government (11986: 19-39). 
Other roles attributed to the media Include that of a communication channel, what 
O'Heffernan also refers to a diplomatic signal system (1991: 53). Officials In this case 
employ the media as communication devices to negotlato with governments, send 
Influential messages to people and agencies and of course receive signals back from 
them. The media have also been suggested to act as Interpreters, disseminators and 
adversaries by David Weaver and G. Cleveland Wilhoit (1986), while Morris Janowitz 
(1975) has proposed roles Including that of the gatekeeper, the watchdog and advocate. 
On a similar basis, Patterson suggests a two-dimension typology of the media roles In 
the political process: the passivo-actIvo dimension and the noutirni-advocato dimension. 
The former Is developed based on the media's autonomy as a political actor according to 
which the media are passive when they act as Instruments In the hands of politicians; 
and they are active when they become participants shaping, Interpreting or Investigating 
political subjects. The latter dimension Is based on the media's positioning as a political 
actor. As a neutral actor the media take no sides In the political scene of a country and 
as an advocate they take sides - they may be the advocates of a particular Ideology - 
and they do so In a consistent and substantial way. 
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Patterson Identifies four combinations that derive from these dimensions and that 
encompass virtually all media role conceptlons. Therefore, the media can be passive- 
neutral and act as observers, neutral reporters, mirrors of reality or messengers; they 
can be passive - advocate, which would Include hack reporters or the partisan press; 
they may be active - neutral and In this case behave as critics, adversaries and 
watchdogs or they could be active -advocates, which in this case would translate Into 
missionaries or Interpreters (1998: 27- 28). 
All the above suggest that It would be rather a cI1ch6 to say that the media no longer 
constitute mere observers but they proceed with constructing meanings of reality and 
contemporary society. Brian McNair describes them as political actors based on their 
predisposition to perform not just cognitive functions of Information dissemination, but 
also Interpretative functions of analysis and comment (1995: 67). This form of political 
action Is mainly associated with the degree of freedom and independence the media 
enjoy In their reporting and Interpreting of the political world. This Independence, which 
Is attached to their organisational structure and the relationship of journalists with media 
owners, advertisers or the government, becomes the main source of their political 
power. 
The media's Independence In the reporting of politics Is traditionally associated with the 
degree of freedom that media organisations enjoy from respective governments and 
their function as an Independent source of knowledge that Informs and protects the 
public from governmental manipulation. McNair explains that when Edmund Burke first 
described the media of the late eighteenth century as the 'Fourth Estate', he was 
acknowledging their role and Importance In the function of democracy (2003: 48). This 13 
a role the media can achieve only when they are free from any political Interference. We 
could therefore argue that, given that state ownership of the media has become less 
significant In democratic states, the media are now more Independent and powerful to 
actively Involve In the political process than ever before. 
Nevertheless, the concentration of media ownership In a limited number of 
conglomerates raises the question as to what extent this pattern of ownership can 
actually guarantee the existence of Independent media. As Claran McCullagh puts It 
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The political economy perspective most clearly articulates the view that the system of ownership 
is central to understanding of media content and ... media power. It argues that private ownership on this scale leads to a media that Is limited In scope and diversity' (2002: 77). 
McCullagh explains that ownership Is translated Into control that automatically 
diminishes the degree of media autonomy. This control Is Imposed by the Industry In 
which there Is concentrated ownership, by the advertisers on which the media depend 
on for their profits, and by the political and corporate sources on which they depend for 
Information (2002: 77). Hence, a reported problem Is that there Is no simple way to 
measure the degree of Independence of media systems. Denis McQuail argues, 
There are too many variable features for this to be possible. Differences of tradition and 
convention often defy outside Interpretation. Different expectations concerning freedom often 
attach to different kinds of publication and types of content. The sources and kinds of pressure 
are too variable to be captured by standard Indicators ... media 
freedom cannot be established by 
constitutional or legal decree, but has to be constantly developed and re-affirmed In daily practice' 
(1999: 110-111). 
A possible way to demonstrate the media's autonomy Is through certain features of the 
news construction that also justify their establishment as poliUcal actors. An Important 
part of their political power stems from the way the media select and report Information. 
The process of selectivity can occur on two levels. The first one Is described as the 
8 agenda-setting' model Introduced by McCombs & Shaw (1972) who argued that people 
learn two things from the media. On the one hand they receive factual Information, and 
on the other they learn how to attach Importance to certain Issues through the extensive 
coverage that certain events attract. One aspect of the significance of the agenda- 
setting Issue Is that It underscores the media's power to define what Is Important and 
what Is not through a process of selection among the vadous Issues that are worth the 
public attention. McCombs describes the agenda-setting process as a zero-sum game. 
highlighting the Intense competition among Issues for attention by the media and the 
public (2004: 38). Within this context of competition, the media's process of selectivity 
enhances their power In defining the degree of Importance Innate In a given news story. 
The second level of media selectivity Is Inherent In the Interpretative frameworks through 
which the media portray a given Issue; or In other words, the aspects of each perceived 
reality that the media choose to emphasise. This Is because, 'when covering a news 
event, journalists decide which elements to Include or exclude In a story' (Chyl, 
McCombs, 2004: 24). Framing Is a fundamental element when It comes to media power 
and will be further Investigated later In this chapter. It serves as an Indicator of media 
power and autonomy In the sense that through its process journalists exercise the 
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freedom and the power to be selective In the events they cover and consequently to 
represent the world In ways that reflect their own motivations (McCullagh. 2002). 
The media's Independent performance refers In this case to the ability of editorial 
decision-makers to Implement conscious choices and decisions In the crafting of news, 
on the basis of their own Ideological preferences. Yet, once again the element of 
Independence becomes questionable when one considers the sources, which those 
frames stem from. Such sources are In principle embodied In the procedure of news 
construction and can reflect both the Ideological Inclinations and the organisational 
structure of the media. The former case reflects both the personal Ideological 
orientations of the journalists as Individuals and of the media organisation for which they 
work. It Is especially the newspapers in most countries that are Identified with a 
particular political Ideology, while broadcast and television organlsatlons are allegedly 
less influenced. It needs to be clarified of course that given their professional and 
organisational commitments, journalists rarely have the capacity to 'channel' their own 
Ideologies into the news (McCullagh, 2002). 
It Is also these organisational commitments and pressures that constraint the degree of 
Journalists' personal autonomy and of the media Independence as a whole. Apart from 
the ownership controls and advertising and public relations pressures mentioned earlier, 
the media's organisational structure also presupposes practices such as reliance on 
routine sources and agency-made news stories, which Indicate lack of diversity and 
originality and consequently lack of an Independent line of reporting-, and which would 
ultimately result In bias and In a limited Journalistic autonomy (MCOU3il, 1999). As 
McQuail puts it, even If an Important aspect of the media's Independence concerns their 
relationship with powerful outside Interests, their heavy reliance on powerful sources 
entails a reduced freedom (1999: 130). 
Therefore, even If framing Indicates a degree of autonomy In the selection of the aspects 
of a news story that journalists emphasise. this autonomy becomes relative when 
considered within a wider organIsational context of news construction. The present 
section suggests however that the media's description as political Institutions provides a 
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consistent approach to the media's autonomy as a resultant of their organisafional 
structure. It Is a concept that systernatises the media's action as political players and 
provides a basis on which to build a more detailed model. 
2.2.1 Tho Political Institution 
The conceptualisation of the media as political Institutions Identifies the qualities that 
underline the media's social and political status as Independent players In their ability to 
report and frame events autonomously (Sparrow, 1999, Cook, 1998). The concept of the 
media roles as Institutions focuses on their function within society and. more precisely, 
within the structure of domestic politics. North (1981) defines Institutions as a framework 
through which human beings Interact. Within this framework, Institutlons establish the 
cooperative and competitive relationships, which set up society and economic order 
(Sparrow, 1999: 9). On this basis, Sparrow suggests that the production of news media 
provide a regular framework by which and within which political actors operate 
(1999: 10). 
Cook (1998) defines the media firstly as a social Institution. Their role In this case Is a 
resultant of their organisational status In principle and of their function as Information 
sources and communications channels for officials and the public. In the former case, 
the news construction relies upon a series of routines/practices that journalists follow. 
Sparrow refers to these practices as the micro foundations of a macro political 
understanding of the media as an Institution (1999: 10). This, In combination with the 
media's operation as large-scale conglomerates that pursue economic profiL enhances 
the organisational structure of the media. At the same time, the reliance of both officials 
and the public on the media for the conduct of the social function of communication 
renders them Integral parts In structuring the actions of social and political constituents. 
In other words, their organisational nature and their Impact on other social actors, render 
the media social Institutions. It Is particularly the former that enhances their status as 
Independent players through the Increasing competition that it can generate. According 
to Entman (1985), 
Competition a) enhances the quality of newspaper meaning... more In depth news and editorials, 
b) provides more diversity of views on public Issues, c) encourages more fairness or balance In 
presentation of political controversies and d) stimulates greater responsiveness to the Interests of 
citizens - providing stories and editorial that help encourage enlightened and rationally participant 
citizens (McQuall, 1999: 114). 
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For Cook, their political utility is Inherent In the recurring negotiations between journalists 
and official sources. The Idea of the media as a political player lies In the fact that even if 
it Is officials that provide an arena for certain important events to occur and attract media 
coverage, the final crafting and colouring of the news Is decided by journalists. He 
argues that the media production values might direct the news towards the creation of 
good stories that are not necessarily translated Into good political outcomes. He 
therefore stresses the degree of autonomy In the media's framing of political events and 
the degree of power to establish authority for certain politics and political actors (Cook, 
1998: 87-97). Sparrow adds to their authoritative nature by describing them as 'attack 
dogs' that employ negative reporting In order to maintain a constant position that 
protects them from the machination of politicians and allows them to signal to the mass 
audience about what Is really going on In the political domain (1999.49-50). The view of 
the media acting as a watchdog and a critic to the government or any form of political 
authority Is perhaps the most central requirement for the understanding of the media as 
Independent political players, both from government and ownership. that defend the 
Interest of citizens despite governmental and commercial pressures (Cohen, 1986, 
Curran 1991; McQuail, 1999). 
Their independent profile Is also embedded In the pursuit of commercial Incentives vis-b- 
vis the audience that Is often approached as potential consumers. This has led to the 
description of the news content as an outcome of a set of rational decisions made by a 
unitary actor that alms at maxlmising his preferences (Sigal, 1973: 1980). Cook 
concludes that due to the strategic Incentives Implicit in the process of news 
construction, the media develop Into a political Institution that resembles the function of 
actors such as the political parties and Interest groups. The three of them share an at 
least partial Independence of government and the pursuit of political goals, either 
explicitly or implicitly (1999: 109). 
The concept of the political Institution highlights the media's relevant autonomy In the 
crafting of news stories, their power to establish authority and their organis3tional and 
strategic Incentives as the main components In the news production process that 
establish them as a political actor. Cook describes their action as one that occurs both 
Inside and outside the government, an observation Inherent In O'Heffernan's (1991) 
Insider's model as well. In O'Heffernan's paradigm. as Inside players the media supply 
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officials with fast and useful Information. The outside action Is reflected In the shape that 
the media give to their stories as an outcome of their own motivations and Incentives. 
Both examples focus on the organisational structure and the pursuit of own Incentives 
as a source of the media's authority. 
To sum up, the view of the media as a political Institution recognises a significant degree 
of power In their practices that may constraint the choice sets of other political actors 
through the dissemination of Information, criticism or even threats. It Identifies the media 
as a political player through the cooperation of a set of Individual components such as 
networks of journalists and politicians. Each of them pursues Incentives, which they 
accomplish through the development of a mutual Interrelation. Within this context, the 
news production practices become Integral to the political process, rendering the media 
a political output. 
Part of their political power derives from 'authored' forms of political Intervention- Le. 
editorials, columns or featured articles- that permit the reporting of news and opinions 
Independent of organisational and structural constraints (McNair, 1995,69-72). George 
Reedy argues that the significant Impact of the news content on the government lies not 
only In Its critical reflections, but also In Its ability to tell officials what there are doing as 
seen through other eyes. The main Idea Is that the news content reaches the 
government without previously being shaped by people whose Intentions might oppose 
the government's Interests (Sigal, 1973: 186). At the same time, as O'Heffernan claims. 
the media frame Issues so that the face of an Issue seen by the government becomes 
also the face of the issue that the public perceives and has to be dealt with by all the 
government players (1991: 109). 
The Idea of the political Institution underlines the media's power particularly within the 
context of their Interaction with policymakers and In terms of the constrains that 
Journalistic practices may Impose on the choice sets of other political actors. It also 
underlines the media's power to exert pressure by becoming critical towards politicians 
but it does not explain how this pressure affects political activities and official decisions. 
The contribution of the political Institution as a media role Is that It provides a systematic 
explanation of the media's power as political actors; and a departure point for this thesis 
to go beyond that role and demonstrate how the media, having developed In an 
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Institution that functions within the structure of domestic politics, proceed with a framing 
process that renders them strategic actors that Influence foreign policy decisions. 
Framing Is Identified as the key element In what this thesis will attempt to demonstrate 
as a strategic action of the media. It Is therefore deemed essential to present some 
fundamental theories and aspects of framing before we proceed with the media 
approach. 
2.3 Introducing the theory of frames 
Over the years a number of definitions of frames or framing have been offered either In 
relation to the media or more generally as a cognitive Information process for the 
understanding of the social world (Cappella & Jamieson. 1997; PrIce & Tewksbury, 
1997; Entman, 1993; Iyengar, 1991; Garrison & Mod1glianI, 1989. Win, 1980, 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Minsky, 1975; Tuchman, 1978). In the development of 
numerous definitions Goffman's formative work has been a reference point for many of 
them. In his widely cited book he defines frames as 'schemata of Interpretavon' that 
enable Individuals to understand certain events and 'to locate, perceive, Identify and 
label' occurrences. He calls these schemata primary frameworks because 'they turn 
what should be a meaningless aspect of a scene Into something meanlngfur (1974: 21. 
22). Goffman distinguishes between natural and social frameworks In an effort to 
differentiate between the understandings of events as outcomes of natural determinants 
on the one hand and outcomes of the motives and Intents of human beings on the other. 
What Is Interesting about the social frameworks Is that they provide an arena for the 
Individual to decide what Is going on according to their Interests, cultural and social 
environments. Most Importantly, decisions are perceived as the outcome of the 
exploitation of natural constraints and the causality of events In terms of the moUves and 
Incentives of the agent (Goffman, 1974: 22-26). Goffman proceeds to show how our 
based on reason knowledge performs its constructive role In our everyday life and how 
the respective schemata of Interpretation are 'acted out'. Following this tradition. framing 
analysis Is concerned with how social actors act In order to gonerate organised ways of 
understanding the world (Pan & Kosicki, 2003: 38). The process of framing as examined 
by Goffman presupposes a cognitive processing of Information, which Is done on the 
basis of the actors' belief systems, Interests and culture. This means that actors are 
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involved In an Interpersonal understanding of the world, which at the same time 
Influences their action as well. 
The implications of the framing process on the action of individuals and on the process 
of decision making will be discussed in the following section within the framework of 
prospect theory. The theory locates the importance of framing In decision-making 
processes and 'elevates' its cognitive underpinnings as determinants of the Information 
processing and the evaluation of a given situation by the agent before a decision Is 
made. Prospect theory Is here Introduced as a systematic approach to the potential 
Impact that framing analysis may have on action and decislon-making. 
2.3.1 Frames In the decision-making process: the prospect theory 
Prospect theory Is an alternative account of decision making under risk as examined by 
rational choice theory, and focuses on clarlyng the Influence, that Information has on 
individual decision making, when portrayed through certain frames. It offers powerful 
Insights Into political declsion-making and can facilitate the Identification of news frames 
as a means for the media to ascertain their Influence In the decision-making process. 
Prospect theory has been employed for the analysis of decision-making processes In 
International politics as an attempt to challenge the aptness of rational choice theory to 
provide a more convincing account (Famham, 1992: 205). However, this thesis suggests 
both theories can offer propositions for the understanding of the media's power to 
influence political decisions as conveyors of framed Information. The Introduction of 
prospect theory at this point serves In Identifying those framing dimensions that 
rationalise media frames as a fundamental component of the media's role as political 
actors. 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1984) developed prospect theory In terms of a 
critique of utility theory. ' Their aim was to Investigate decision-making under risk 
2 The main concept of utility theory suggests that the risky choices of rational decision makers are 
defined by their preferences among the potential outcomes. The theory was first developed by 
Daniel Bernoulli (1738) who suggested that the values of things to an Individual are not just 
equivalent to their monetary worth. On this basis, decisions are shaped by the worth of the 
outcomes to the Individual rather than by their cash value. The theory was rehabilitated by Von 
Neuman and Morgestern In a way that assigned utilities to non-monetary outcomes as wefl. They 
contributed In the development of modem utility theory, which enables numerical utilities, 
corresponding to degrees of preferences, to be assigned In games with qualitative outcomes. 
Although Von Neuman and Morgestem's utility theory provides a convincing method solving 
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concentrating on cognitive and psychophysical determinants of choice. Especially In 
terms of money related decisions, Kahneman and Tversky showed how certain 
psychological factors can Invalidate utility theory. One major contribution of the theory 
lies in demonstrating the power of frames to cause alterations to the action people take 
In order to deal with a problem or situation, by calling attention to particular aspects of 
this specific situation. In particular, the two analysts claim that all analyses of rational 
choice Incorporate two main principles namely these of Invariance and dominance. On 
the one hand, Invarlance presupposes that the description of Individual options should 
have no Influence on the preference. Two prospects should be recognised to be 
equivalent either when they are shown together or separately. On the other hand, 
according to the principle of dominance If one option Is better than another In one aspect 
and at least as good as the other In all other aspects, then It Is the dominant option that 
should be chosen. 
What Kahneman and Tversly demonstrated in a widely cited study was that these two 
requirements could often be violated as a result of the framing effects. Based on 
responses to two Identical problems the outcomes of which were presented In different 
ways, they proved that simple word changes could produce significant differences In the 
choices people make. In particular, prospect theory Implies that people's attitude 
towards a risky decision depends on whether the outcomes are presented as gains or 
losses, always relative to a reference point, such as the status quo. The Implication of 
the frames lies In the shifts made In the way the reference point of a problem Is 
presented. Such shifts evoked by the frames can have predictable effects on the ranking 
of an Individual's preferences. In brief, the same problem can be framed In different 
ways and lead to different decisions on behalf of the recipients. As McDermott states, 
choice can be Influenced by relatively trivial manipulations In the framing of options, for 
Instance what Is costly and what Is not (1992). 
Kahneman and Tversky (1986) came to the conclusion that rational choice and utility 
theory do not represent Individual declslon-making accurately. Decision makers due to 
certain phenomena such as the framing effects systematically violate the basic pdnelples 
games of change Involving great risk, It has not solved all problems related to the assignment of 
numerical utilities to the outcomes Of g3MOS. 
Colman(I 982). p. 18.19 
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of the specific theories. They proved that variations In the framing of options (E. g. 
framing an outcome as a gain or a loss) yield different preferences. The outcome being 
that Information portrayed through certain frames can ultimately Influence the process of 
decision-making and the final choice made by the decision maker. The findings of 
Kahneman and Tversky offer a useful tool for the understanding of decision-making 
processes In every day life with regard to the Impact that frames may have on action. 
However, as this thesis suggests, when Investigating frames produced by the media and 
received by politicians, their Impact on the process of political decision-making Is subject 
to various parameters that render the media-politicians' Interaction a complex one. The 
argument here Is that prospect theory provides a practical Instrument for the 
Investigation and understanding of media framing effects, but basically when employed 
as part of a wider theoretical framework, which Is built on the norms of rationality. 
Let us now examine how the framing theory Is Incorporated Into the decision-making 
process, always based on the norms of prospect theory. Prospect theory recognises 
two phases In the declsion-making process. The first one 13 the phase of framing and 
editing. This Is a preliminary analysis of the choice problem and the alternatives offered 
to the decision maker. This Is the phase where the actor frames the alternative options 
and the potential outcomes before proceeding with a decision. This process consists of 
the reformulation of the alternative options in order to facilitate the final decision. In this 
process, the actor Is likely to code the outcomes of a decision problem either as gains or 
losses In relation to a reference point. The formulation of the reference point as well as 
the way In which the actor frames the above Information depends largely on the manner 
in which the decision problem Is portrayed. In the second phase of the process, the 
decision maker evaluates the framed Information and the altemaUve options, selecting 
the most highly evaluated option. (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). 
The importance of framing Is basically concentrated In the first phase of the decision- 
making process. as suggested by prospect theory. The decision maker processes and 
analyses Information before he/she decides upon a certain action. At this stage the actor 
Is likely to encounter the principles of Invarianco and dominance. Whether these 
principles will be violated depends on the manner In which they will frame the available 
options, which also depends on how the specific decision problem Is presented to them 
or even perceived by them. 
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2.3.2 Prospect theory In International politics 
Prospect theory has been employed for the analysis and understanding of decision. 
making processes In International relations, with emphasis on framing gains and losses 
and particularly on the Impact of loss aversion on political decisions. Levy (1992) refers 
to numerous examples In which states select a risk-seeking move as an outcome of the 
way alternative choices have been framed. The essence of framing In this case lies In 
preventing a political actor from recognising the degree of risk embodied In a certain 
decision; or exaggerating the degree of cost a situation entails to such an extent that, In 
order to avert the costly outcome, the actor would be willing to engage In a riskier 
decision than might be predicted by a probability of calculus (Levy, 1992: 287). On those 
terms, as Jervis puts it, prospect theory leads us to expect people to persist In risky and 
losing actions much longer than standard rationality would (1992: 191). 
Barbara Farnham (1992) employed the norms of prospect theory to provide an 
Interpretation of President Roosevelt's decision-making during the Munich crisis, 
focusing on the correspondence between the decision framing and preference reversal. 
Her inquiry dealt with Roosevelt's reaction to the crisis between Hitler's Germany and 
Czechoslovakia during World War 11. Particularly, Farnham examined the policy change 
of the American President from maintaining a neutral position to seeing the possibility of 
a European war as of Immediate concern for USA that led to his Intervention. Using 
Tvesrky and Kahneman's hypothesis that the way a decision Is framed affects how 
people see the consequences of their decisions, she attributed Roosevelt's policy 
change to the way he framed the situation to himself. She explains that framing the 
decision problem posed by the European crisis so that the outcome would seem as a 
loss for the United States could have changed the way In which he experienced the 
Implications of non-intervention, which ultimately altered his evaluation of the crisis 
(1992: 226). In other words, Farnham attributes Roosevelt's decision not to a gradual 
process of a logical re-evaluation but to a change of mood that was caused by his 
communication with Europe and that led to a shift In his preferences. 
A similar analysis was conducted by Rose McDermott (1992) In an attempt to Justify 
President Carters risky and failed rescue mission of the American hostages In Iran, in 
April 1980. McDermott Investigated the framing of Cartees four alternative options and 
his decision to take up the one that entailed the greatest risk. She concluded that the 
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framing process resulted In Carter placing himself In the domain of losses. In this case, 
the actor's framing and evaluation led to the perception that he had little to lose In taking 
up a risky decision and everything to gain If that decision succeeded. It Is an observation 
that Is consistent with the norms of prospect theory and the hypothesis that people tend 
to become risk seeking when framing the outcome of a decision In terms of losses. 
The Input of prospect theory, as seen through Its application to decision-making 
situations In International politics, Is Inherent In the Influence of framing on decisions and 
political outcomes. Prospect theory promotes the concept of framing as a vital stage of 
the decision-makIng process and of the analysis of a given choice problem. It therefore 
paves the way for a systematic Introduction of the media frames In political decision- 
making. 
2.4 Framing In the media 
In the beginning of this chapter, It was stressed how the media power Is Inherent In the 
selectivity embodied In the media decisions about what to cover and how to cover It or 
else the aspects of the story that the media choose to emphasise on and elevate In 
salience. As Durham puts It, 'being able to designate salience reflects the social power 
of journalism, which lies In the Inclusion of certain voices In normative social discourse 
and the exclusion of others' (2003: 125). Entman (1993) describes the process of 
framing as the selection of some aspects of a perceived reality In order to make them 
more salient In a communicating text, In such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition. Selection and salience are therefore fundamental In the process of framing 
information. The argument developed In the present section Is that the framing process 
can actually 'elevate' the media's role as political actors. This Is by revealing the 
strategic Impact that media content Is liable to exert on political decision-making. 
There Is actually a list of commonly cited definitions of news frames, which illustrates the 
difficulty In creating a single definition (Schwartz, 2004). Gitlin has defined news frames 
as'persistent patterns of cognition, Interpretation, presentation, selection, emphasis and 
exclusion by which symbol-handlers routinely organise discourse' (1980). Gamson & 
Modiglianl (1989) refer to frames as 'a set of packages that give meaning to an Issue. A 
package has an Internal structure. At Its core Is a central organising Idea. or frame. for 
making sense of relevant events, suggesting what Is at Issue. It has also been 
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suggested by McCombs, Shaw and Weaver that framing Is In fact an extension of 
agenda setting. They defined framing as a second-level agenda setting to describe the 
Impact of the salience of characteristics of media coverage on the Interpretation of news 
stories by audiences (Sceufele, 1999: 103). Yet, this is an observation that contrasts 
Entman's argument, that framing Is more than agenda setting. He points out that, 
'Frames define problems- determine what a causal agent Is doing with what costs and benefits, 
usually measured In terms of common cultural values. diagnose causes-Identdy the forces 
creating the problem, make moral judgements-evaluate causal agents and their effects: and 
suggest remedies-offer and justify treatments for the problem and predict their likely effects' 
(Entman. 1993). 
The framing function might not necessarily exist as an extension of agenda setting: but It 
can co-exist with it and In this case it adds to the potential role that the media can play In 
the political process. Entman's definition Is actually the most detailed; and It also 
demonstrates the media's power to engage In a coverage that expands further than just 
a description of occurring events. This Is because, by engaging In a process of problem 
definition the media ultimately proceed with analysis and Interpretation of a certain Issue 
that Is placed on the media agenda. This Is an Initiative that the media take independent 
of whether or not the specific Issue has been placed on the agenda by officials, and It 
can reinforce the role of the media turning them Into actors whose Influence In the 
political process lies beyond their function as a source of Information or a 
communications channel. 
As Entman states, frames dorino problorns, diagnose causes and suggost romodio& 
The use of frames for the dissemination of Information and portrayal of certain Issues by 
the media adds a new dimension to the role of the media as source of Information and 
highlights the power Inherent In their content. Because their autonomous role as political 
actors Is not a mere reflection of their news gathering systems, organisational Incentives 
and decisions. It Is also a reflection of their capacity to Involve In a more profound and 
extensive analysis of the collected Information offering Interpretations that are perhaps 
different from the official ones. They can disseminate criticism or support for a decision 
and a policy option, becoming more than just a source of Information. Their power Ilos in 
the fact that as soon as this criticism becomes public, It also becomes dangerous to 
officials and governmental decision-makers. The media cannot restrict themselves to a 
neutral depiction of a given reality but they frame It by selecting, emphaslsing, analysing 
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and Interpreting certain aspects of It. This frame 'can stimulate support or opposition to 
the sides In a political conflict' (Entman, 2003: 417). This Is an observaflon that also 
clarifies how this thesis perceives the cost that a political actor Is likely to bear due to a 
decision/ move that Is critically covered by the media. It offers basis to argue that the 
media take Initiatives that can turn them Into actors regardless of the extent to which 
they ultimately lead officials to a reassessment of a policy decision. 
In terms of this dimension their role as a communication channel can also be examined 
from a different perspective. One cannot deny the employment of the media for 
signalling purposes on behalf of political actors. Yet, the frames through which certain 
signals and messages are portrayed render the media more than a mere communleagon 
channel. By emphasising a given aspect of a reality and therefore framing a message or 
a signal, the media slip from the official's control. Whether, the signal conveyed works 
for or against a certain policy option, what matters Is that the media do not always 
operate as tools exploited by politicians to do their job. 
One could argue that the essence of framing theory In relation to the media Influences 
on decision-making lies In the manifestation of a looser relationship between the media 
and governmental control (Entman, 2003). A question that arises here Is to what extent 
this slack relationship signifies automatic Influence from this domestic political 
constituent over politicians and their decisions. That Is to say, the more the media 
proceed with Independent framing and analysis of Information they receive from officials, 
the more influential this Information becomes. One possible way to conceptualise this 
Influence Is as from a cognitive perspective. Entman states that the analysis of frames 
clarifies the exact way In which Influence over a human consciousness Is exerted by a 
transfer of Information from one location, such as a news report. to that consciousness 
(1993: 51-52). This observation Implies the media's function as a cognitive device In the 
encoding, Interpreting and retrieving of Information (Pon & Kosicki, 1993: 57). which 
would ultimately Influence the Interpersonal processing of the receiver. 
Media frames as carriers of cognitive influence canenteedecision-making processes on 
the basis of the correlation of framing with the process of docislon-making In 
International politics. This triggers the suggestion that media framing may be equally 
fundamental In decislon-making processes. 
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Figure 2.1: The cognitive Impact of media frames on declsion-making 
A political situation approached based on the norms of prospect theory, Is seen as a 
choice-problem divided Into the framing phase and the editing phase. The focus of 
attention Is the former, which represents the preliminary stage In which the political 
actors assess the given situation before proceeding with the decision. By locating the 
media in this stage, the frame of the problem In question Is then controlled by the way 
the choice-problem Is perceived both by the political actor and the media. The media's 
capacity to engage Into a framing process that resembles the evaluation conducted by 
political actors Increases their potential Impact on official choices. The media's role Is 
further enhanced when considering that framing Is vital In the communication between 
political actors. 'Successful political communication requires the framing of events, 
Issues and actors In ways that promote perceptions and Interpretations that benefit one 
side while hindering another' (Entman, 2003: 417). 
In this case, the media frames may exert a direct Influence on political decisions that Is 
conceptualised as a change caused to the framing of the political actor, by the media 
(Figure 2.1). The diagram depicts a direct and circular Interaction between the political 
and the media frame. In that, a given choice problem Is framed by the decision-maker. 
The same choice problem is received by the media either simultaneously from other 
Sources or through the decision-maker's political frame. The media then proceed with 
their own frame that changes the perception of the declslon-maker about the choice 
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problem through a cognitive process. According to prospect theory, the frames through 
which a choice problem Is presented are often responsible for the violation of the axioms 
of rational choice and utility theory and the change of preference of the decision-maker. 
Hence, media frames change the policymaker's perception of the given situation 
eliminating the degree of rationality In their decision. The examples of the Munich Crisis 
and the Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission also demonstrate how the framing of the 
options available to the two political actors caused psychological Implications that would 
ultimately determine their decision. 
The possibility for a direct, cognitive media Influence on the docislon-maker is rather 
problematic and difficult to verify. It appears to be a simplistic approach. when 
journalism Is considered as an Inherently rationallsing practice that organises certain 
social meanings Into frames while excluding other meanings from the dominant 
discourse (Duncan, 2003: 128). Duncan Identifies the rationality In the media framing as 
a practice of Including and excluding meanings In ways that establish power relations 
within a social and political context. This rationality can also be Identified In relation to 
the commercial objectives that media organisations pursue and according to which they 
frame the news. When these objectives concentrate on creating meanings with powerful 
effects on the targeted audience, then the media Influence acquires a different 
dimension, with the Introduction of the public as an additional 'playeeat which the media 
frames are targeted. The argument that this chapter seeks to make Is that the Influence 
of media frames are more likely to develop In the form of domestic pressure on 
policymakers; this pressure Is not exerted In a direct and cognitive manner but rather In 
an Indirect way and through the concept of public opinion. In the case of foreign policy 
decisions, O'Heffernan suggests that the media's power lies In sustaining domestic 
pressures about certain policies (1199 1: 62-64). The next sections will attempt to analyse 
this domestic pressure as an Interaction between media frames, pollcymakers and the 
public. The Interaction embodied In this triangle Is of course not now. The objective Is 
however to Investigate It In a way that reveals a more rational, systematic and strategic 
Influence of the media In the decision-makIng process. 
2.4.1 Modla and public opinion as a sourco of domostic prossuro 
The public views are here conceptualised as composing one of the domestic factors that 
Influence the International behaviour of states and the objective of the present section Is 
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to explain how the concept of public opinion can result In the fabrication of domestic 
pressure by the media. Admittedly, the linkage between the media, public opinion and 
policymakers Is a complex one with no theory adequately clarifying on the one hand. a 
profound media Influence on the public! s views and on the other, the Impact of such 
views on policy making. Shapiro and Jacobs (2000) have reported the existence of 
congruence occurring between opinion changes and subsequent policy changes, 
especially In the area foreign policy. On the other hand, Entman (2004) argues that 
research offers very little Insight Into whether and how officials rind out what the public Is 
thinking. There are, however, certain findings that provide grounds to consider public 
opinion as a key component In the media's strategic action. 
A reported key Issue Is the lack of knowledge of the public, which Is enhanced by the 
often abstract and obscure nature of foreign policy Issues. At the same time, the lack of 
direct experience of the public with regard to the effectiveness of certain foreign policy 
decisions Is another reason why It becomes less likely to be affected by them in the 
same way it would be affected by economic or health care changes (Manhelm, 1997, 
Kennamer, 1992). From a first point of view, this observation might render the possibility 
of a public pressure on pollcyrnakers merely unrealistic, especially In foreign affairs. 
However, It also explains the publlc! s dependence on the media for Information on 
foreign policy decisions and understanding of particular situations. Framing becomes 
central here since the public! s Interpretations are rarely automatically deduced from the 
reporting of an event itself, on the contrary, It Is mostly the media frames that will 
determine which problem definition, cause and policy response gain widespread 
adherence (Entman, 2004: 124). Taking Into consideration that governing elites are 
aware of this media-public linkage, the focal point Is the perception of policyrnakers 
about the public and most Importantly their perception of the media's potential In shaping 
the public's views of foreign policy Issues. 
The Impact of such a perception on a given political action can be summarlsed In the 
concept of the third person effect. developed by Davison (1983) based on the human 
tendency to see media effects as greater on others than on oneself (Lasorsa, 1992: 
165). The Idea Is that media coverage of an Issue might load to an official decision not 
because of its direct Impact on the public's beliefs but because of politicians' perception 
that it will have such an Impact on the public. This Is an observation that could explain 
Modia Rolos In Political Docislon-Making. Tho Contribution of Framing ThoorY 55 
the Impact of public opinion on policymaking through the prism of the perceived public 
opinion. This reflects the perception of political elites about where the majority of the 
public stands with regard to a given Issue, while such perceptions are largely developed 
from dominant media frames (Entman, 2004: 127). 
Entman refers to a 'putative' public opinion the media promote, which although barely 
represents the true mood of the public towards certain policies, It does Increase the 
media's Influence on policymakers. He Introduces the concept of 'perceived' public 
opinion as a convenient fiction for both journalists and politicians to refer to the 
comprehensive preferences of a majority of citizens (2000: 21), which Is related to the 
politicians' need to associate their activities with public approval (2004: 125). Entman 
Implies the construction of public opinion by journalists and politicians that will ultimately 
work as a guide for the shaping of governmental behaviour. This proposition Is however 
rejected by Page who suggests that retrospective judgements and latent or anticipated 
opinion play a crucial role In foreign policy and policymakers' evaluation of certain 
decisions (2000: 87). 
Anticipated public opinion Is here approached In terms of the expectation of a public 
opposition that would generate a domestic cost for pollicyrnakers. It Is perhaps this facet 
of the public's views that encompasses the substance of the domestic pressure that the 
whole concept of public opinion can exert on policymaking. Its essence lies In the 
anticipation of a strong domestic opposition and Its potent Impact on policymaking. 
Ultimately, the unknown future direction of public opinion can become a constraint for 
policymakers. As Entman states, the anticipation of a majority opposition to the 
continued Involvement and losses In Somalia In 1993 led President Clinton to withdraw 
the US forces soon after the battle of Mogadishu (2004: 127). Similarty, President 
Johnson led the country to a war with the communist guerrillas In Vietnam based on the 
speculation of a public refutation In case he failed to present a communist victory (Zaller, 
1994: 250). In the latter case, anticipated public opinion Is conceptuallsed In the form of 
domestic reputation for toughness in dealing with foreign adversados (lbid, 271). This 
can explain why the Nixon administration used polling data to avoid taking unpopular 
positions In the area of foreign policy (Shapiro & Jacobs, 2000: 232-233). It can also 
Justify Elsenhower's willingness to allow Franco to be defeated In Indochina and 
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Kennedy's tough and risky responses to Khrushchevs provocations as Instances where 
anticipated public opinion posed as a threat to the leaders' domestic reputation. 
The essence of the discussion is to demonstrate the existence of a certain degree of 
sensitivity or cautiousness that politicians develop towards a future public opposition. 
The association of the public sentiments with media frames. which Is also acknowledged 
by policymakers, justifies why the concept of public opinion becomes Important In 
decislon-making processes. Given the public's reliance on the media for Information, 
understanding and interpretation of foreign policy Issues, the anticipation of a public 
opposition equals the recognition of the media's central role In generating conditions of 
domestic pressure. The whole concept of public opinion Is an Integral component of the 
framing process and the Impact of media frames on policymakers exists, If not as an 
actuality, as a notion. It carries with It the expectation of a domestic cost that Is difficult to 
Ignore. If the public's views about foreign policy Issues are shaped by media frames, 
then by responding to an anticipated or perceived public opinion, policyrnakers respond 
to selected Interpretations of the public! s beliefs as determined by these media frames. 
This gives media frames a central role In the process of decision-making, the power of 
which Is further enhanced when one considers the critical part that framing plays In 
decision-making processes as demonstrated by prospect theory. 
2.4.2 Media Frames In the docIsIon-makIng process 
Media framing In this case may Influence political decisions through an Indirect route, 
this time bringing public opinion Into the picture. Prospect theory has made a significant 
contribution on that front by emphaslslng the relationship between framing of choices or 
decision outcomes and situations Of loss aversion. In the examples described earlier, 
Presidents Roosevelt and Carter found themselves In a position of an Imminent loss. 
which they had to recoup; It Was their framing of the situation as such, which ultimately 
led to the selection of a risky decision. The Idea of loss aversion becomes further crucial 
due to Its association with future reputation and domestic cost. The role of the public 
becomes Important here since, as Levy (1992) suggests, loss aversion also has an 
Impact on public opinion, not just on pollcymakers directly. This Idea Implies that the 
public Itself Is Involved In a framing procedure, if a situation of loss aversion Is produced 
through the framing of a given problem, this may result In punishing political leaders. The 
role of public opinion becomes crucial due to the tendency for domestic publics to react 
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more strongly to strategic losses than to comparable gains and to punish their leaders 
more for the former than to reward them for the latter (1992: 285). 
The media's capacity to Influence political choices In this case Is through the impact of 
media frames on the public. Given the emergence of public opinion from framed and 
mediated Information particularly In the domain of foreign policy, the public becomes the 
filter for the media frames to exert domestic pressure on pollcymakers. Figure 2.2 
depicts the route through which the media frames affect political decision-making, this 
time with the public as an additional component of the Interactlon. The Idea Is that the 
cognitive Impact of the media frame Is now exerted on the public, which then converts 
into the expectation of a domestic opposition In case the decision-maker falls to conform 
to what the public sentiment dictates. 
Decision-maker 
Choice vroblem 
----- Domestic Cost 
Pol6ccal Frorne 
I 
Media Frame 
Cognhive Impact 
----------- 
Figure 2.2: The Indirect Impact of media frames on decision-making 
The difference with the Impact depicted In figure 2.1 lies In the type of pressure the 
media frames exert. In the former case, a possible media opposition to the political 
frame of the choice problem Is translated Into pressure that concerns International 
decisions the actor makes and the respective International cost they may entail. In the 
latter case, the pressure acquires the dimension of a domestic expected cost and the 
Media Rolos In Political Docision-Making. The Contribution of Framing Theory se 
damage that a potential failure may cause to his domestic reputation. Any possible 
Influence of the media frame on the framing of the decision-maker Is exerted not on his 
Interpersonal processing of Information but on his expectation of the public reaction. In 
other words, it Is not the political frame per se that changes, but rather a domestic cost Is 
now attached to it. The cognitive Impact on public opinion Is Incorporated In what I would 
call a 'rationally' oriented relationship between media Influences and foreign policy 
decisions and will be epitomised In the next chapter with the aid of game theory. 
2.4.3 IdentIfication of tho modla framo 
We have therefore Identified the Importance of framing on decision-making processes 
and a potential route through which media framing can be equally Influential on political 
decisions. Prospect theory has offered a foundation for the Identification of both a direct 
and Indirect potent Impact of media frames. The present section attempts to Identify the 
dimensions of the media frames, In the coverage of a foreign policy Issue, such as an 
International crisis. It alms at Identifying and formulating the Instrument with which the 
media play their part In decision-making, In theoretical terms. It will also provide the 
foundation for the analysis of the press coverage In order to test the application of the 
model to be completed In the next chapter. It Is an effort to describe how the media 
frames should be conceptualised In order to Illustrate the media's role as a political 
actor. 
To investigate the media frame of a political situation such as an International crisis, we 
assume that, similar to the political frame, the media frame Is controlled by the manner In 
which the choice problem Is perceived and presented In the media. In this case, the 
media frame takes the facts and organises them around a central Idea. This central Idea 
Is constructed by words that compose the frame and at the same time emphasise those 
aspects of the given situation that the media aim at highlighting. 
Research on framing has distinguished two categories of frames, namely those of 
frames as dependent and as Independent variables. In the former case the creation of 
frames Is Influenced by several soclo-structural or organisational factors. In the latter 
case, It is the media frames that Influence attitudes (1999: 107). The media's function as 
a political actor may encompass both frame categories. As dependent variables, the 
media frames are produced through the organisational structure of the media 
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organisations and the way that this shapes the news construction. The Idea refers to the 
media's roles as a political actor and a political Institution that organises the news 
production around certain practices. which reflect the media's Incentives and 
motivations, be It of commercial or Ideological disposition. The latter case creates scope 
to conceptuallse the media as political actors and 'conveyors' of frames that Influence 
political behaviour, and focuses on content as the Instrument for the media's political 
action. The media frames as an Independent varlable will be the focus of attention In this 
thesis. 
The model for the organisation of the media content within the context of decision- 
making is found In Entman's definition according to which, media fmmos dorine 
problems, diagnose causes and suggest remedies. The key Idea Is firstly the media's 
Initlafive to proceed with an analysis and Interpretation of a given situation that goes 
beyond a mere depiction and neutral presentation of an event and resembles the 
evaluation process In the framing phase of a choice problem, as suggested by 
Kahneman & Tversky. When seen through the prism of prospect theory, Entman's 
definition organises the media content In a frame that allows for the conceptualisation of 
the media as declslon-makers. That Is to say, the media offer a way of reasoning for a 
given matter and also suggest a solution. 
Secondly, Kahneman & Tversky defined framing as 'the decision-makeesconception of 
the acts, outcomes and contingencies associated with a partcular choice' (1981: 453). 
When such acts, outcomes and contingencies Involve a given degree of risk, the framing 
of the decision will render the decision-maker loss averse. In other words, there are 
certain compelling notions that define the process through which decisions are framed. 
Therefore, the media proceed with framing a situation by defining a problem, diagnosing 
a cause and suggesting a remedy based on some further compelling noVons. which 
stem from their own preferences and motivations. This Idea refers back to the discussion 
with regard to the media process of selectivity as an Indicator of their power to report 
Independently. Entman's definition of the media framing enhances this concept of media 
power since it assigns the media with a framing procedure analogous to the decision- 
making process that prospect theory suggests. 
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The Interesting aspect of this approach lies in the potential Impact that such a framing 
may have on the political frames. Framing a situation In a procedure that resembles the 
decision-maker's evaluation process, the media Increase the possibility for their frame to 
be noticed and even to be considered by the decision-maker, especially when it Is 
known to Interrelate with the public mood. At this stage it Is the frames embodied In the 
news text that become the centre of attention for the decislon-maker and represent the 
preliminary analysis of the choice problem on behalf of the media. They describe 
attributes of the news Itself encouraging a particular understanding of those events the 
news refers to. What the media do In the framing phase of the choice problem Is to 
construct their own reality and approach of a situation that ultimately leads to a particular 
solution of the problem at hand. In cases when the subject of the frame becomes a 
potential loss and considering that a loss will always hurt more than an equal gain will 
please, it could then become harder for the decision-maker to remain Inactive before 
similar media coverage. It Is therefore Interesting to examine how the decision-maker 
would perceive the media framing on these circumstances. 
Entman notes that through repetition, placement and reinforcing associations with each 
other, the words that comprise the frame render one basic Interpretation more readily 
discernible and comprehensible than others (Entman, 1991). His definition of the media 
frames provides the model according to which the words that compose the media frame 
may be detected, and a framework withln which these words may then be translated Into 
an Influentlal Instrument. 
This frame can be described as 'diagnostic' and 'prognostic'; It alms at capturing those 
elements in the press coverage that will appear to compose a preliminary analysis of the 
choice problem on the same basis as the political framing and the analysis made by the 
two political actors. The media frame In this case consists of word combinations that 
Promote a problem definition and a certain degree of seriousness of the situation 
Attribute responsibility 
Promote certain risk, cost and pay-offs for each available option 
Predict the outcome of each combination of the options available to the 
governmental players 
o Suggest remedy 
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Attention should also be given to the 'time' element in the framing conducted by the 
press. 'Although conventional wisdom Is that the news deals with present happenings, 
news stories may focus on the past - providing historical background or tracing related 
event In the past - or the future - making predictions about further developments, 
proposing actions to be taken, or evaluating the Impact of the event In the future' (Chyl & 
McCombs, 2004: 28)). In this case, the dimension of time Is closely related to what is 
defined as episodic and thematic framing (lyengar, 1991). When the media tend to 
portray an event from an episodic approach, they focus on the specific Issue Itself 
without providing any further explanations about the history and background of the 
event. On the contrary, thematic framing places the event In a broader field 
concentrating on the social forces and Institutions on which audiences are expected to 
put the blame when It comes to the coverage of a certain problem. 
In our case it Is both the episodic and thematic framing that encompasses all time levels 
-past, present and future- offering a coverage that Includes description of a given 
situation as well as analysis and assessment. The time levels are embedded In the 
diagnosis and prognosis In which the analysis of the press coverage will be organised. 
Ultimately, the prognostic and diagnostic media frame that this thesis seeks to detect 
can be traced both In the episodic and thematic framing. On the one hand, the 
description of an event, such as a crisis, per se, even with no reference to background 
Information may still define the problem, attribute responsibility and suggest remedy. At 
the same time, it may also embody those time dimensions that are likely to provide a 
profound and rigorous account of the given political choice problem. 
The essence of the media diagnosis and prognosis Is the Indication It gives to the 
audience about what the causal forces are and what the preferred action should be. The 
dissemination of prognosis may be particularly Important with regard to the Impact It may 
have on what the audience would consider as the best decision to be made by the 
government. The dissemination of a negative prognosis Is likely to create conditions of 
loss aversion and place the policymakers In the domain of losses, as prospect theory 
suggests. Yet, what this thesis will seek to demonstrate 13 that the significance of this 
occurrence lies first In the Impact that this situation is likely to have on the audience and 
second In the way the government will perceive the audience's Involvement too. In other 
words, the diagnostic and prognostic media frame needs to be Investigated within a 
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wider framework that will include the frame's cognitive Impact on the audience and 
consequently, the Impact of this media frame-audience Interaction on the government. 
Once the Information that falls under the above categories Is detected, the ultimate 
objective Is to Identify to what extent the media frame the current situation In a way 
similar to the frames employed by the politicians. The political framing Is mainly detected 
through the official statements and moves made by the two governments. A media 
frame, which appears to be opposing the political frame, Is being evaluated In relation to 
the anticipated public 'punishment' it may Instigate and to the official governmental 
responses. 
The element of time becomes Important also In terms of the potential changes In both 
the media and the political frame. The extent. to which both frames tend to change 
during the progress of each crisis, Is a potential Indicator of their Influence over one 
another. The detection and examination of such changes Is an Important step for the 
investigation of the media-politiclans Interdependence. Particular attention should be 
given to the similarities and differences between the risk, cost and pay-offs of each 
potential outcome of the crisis as framed by the media and the political actors. Any 
possible changes In the evaluation phase of the choice problem on behalf of the political 
actors in relation to their Initial policy line should also be Investigated In terms of media 
influence. 
In brief, the objective of the employment of content analysis In the press coverage of the 
case study Is to Identify those text elements that present an attempt of the Greek and 
Turkish newspapers to frame and analyse a specific choice problem similarly to the 
political actors. The press coverage will be approached as another actor that frames a 
given situation but without being In the position to make a direct move In this 
international game. Its role as an actor concentrates on its power to Indirectly participate 
In the political game by Influencing the moves of the political actors and the final 
decisions they proceed with. 
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2.5 Summary 
The present chapter discussed the media's quality as political actors through the theory 
of the political Institution, in an effort to trigger an examination of a more rigorous and 
drastic approach of their role as active particlpants In the decision-making process. 
Within this context, the chapter introduced framing theory as an Illustration of the 
media's capacity to proceed with evaluation and analysis of Information Independent of 
official controls. The media frames may then become a source of drastic Impact on the 
policymakers' perception of a given Issue. The Importance of framing as a media 
'weapon' was further enhanced with the Introduction of prospect theory, a paradigm of 
decision-making that unravelled the strategic predisposition embodied In framing. With 
the rationalisation and systematic connection of framing with public opinion, prospect 
theory helped locate the media In the political domain as active participants, focusing on 
the Impact that media framed Information has on policyrnakers. 
The objective of this chapter was to build an argument to support the media's strategic 
role In the political game. It was mentioned earlier that although framing Is shown to 
determine choices that political actors make, It has been conc-eptualised as a cognitive 
impact. This thesis recognises the cognitive Importance of frames on the emergence of 
public opinion. By putting together the three Individual players and the relationships they 
develop with one another It needs to produce a schema that will systematically 
demonstrate how the different components of the media-politicians relationship result In 
and explain the media's strategic action. The present chapter comprises the first part In 
the production of this schema. This Includes the Identification of the media's power as 
embedded In the framing of news, and the location of the media frames In the decision- 
making process as a source of Influence that may develop Into domestic pressure. The 
remaining part of this model will connect the different components In a game-theoretic 
Interaction that will create the profile of the media as strategic actors. 
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3 The Media In the Political Game 
3.1 Introduction 
Having demonstrated the media's quality as political actors and Introduced framing 
theory as a vital 'ingredient' In their ability to develop an independent action, the thesis 
will now attempt the merging of the observations and Inferences made In chapter two, 
with the theory of games. The present chapter comprises the last stage In the formation 
of the theoretical model that seeks to Illuminate the media's strategic role and Influence 
on foreign policy decision-making processes. Game theory Is here presented as a model 
for the study of decision-making process between rational actors. Given that the 
aforementioned model reflects an attempt to Integrate the media In political decision- 
making process, game theory has been selected to help In exploring the political process 
itself through a more systematic and consistent framework. It serves In offering Insight 
Into the forces that drive political decisions and In creating entries for the media frames 
to be systematically Incorporated In that process. 
Game theory Is favoured over prospect theory for the reason that strategic Interaction Is 
favoured over cognition as a theory for deCision-making analysis. On the one hand. It Is 
essential to clarify that prospect theory would provide the context for the examination of 
the media-government Interaction and the media's Influence from a cognitive 
perspective. Apart from the fact that cognition represents the main approach through 
which media effects have been largely studied so far, a cognitive Impact of the media 
frames presupposes an Impact on the Interpersonal Information processing of the 
decision-maker and a change In their perception of a given situation. Such a method 
would entail a correlation between media frames and political decisions that Is rather 
fluid and abstract and therefore problematic to be studied and verified within the context 
of a cause-effect relationship. On the other hand, the preference over a strategic 
approach offered by game theory alms at filling an existing gap In the theory of media 
and communication with regard to the media-government relationships and In particular 
the effects of the media on governmental decision-making. The absence of a theoretical 
framework that examines media effects in terms of a strategic Interaction provides the 
incentive for the production of a model that examines the media's role In political 
decision-making through an alternative, more systematic approach; which can also 
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function as a departure point towards the development of a more accurate and 
methodical theory of media-government relations. 
The present chapter will therefore defend the employment of the game theoretic 
approach first by Introducing rational choice theory as the foundation of the political 
game and of the presentation of some fundamental norms that explain human behaviour 
consistently. It will pave the way to Introduce game theory as a form of two-person 
Interactions, between rational actors. Particular attention Is given to the description of 
conflict situations as games, which serves a two-fold purpose. On the one hand it 
prepares the reader for the type of game that will be used as a basis for the building of a 
coherent framework for the media to be Integrated too. On the other hand, It draws 
attention to the national costs that decisions In situations of conflict entail and, which 
could rise even further due to media frames. The depiction of a conflict situation In the 
context of a game Is made with the employment of the Cuban Missiles crisis as an 
empirical example. 
A media entry Is created In the political game by way of the vital role of Information In the 
coordination of the players' moves. Information Is here presented as a key component of 
the media's action In the political game, through which their strategic role Is Identified. 
The final stage of the model Is the location of the media In the structure of the game, 
with the aid of theoretical examples that highlight the possibility of multi-levell games. 
Their position is Identified as a third actor that develops Interactions Wth the decision- 
makers. The outcome of these Interactions converges the media's strategic Impact on 
the decision-making process. 
The thesis argues that the employment of game theory will provide the foundation to 
Identify parameters In how and why people act the way they do. This will allow the 
drawing of Inferences about the forces that drive political decisions and create a 
framework of decision-making. The main objective In the employment of the theory Is to 
provide a more consistent approach to the media's role as a political actor and, by 
analysing how politicians also view this role, create their profile as a strategic actor. 
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3.2 The emergence of Rationality and Game Theory In the social 
sciences 
Before we proceed with a more detailed discussion of game theory and the way the 
political game Is conceptualised, it would be useful to briefly examine the roots of game 
theory and its emergence In relation to rational choice theory. 
Randall Collins (1994) Identifies the development of the rational tradition during the 
1700s and 1800s under the name 'utilitarianism' and as closely related to economics. 
John Locke, the Ideologue of the Glorious Revolution, was the one who set down many 
of the Ideas of utilitarianism, focusing on the Individual as the centre and starting point of 
social action. Locke understood action to be the outcome of people's physical 
sensations and of their capacity to shape the circumstances In which they lived, rational 
Individuals built up their Ideas based on their own experience and as a resultant of their 
own sensations (Collins, 1994: 125-126, Emirbayer & Mischa, 1998: 964-965). However, 
his Ideology left unanswered questions with regard to the gap left between explaining 
what rational Individuals ought to do and explaining the way people have actually been 
behaving. In other words, at that stage utilitarlans failed to explain what they regarded as 
false Ideas and disadvantageous behaviour (Collins, 1994: 126). At the same Ume, 
Locke's emphasis on people's physical sensations generated the Image of a selfish 
Individual that Shaftesbury and Hutcheson tried to avoid by suggesting an Instinctive 
moral sense that enabled people to distinguish what was right to do. However, because 
such an assumption would lead to a return to religious dogmatism, Collins reports that 
other empiricists focused on showing how all beliefs are built through Individuals' 
experiences, In order to protect the mind from superstition (1994: 127). 
Wthin this context, Hume suggested that the beliefs and actions of Individuals were the 
outcome of Ideas that were built based on habit and the order In which their sensations 
have occurred to them. Hume's argument was that the way people behaved was 
because of their habitual experience and not because of what was rational for them to 
do. He therefore emphasised on thoughtless habits as the forces of Individual action, 
which would also explain why Individuals would put up with Institutions even If the latter 
would not really fit their rational interests (Collins, 1994: 127). 
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Towards the end of the 19'h century, the tradition of utilitarianism fades with one of the 
main reasons being the fact that as Collins states, economics was becoming divorced 
from common sense and from sociology, which became an Independent discipline. 
Sociologists like Durkhelm criticlsed utilitarianism for pdodUslng the Individual rather than 
society and tried to shift the emphasis to the moral ties among people as a more 
significant force than economic/market exchanges. The main philosophic trend was to 
focus on the use of ethical concepts and ethical language rather than logical 
explanations of action (Collins, 1994: 132-133). 
In the 1950s a new version of utilitarianism started to develop again, this time In 
sociology, the roots of which appear to be different from the old ublitarlan tradition and Its 
economic disposition. Theorists of the new discipline, such as Mead, Weber and 
Parsons argued In different directions. it was particularly Parsons towards whom 
Homans launched an attack, starting out the establishment of a now version of 
utilitarianism. Parsons recognised that Individuals behaved according to their roles In the 
larger social system, which were shaped by culture and the process of socialisation 
(Collins, 1994: 134). He actually sought to combine the rational and non-rational 
dimensions of human action by Identifying effott as the linking point between what he 
described as social conditions and ends (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998: 965). 
Homans reacted to Parsons' structural-functionalism describing the whole notion of his 
social system as abstract and stressing that whatever happens must be closely linked to 
and caused by the Individuals' motivations. Homans' law, which Is his most Important 
principle, focuses on the Interactions among Individuals. He formulated a sedes of 
principles of how people behaved leading to what was known as 'exchange theory. 
Within this context, Homans shifted sociological theory towards the Individual. herihis 
self interests and the way Individuals Interacted and made exchanges with each other. 
Unlike the traditional version of utilitarianism, sociology and exchange theory were 
concerned with Issues of power and how Inequality comes about (Collins, 1994: 133- 
137). The re-establishment of rationality as seen through Homans' effort to crystallise a 
new version of utilitarianism, Is assoclated with the abstractness of theodes of sociology 
and structural-functionalism - which were difficult to verify by empirical evidence- that 
rational choice theorists sought to overcome. 
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Collins goes on to describe how the study of rationality within this sociological context 
came up against paradoxes and limits of rationality related to the ability of Individuals to 
process Information and make rational decisions, as well as to the ability of Individuals to 
form groups and proceed with collective action. It Is the latter that Is particularly 
Interesting here since it led to the issue of the 'free rideethat was among the problems 
dealt with by game theory. As Collins describes, Mancur Olson formulated the'free ddee 
issue In 1965 explaining how 'the rational individual will not contribute to the costs of 
providing public goods but will go ahead and enjoy them nevertheless' (11994: 157). 
The 'free rider' problem is what has been described as the 'prisoner's dilemma' problem 
in game theory, which was a method that developed during World War 11 for the analysis 
of strategic decisions. The prisoner's dilemma encompasses the problem of the 
contribution that rational Individuals make or don't make to society and the distribution of 
public goods; and Is 'analogous to a social world In which public goods would be 
valuable to have, but In which Individuals would lose something from contributing to the 
public good as long as other people do not' (Collins, 1994: 158). What makes the 
situation a dilemma Is the fact that Interactions between rational selfish Individuals leads 
to no one ever sacrificing anything for the public good. 
The prisoner's dilemma Issue represents a stage In the development of rationality where 
the Introductiion of game theory and In particular of Iterated games, according to Collins, 
have been proposed as a way to overcome the problems of social coordination. This Is 
because when Individuals are Involved In a series of games with the same patterns, they 
ultimately develop long-run patterns of behaviour that differ from what happens In a 
single game (1994: 159). Game theory Is here Invoked as a solution for understanding 
social solidarity reflecting some first attempts to develop and employ an economics 
rooted theory, such as rationality, for the explanation of social behaviour and decision- 
making processes. 
As Andrew Colman (1982) states, traditional theories of social psychology lacked the 
necessary concepts with which to deal rigorously with Interdependent decision-making. 
This justified the necessity and suitability of a systematic theory, which would analyse 
Interactions and decision outcomes that depended upon the decisions of other people. 
Colman recognlsed the need to explain deliberate decisions, which was an area that 
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existing theoretical models were unable to deal with, since they tended to explain the 
behaviour of inanimate objects as responses to external forces. He states that most 
psychologically Interesting forms of social behaviour derive from deliberate decisions, 
some of which are agreeable to game theory analysis (1982: 34). 
Nevertheless, game theory did not attract much attention until Jon von Neuman and 
Oskar Morgenstern published 'The Theory of Games and Economic behavioue In 1944, 
It was their mutual Interests In strategic behaviour that joined von Neuman's 
mathematical expertise with Morgenstern's Interest In Individual-level analysis In the 
building of new economics leading to the development of the first social science - 
centred mathematical Innovations. They were both convinced that mathematics provided 
the appropriate toolbox for researching the complicated social sciences (O'Rand, 1992: 
182-183). They focused on Interactions among agents govemed by a set of rules that 
specified the possible moves of the participants and a set of outcomes for each possible 
combination of moves. The Idea was that such a theory of games could apply to almost 
any social Interaction where Individuals have some understanding of how the outcome 
for an agent Is affected not just by his own action but by the actions of others as well 
(Heap & Varoufakls, 1995: 1.2). It Is therefore no surprise that von Neuman and 
Morgenstern's game-theoretlc notions coursed Into political science as well. 
Wiliam H. Riker (1992), who also had a part In the development of the entrance of game 
theory In politics, explains that the lack of an Intellectual centre In political science In the 
1950s, with a clear understanding of what the science of politics was all about. rendered 
the Introduction of a more scientific and systematised theory Imperative. Riker refers to 
two features of game theory In particular, that appeared to fit Into political science. 
Firstly, game theory tended to analyse soclal outcomes In terms of the Interaction of 
participants, each of whom sought to achieve their goals, excluding factors such as 
Instinct, thoughtless habits or unconscious desires that psychological and metaphysical 
theories would embrace In explaining social behaviour (1992: 209). 
Secondly, Riker explains that game theory allowed for free choice, recommending that 
participants could choose their strategies according to their preferences and based on 
calculations of the opponents' preferences as well. That was contrary to theories of 
economic and historical determinism that had turned humans Into mechanistic agents or 
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carriers of exogenously determined drives. At the same time, game theory can also 
guarantee the behaviour regularity that allows generalisaflon and that Is present In the 
study of politics. Riker therefore argues that what game theory offers Is the possibility for 
both generalisation and free choice In the analysis and understanding of political 
interactions and outcomes (1992: 210). All In all, the significance of game theory and 
particularly of its entrance In political science lies In allowing the Investigation of political 
decisions within the context and as outcomes of Interactions between participants; and 
more Importantly, It focuses on political outcomes as resultants of decisions that are 
made consciously, unlike the decisions driven by unconscious desires that social and 
psychological theories explain. 
The brief historical account of the development of rationality as a tradition and the 
entrance of game theory In the social and political sciences serves as a departure point 
In demonstrating the advantages of the specific approach In relation to other sociological 
theories of social action and decision-making. For Instance. contrary to the discipline of 
sociology that depends on largely abstract social systems, rationality and game theory 
provide a systematic context for the investigation and analysis of social and political 
action. Instead of focusing on thoughtless habit and Instinctive processes of decision- 
making, game theory places the emphasis on Interactions and examines human 
behaviour as the outcome of such Interactions. Action Is therefore a complex Interactive 
phenomenon that game theory helps Investigate In depth: while the emphasis on the 
purposive Instrumental and calculating orientations of the Individuals make the empirical 
study and analysis of human behaviour possible as well. 
3.3 Rational Choice Theory and the political process 
Rational choice theory provides the foundation to understand and employ game theory 
for the analysis of political Interactions. The present section Introduces the concept of 
rational decision-making as a foundation of game theory In an effort to Identify some 
fundamental principles In the behaviour of actors that will contribute In the formation of a 
systematic game model. Given that the theory Is often accused of being unrealistic, the 
present section will attempt to defend It by highlighting Its analytical strengths In relation 
to the purposes of this thesis. 
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To act rationally presupposes correspondence between means and ends and the 
development of a behaviour that aims at maximising one's own Interests. The process of 
rational decision-making reflects the selection among a number of given alternatives with 
certain consequences each; and requires that Individuals choose the alternative with the 
most beneficial outcome, In relation to their preferences and the value assigned to them. 
Prior to making a choice, rational actors are expected to rank the available alternatives. 
This ranking will help them In specifying the payoffs and worth of each possible 
outcome, before they proceed with the selection of strategy. The choice they make 
ultimately represents the goal they seek to achieve (Elster, 1986; Riker, 1992: Allison & 
Zelikow, 1999). 
Rational choice theory recognises a certain degree of consistency In human behaviour, 
particularly for the achievement of goals. Eisler describes rationality as a 'normatlveý 
concept, which Indicates what action Individuals should take In order to achieve their 
objectives. However, he recognises important non-normative applications In the use of 
rationality, particularly for explanation, prediction and description of the human behaviour 
(1986: 83). One of the theorys advantages lies specifically In the fact that, as opposed 
to psychological and cognitive theories of explanation, the rational choice approach 
focuses on outcomes of decisions and most Importantly, It explains outcomes as 
deliberate choices (Tsebells, 1990: 3940). 
To analyse human action based on the outcomes that this action yields. allows for the 
methodical Identification and explanation of all these factors and constraints that lead to 
a given behaviour. It allows for the connection of the selected action with the actor's 
motives, preferences, goals, alternatives and consequences In a consistent way that 
produces a simple and systematic formula of how and why certain actions lead to certain 
outcomes. The Idea Is that the production of such formulas takes Into account 
constraints and contextual factors and organises a number of variables In a way that 
offers adequate justification of non-optimal action not as a mistake but as a resultant of 
the combination and Interaction of those variables. To examine human action as a 
deliberate one implies that this action Is optimal to a certain degree and under certain 
circumstances, The input of rational choice theory In this case lies In discovering this 
optimal behaviour through the analysis and investigation of those forces that lead to a 
given course of action (Tsebells, 1990). 
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The argument the present chapter seeks to make Is that although rational choice theory 
Is not the only possible approach to politics, It provides the tool for the understanding of 
interactions, which paves the way for a profound explanation and analysis of political 
decision-making. This can help discover unseen parameters In the development of 
specific political behaviours. It allows making more accurate guesses about future 
consequences of current actions and ultimately builds assumptions that permit prediction 
of future actions as well. 
The theory Is however often accused of being too Idealistic, as It tends to exaggerate the 
degree of control that political actors have over their decisions. A popular example of the 
rational choice approach of an International political Interaction was made by Graham 
Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999) on the Cuban Missile Crisis. The analysts approach the 
Soviet and US decisions, to place offensive missiles In Cuba and to proceed wilth a 
blockade respectively, as alternatives whose consequences were preferred in terms of 
the actors' utility function; and they produce a detailed account of how and why each 
decision was made at a given point of time. They conclude that the specific event cannot 
be adequately explained through the rational approach due to several complexities and 
uncertainties that the model falls to take Into account. 
They actually Introduce the concept of bounded rationality In an attempt to acknowledge 
the Importance of knowledge and the limitations in the Information processing ability of 
the rational agent (1999: 20). This Is In order to highlight the often-misleading nature of 
rationality when It comes to analysing an actor's decisions, and the underestimation of 
Information and empirical evidence about an actoes objectives and preferences. The 
limitations of rational choice theory as a tool for the explanation of goal-oriented human 
behaviour have also been stressed by Elster who recognises that. apart from the 
Information processing constraints, also Freudian- type emotional factors hinder actors 
from selecting the most effective strategy to achieve their objectives (1986: 83). 
In other words, rational choice theory appears to be highly demanding to the extent that 
one might wonder whether political actors can ever conform to It. It needs to be clarified 
that this thesis does not overlook or underrate the theorys deficiencies. It does however 
defend its effectiveness as an analytical Instrument that can serve the purposes of this 
study. The employment of the theory does not serve to demonstrate that political actors 
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and Institutions such as the media, act rationally In the sense of taking Into account all 
the objective realities of the situation they are faced with. Yet, the argument this thesis 
makes Is that a rational choice approach of the med! 3-politicians Interaction In the 
framework of International events can assist In comprehending why the actors In 
question behave the way they do. It can produce a model that will Illuminate certain 
parameters In the behaviour of the two parties and reveal a new dimension of the 
media's role that extends beyond their cognitive impact on decision-making process and 
is consciously assimilated In governmental policy decisions. 
3.4 Games and rational behaviour 
In Interactions between two or more actors and In situations of conflict many of those 
factors that define decision-making are not assigned to chance or to the given choice 
problem but to the opponent of each actor. 7his brings us to the theory of games. where 
such an opponent is an Integral feature of the decision model problem' (Rapoport 
1980: 52). Eisler defines game theory as 'the theory of rational behaviour by two or more 
interacting rational Individuals, each of them determined to maxlmlse his own Interests 
as specified by his own payoff function' (Eisler, 1986: 89). What game theory offers In 
the analysis of rational behaviour, is a mathematical technique and a systematic 
character that can help In a more consistent analysis of the political Interactions. It can 
analyse social outcomes In terms of the Interaction of participants, each of who 
calculates to achieve self-defined goals. It also suggests that all estImations actors make 
about potential outcomes, they make them acknowledging that similar estimations are 
also made by the adversary (Riker, 1992). 
On a general basis, a game can be described as a method for the solving and analysis 
of problems related to the process of decislon-making. In order to solve a problem, it Is 
essential that one assesses and analyses a given situation. When two or more actors, 
who face one another In their attempt to find a solution that Is favourable to them, handle 
such situations then the situation can be desc4ibed as a game, Games that are played 
between two or more actors are classified as games of strategy and they are concerned 
with situations in which outcomes depend upon the choices that all the Involved players 
make; the outcome of the game Is therefore controlled partly by all players (Colman. 
1982: 10). Decisions In such games are made under uncertainty due to the fact that 
actors cannot fully allocate probabilities to one another's moves and they are not 
The Media In the Political Game 74 
capable of having complete control of the outcomes of the game (Heap & Varoufakls, 
1995; Hamburger, 1982; Colman, 1982). One basic attribute of the game Is the effort 
that each participant makes to prevent the adversary from making moves and decisions 
that will hinder the payoffs of the former. The actors are Involved In an analysis and 
assessment of the given situation; they develop strategic action and make moves that 
will ultimately maximise their Interests. 
Games do not descdbe only Interactions between two or more actors but also models of 
one-person decisions, whose outcomes are Influenced by the moves of Nature. Colman 
refers to this type of decision-making as games of chance (1982: 9). The outcomes of 
such games result partly from the decisions of the actor and partly from Nature, which 
represents an Invented player and operates as a force that Is unpredictable by the 
decision-maker. It has Its own set of actions and rules and can pursue them In a way 
that Interferes with the achievements of the player. Later In this chapter we will 
encounter both types of games as part of the model under construction. 
The contribution of game theory to this thesis Is of course analogous to that of rational 
choice theory. Game theory Is Introduced here as a process that Incorporates rational 
decision-making In Interactions between players. It assumes that players act rationally 
calculating and following their best strategies. The outcome of the Interaction between 
strategies of rational players Is described as equilibrium. Behaviour'In equilibrium' Is a 
key part of the structure and process Of a game and signifies a player's selection of 
strategy as the best response to the strategies of the opponent. Such a strategy 
represents the course of action from which none of the players has an Incentive to 
deviate (Dixit & Skeath, 1999; Heap & Varoufakis, 1995, Tsebelis, 1990). Equilibrium 
arguments help In discovering the optimal behavlours of actors (Tsebelis. 1990: 41) and 
are seen as among the analytical assets the theory offers. When actors do not appear to 
make an equilibrium decision, the analysis can ultimately lead to the discovery of 
contextual factors that provide a more accurate and In depth behaviour explanation. 
As It was mentioned earlier, game theory Is here favoured over prospect theory as an 
extension of favoudng a rational approach over a cognitive one for the analysis of the 
media's impact on political decision-makIng. Game theory can organise human 
behaviour In a consistent and analytical manner and therefore can provide a systematic 
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explanation of specific events and outcomes that prospect theory cannot. Given the set 
of rules that control media organisations as well as the Interests they pursue. the media 
appear to bring together features that render their approach as strategic actors feasible. 
At the same time, their Interaction with the government offers for profound analysis as a 
game. A cognitive analysis of this interaction would assign the potential media Impact 
to the interpersonal processing of the media frame by the decision-maker. On the 
contrary, a game theoretic approach will highlight the Interests that drive the employment 
of specific frames by the media and Integrate them in the analysis as part of the 
decision-maker's processing and evaluation of a given situation. 
Apart from the use of explanation, game theory can be used for purposes of prediction 
as well. Dixit & Skeath note, 'when looking ahead to situations where multiple decision- 
makers will Interact strategically, we can use game theory to foresee what actions they 
will take and what outcomes will result' (1999: 34). The construction of a formula, which 
consistently analyses the forces that drive decisions made both by political and media 
actors, can help model the Interaction In a way that allows Its application to future 
Instances. In this case the media could even become considerable tools for the analysis 
of political outcomes. 
3.4.1 Game theory In conflict situations 
The thesis seeks to produce a theoretical model, for which there exists no formula In the 
literature that can be employed as an example. What the literature does Include though 
Is examples of the application of game theory on International events and situations of 
conflict between nation-states. The present section will Introduce the Cuban Missiles 
Crisis as a paradigm that will help understand the structure and process of a political 
game. This example will also provide the foundation for the type of game In which the 
media will be Integrated as part of our theoretical model. At this stage It Is essential to 
Introduce a few basic concepts and presentational conventions that will be encountered 
In the present and In later chapters as well, with regard to the formulation and 
development of political games. 
A game theoretic analysis involves three fundamental concepts, players, strategies and 
payoffs. A player represents any Individual or composite actor that makes purposeful 
decisions/moves, which will then represent the player's strategies. The Intersection of 
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the strategies produces outcomes, the evaluation of which Is then translated Into payoffs 
for each player, according to the players' preferences among the produced outcomes. 
These concepts can be organlsed In two basic forms, -the 'normal form' and the 
'extensive form'. The first represents the choice situation as a matrix In which the 
strategies of one player are represented by rows while the ones of the other player are 
represented by columns. The combination or Intersection of the players' strategies 
results in their payoffs, which are In the form of numbers depicted In the cells of the 
matrix. The normal form of the game represents the form of games where the players 
move simultaneously, contrary to the extensive form that represents games played In 
sequential moves. In the extensive form of the game. the players' moves are depicted In 
a decision-tree that shows the sequence In which the two players move and lists their 
payoffs at the end of each sequence of moves. Trees allow to express a succession of 
moves with each player knowing the moves and decisions that have taken place up to 
the time of a particular decision (Hamburger, 1979: 11-12.26; Scarpf. 1997: 7). The two 
forms of the game will be introduced In the following section, based on the example of 
the Chicken game (Figure 3.1). 
Rapoport claims that the theory of games can be reasonably defined as a theory of 
rational decision In conflict situations. The conceptuallsation of politics as a 
manifestation of conflict and the conceptuallsation of rationality as a mode of reasoning 
allow for casting a crisis Into a framework of decision under risk (1980: 52). While this 
does not imply that the political actors Involved will behave fully rationally, the 
organisation of a crisis as a game allows for the in depth examination and explanation of 
polifleal decisions. 
A conflict can be described as an Interaction between nation states and parties that seek 
to achieve certain objectives'. If when pursuing these objecUves, the Involved parties 
develop a strategy plan to confront the adversary, knowing that the adversary Is doing 
the same and knowing that they depend on the adversarys moves as well, then the 
opposing parties become actors In a political game. In other words, this thesis suggests 
1 Conflict emerges from a particular combination of parties, Incompatible posftions over an Issue. 
hostile attitudes and certain types of diplomatic and military actions. The parties to an 
international conflict are normally the governments of nation states ... parties took to achieve 
certain objectives ... Conflict behaviour Is likely to result when party 
A occupies a position that Is 
Incompatible with the wishes or Interests of party 0 ... the most traditional Issue field Is territory... ' (Holsil, 1992: 348-349), 
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that any political Interaction In the form of a conflict, can be Illustrated In the form of a 
game. 
A conflict situation In politics can be best described 03 a nonzero-sum game. It 13 difficult 
to assume that the total loss of an actor will entail the best outcome and greatest payoff 
for the other. Not to mention that, 'pure conflict, In which the Interests of two antagonists 
are completely opposed, Is a special case, It would arlse In a war of complete 
extermination, otherwise not even In wae (Schelling. 1960: 4). Especially In cases 
where two parties are Involved In a connict about to end up In war, the Wnnee will 
Inevitably bear a certain cost from the outcome. Besides, In most political conflicts actors 
are Involved In bargaining situations. This Indicates the element of cooperation that Is 
often allowed In nonzero-sum games, where the Involved parties select strategies and 
make decisions following communication. In this category of games actors are more 
likely to reach an agreement or compromise and avoid the worst possible outcome. In 
general, conflict situations are mostly games of mixed conflict and cooperation. One 
such example could be the case of an International conflict where, although both actors 
agree they want to avoid war, they disagree In the way In which war will be avoided, and 
while one actor prefers solution A, the other Insists on solution 0. 
In this thesis, the objective Is to obtain a clear picture of the media's role In the decision- 
making processes, In conflict situations. Therefore, an accurate analysis of the two 
Greek- Turkish crises employed as a case study becomes vital, and Is expected to 
answer some crucial questions In the escalation and resolution of each crisis as well as 
create scope to detect the role of the media. Game theory will help understand why the 
two governments selected certain strategies Instead of others; and also, Identify whether 
and to what extent the media coverage was among the factors that defined the 
Interaction between the two governments and the wider context In which decisions were 
made. 
3.4.2 Tho Cuban Missilos Crisis as a political garno 
The Cuban Missiles Crisis of 1962 constitutes an example from political and military 
history that has been used quite widely In terms of game theoretic analysis. It appears 
that the drama of the episode and the amount of Information available to the analysts 
about the progress of the events renders both the reconstruction of the progress In game 
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theoretic terms and the drawing of accurate Inferences a feasible task. The discussion of 
the specific example provides also a manifestation of a game theoretic analysis of 
political decision-making. It also demonstrates the flexibility of the theory In Incorporating 
and organising the subjective specifications of each situation and the potential for an 
evolutionary development and analysis. The most common perception of the specific 
crisis Is that the two superpowers were about to Involve In a nuclear confrontation, and 
the most appropriate game model to Incorporate this Is the so-called Chicken, a classical 
model of two-person games. 
Chicken has been applied to the Cuban Missiles crisis by Nigel Howard In his article 
'Some developments In the Theory and Application of Metagames (General Systems, 
XV. 1970). The name derives from various versions of a gruesome pastime that 
originated among Californian teenagers In the 1930S and became notorious In 1955 
through Nicholas Rays powerful film Robol Without a Couso, starring James Dean 
(Colman, 1995). The most familiar version of the game Is that of the two motorists 
speeding towards each other. The description of the game can be replaced by the matrix 
shown In figure 3.1. Therefore each motorist can choose between two strategies; either 
swerve, which In this case Is translated Into 'Cooperation'. or else 'C'. or drive ahead, 
which equals 'Defection, or V. More specifically, actor I can choose the right or left 
column while actor 2 can pick the top or bottom row. Their two choices determine a cell 
of the matrix. If both players choose Cooperation and swerve on time. the outcome of 
the game Is 3,3 as shown In the top left cell, which equals compromise or else a draw. If 
on the other hand, actor 1 chooses Defection and drives ahead while actor 2 selects 
cooperation and swerves, the outcome Is 2,4, as shown In the top right cell, with 2 being 
the payoff for actor 2. who Is the Chicken, and 4 being the payoff for actor 1, who Is the 
winner (The payoff for the row player Is shown first). The same outcome occurs If the 
two actors choose the opposite moves (4,2), but this time the Chicken Is actor 1. In case 
none of the motorists decides to swerve on time and therefore they both choose to 
defect, they both get 1 as shown In the bottom right cell, which Is the worst possible 
outcome, and they end up In a head-on collision. 
In the application of the Chicken game on the Cuban Missiles crisis Howard set out the 
following strategies: On the one hand, the Soviet Union could choose either to continue 
placing missiles In Cuba or to withdraw them. On the other hand the strategies available 
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to the US govemment were either to proceed with an Invasion In Cuba or to withdraw. 
The question that Howard attempted to answer was what the best strategy could be for 
both the Soviet Union and the US government Using the example of the chicken game, 
he produced the model shown In figure 3.2. 
Defed -1.1 
Actor I 
C 
Actor 11 
D 
CD Actor I 
3.3 2.4 
4.2 1 11 
Defect 
-,, 00' 
Cooperate 4.2 
Actor 11 Defect 2,4 
Cooperate 
Cooperate - 3,3 
Figure 3.1 : The Chicken game In Its normal and extensive form 
In the specific game, Cooperation Is the best strategy for both actors. The US 
government could reach a peaceful settlement and withdraw from Invading, provided 
that the Soviet Union would also agree to withdraw from placing offensive missiles In 
Cuba. This Is an outcome that does not yield the greatest payoff for any of the sides, But 
it leads to a compromise where none of the actors Is 'chicken'. The choice of Defection 
Is the strategy with the greatest payoff but only on the condition that the adversary would 
choose to cooperate. This Is an example that stresses the Importance of the players' 
coordination of their behaviour In order to solve the problem and reach an equilibrium 
point. Players have to understand each othees sets of moves In order to be able to 
predict each other's moves and avoid the worst possible outcome of the game. 
Howard's example appears rather static when compared to the analysis conducted by 
Allison & Zelikow for the same crisis. This Is because the latter attempt an analysis of 
sequence. They Investigate a series of alternatives available to the two actors and 
examine In detail the reasons that led to the final decisions. What they take Into account 
Is that each side did not make an all-or-nothing cholco but considered altematives, In 
case the adversary did not respond In an appropriate manner (Drams, 1994: 133). 
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USSR 
C: withdraw 
USA 
D: Invade 
C: withdraw missiles D: proceed with placing 
missiles 
3.3 2.4 
Compromise USSR wins 
4.2 1.1 
USA wins Nuclear War 
Figure 3.2: The Cuban Missiles Crises In the form of the Chicken game 
The same example has been analysed by Brams (1994) Illustrating the Incorporation of 
rational choice In game situations. What Is particularly Interesting about Brams' analysis 
Is how, contrary to Howard, he Interprets the US blockade as a move of cooperation. He 
claims, 
'Afthough In one sense the United States "won" by getting the Soviets to withdraw their missiles, 
Premier Nikita Khruschev at the same time extracted from President John Kennedy a promise not 
to Invade Cuba which seems to indicate that the eventual outcome was a compromise solution of 
sorts. Moreover, even though the Soviets responded specifically to the blockade ... the fact that the United States hold out the possibility of escalating the conflict Indicates that the Initial 
blockade decision was not considered final' (1994: 132-133). 
Brams' argument Is that that the two superpowers were Involved In a sequential 
bargaining game In which they considered further alternatives than the ones listed In 
Howard's matrix, and kept their options open while the crisis was progressing. In fact, 
Brams offers the alternative of the crisis being Interpreted as other than a chicken game 
In an attempt to demonstrate the Incapability of game theory to offer an accurate 
interpretation of the situation. " However, there Is potential for a more flexible and realistic 
game theoretic analysis of such an International event that systematically Incorporates 
the complexities of a given situation. Dixit & Skeath, who employed the extended form of 
the game and demonstrated more than one Interpretation of the moves made by the two 
' Drams Is actually suggesting the Theory of Moves its a superior and more accurate Alternative 
to classical game theory, which however preserves the fundamental principles of the latter. We 
could argue that he Introduces TOM as a more flexible version of game theory. which represents 
the progress that Is anyway being made In the development of game theory. Drams, (1994). 
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players, conducted such an analysis. They recognised the uncertainties embedded In 
the crisis and argued that game theory was adequate to explain the decision-making 
process, but not as a two-person game. They therefore suggested the Interplay of a 
number of many-person games as a betterway to look at the crl3lS (1999: 445-450). 
To sum up, the example of the Cuban Missiles crisis provides a manifestation of a 
political game, such as a conflict situation. In the normal form of the game depicted In 
the game matrix. The matrix organises the potential outcomes that result from the 
combination of the two moves available to each player. What It falls to demonstrate Is 
the sequence In which the two actors moved, which can of course be depicted In an 
extended form of the game, as well as the background complexities that affected the 
progress and outcome of the crisis, and which are possible to Incorporate In a many- 
person or a many-arena game. In other words, the normal form of the game represents 
one of the various ways to analyse a decision-making process. The argument that this 
section seeks to make Is the following: the different Interpretations that derive from the 
various analyses of the Cuban Missiles crisis as a game. In principle with regard to the 
outcome of the crisis, do not demonstrate the Inadequacy of the theory to offer accurate 
decision analysis. They rather Indicate that political decisions should not be evaluated In 
Isolation but within a wider context of complexities and uncertainties. Game theory Is 
capable of consistently Integrating this context In the decision-making process and 
tracing the optimal moves of the players that would justify their action and the outcome 
of the game. At the same time, to study the decisions of political actors within this wider 
context creates scope for the Integration of the media as an Influential component of the 
political game. This will be demonstrated In the following two sections. On the basis of a 
political game organised similar to the Cuban Missiles cAsis, the remaining part of the 
chapter will Incorporate the media's role as an actor In the decision-making process and 
Illustrate the dimensions of their strategic action. 
3.5 Games In multlplo arenas 
The purpose of the present section Is to locate the strategic position that the media tend 
to occupy In the structure of the political game. It seeks to Integrate the concept of the 
conflict situation as a game Interaction between actors and the role of Information and 
communication as a role carried by a third actor. This completes the formation of the 
The Media In the Political Game 82 
game model that will serve the purposes of this thesis, * and It Involves breaking the 
political game Into more than one levels. 
Among the most effective Inputs of the game theory literature Is that It creates scope for 
a systematic Integration of soclo-political factors such as the media as actors In the 
political game. The present section will discuss three models that offer a rigorous 
analysis of political games as outcomes of the systematic Integration of more than two 
parties; and that offer reasons why political games should not be studied In Isolation but 
within a wider soclo-political context. Putnam's 'two-level' game (1988), Tsebells' 
I nested' game (1990) and Scharpf s 'composite actor' (1997) will be presented here In an 
effort to Identify some common concepts that will help build a profound understanding of 
the media's strategic position In political decision-maklng. 
Putnam, who sought to construct a model describing situations of International 
negotiations with the two Involved sides calculating both the domestic and International 
Implications of their actions, Introduced the model of the 'two-level game'. In Putnam's 
metaphor bargainers are Involved simultaneously in two arenas of negotiations, one 
representing the International and the other the domestic arena. In order for the 
negotiation round to complete successfully, the parties Involved are expected to 
accomplish an International agreement that has also been domestically ratified. 
In terms of conflict situations, the International or external level represents the main 
conflict between the national parties. In this stage the two national adversaries are 
Involved In a bargaining procedure In an effort to find the most satisfactory solution to the 
conflict and reach an International agreement. The agreement they reach will however 
remain tentative. Any agreement achieved In this level 13 subject to ratification by the 
domestic environment of each national actor. While the bargaining process between the 
two negotiators takes place, there Is a set of separate discussions within the domestic 
constituents of the two negotiators about whether to ratify this agreement. Domestic 
statesmen are expected to negotiate on whether to accept or block the proposed 
agreement. Putnam has called the two different Stages 03 level I and level 2 
respectively (1988: 435-436). 
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Putnam's Inquiry focuses particularly on cases of International negotiations and the utility 
of domestic pressures as a bargaining advantage for the achievement of beneficial 
International agreements. In the example of the Bonn summit conference of 1978 he 
describes how a comprehensive package deal regarding the enhancement of Western 
recovery from the first oil shock was achieved between the govemments of Germany, 
Japan and USA. He suggests that the agreement. which appeared to leave all 
participants happy, 'became possible only because a powerful minodty within each 
government actually favoured on domestic grounds the policy being demanded 
Internationally (1988: 428). The specific model Implies the Involvement of domestic 
constituents In a decision-making process that result In either the ratification or the 
blockage of the respective International agreement mostly through a parliamentary 
function. On this respect the model does not apply In the case of the role the media can 
play as a second-level actor. Yet it brings In Ideas that can help understand and analyse 
the media's Impact as domestic constituents on foreign policy declsions. 
A crucial point Putnam makes Is that, apart from the Impact that domestic rejection of an 
agreement has on the International decision or strategy, even the expectation of a 
domestic rejection Is an equally potent constraint for the progress of an International 
negotiation. The element of expectancy becomes crucial as It allows for the media to 
play the role of the domestic advocate on a second level, through their ability to create 
conditions of domestic cost for the government. This becomes possible for two reasons. 
On the one hand, the Idea of the expectation cost does not necessitate any formal action 
at the second level of the Interaction and it allows for the media to take the place of one 
of the domestic constituents as well. On the other hand, this Is an observation that 
corresponds to the Idea of the audience cost and punishment that the media are capable 
of producing: and the Impact that this potential or expected punishment can have on 
governmental decisions. 
Putnam stresses how the second-level pressure exerted on International negotiators 
derives from a small domestic Wn-set and can explain what he calls 'Involuntary 
defection' (1988: 438). This Is again an Idea that can Incorporate the media In a two- 
level political game. The media's win set In this case Is reflected In their commercial and 
organisational preferences. If this does not overlap with the government's policy 
decision, It could produce a negative coverage and a media punishment, the expectation 
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of which would explain what Putnam calls, Involuntary defection on the International 
board. This Is an Idea that attempts to clarify the complexity of moves that although 
seem irrational on one board, they can be Justified due to being rational on the second 
board. To assume that the media can be perceived as the cause of such an Involuntary 
defection provides the grounds to approach and examine their role also as Instruments 
of analysis of political outcomes and international decJsion-making. That Is to say, the 
media's strategic action, as a source of domestic pressure, can ultimately help Justify 
seemingly Irrational decisions. 
A similar observation Is made In Tsebells' nested game and the concept of the 
suboptimal decision. The nested game represents the political game as a whole network 
of games the actor is Involved In (1990: 5-11). The Idea Is that what appears to be 
suboptimal or Irrational from the perspective of only one game, Is actually optimal when 
the whole network of games is taken Into account. Tsebells explains that the main 
reason why a given decision Is not optimal Is because Its Implications are considered by 
the observer only In one arena. When the Implications of that same decision In other 
arenas are also considered, then the decision-maker has acted optimally. The essence 
of this notion Is to understand the Interconnection of the different arenas In the network 
through the Impact that decisions made In one arena may have on the rest of the arenas 
too. Tsebelis stresses the Importance of the network of games lies In understanding why 
an actor would proceed with a suboptimal move, as this same move might appear 
optimal when seen from the perspective of the whole network of games. It Is an Idea that 
correlates with Putnam's explanation of the Involuntary defection as a move that Is being 
driven to satisfy second-level pressures; only that In Tsebells' model the suboptimal 
move appears as only apparontly Irrational and It represents a disagreement between 
the actor and the observer, rather than the result of domestic pressures. Tsebells' point 
Is that the latter's perspective Is Incomplete since he focuses only on the main arena and 
not on the whole network of games (1990: 9). 
The Important contribution of the examination of a network of games Is that It provides a 
systematic approach to contextual factors and their Influence on the payoffs of the actors 
and the outcomes of the game. Tsebells suggests that such contextual factors can be 
studied as externalities, In the form of the consequences that an Interacuon between two 
parties can have on the decisions of a third party (1990: 58-59). If the media's 
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preferences In the game are approached In terms of their Interaction with the 
government's preferences, the Impact of this Interaction on the outcome of the 
International game and the utility of two governments Is then seen as an extornafityý 
Although both Putnam's and Tsebells' concepts attempt to demonstrate the weight 
accorded to 'background' Influences on decisions and strategy selections, Tsebelis 
emphasises the strategic dimension of deciding against one's own preferences, which 
will not just please the background arenas but will also assure a more preferred final 
outcome (1990: 3). His observation Is clearly illustrated In the example cited regarding 
the Finnish presidential elections. 
'According to the Finnish law, presidential elections are conducted by a three hundred member 
electoral college. An election may require two rounds if no candidate gains the majority of the 
votes and the first two ranking candidates compete In a second round ... In 1956 there were three candidates that participated In the first round: the agrarian Urho Kekkonen. the Socialist Karl- 
August Fagerholm and the conservative Juo Kustl Pa3sikivi. Given that the most challenging 
opponent for Kekkonen, who was supported by the communist party, was the conservative 
Pa3sikIvI, one would expect the communists to give an their votes to Kekkonen. Instead, the 
majority voted for the Socialist candidate' (1990: 2). 
Tsebelis' argument In this case is that the communists voted against their preferences In 
the first round In order to eliminate the more threatening conservative candidate and to 
promote their most preferred outcome in the second round by voting exclusively for 
Kekkonen. This Is a case of an apparently Irrational decision made In the main arena of 
the game, which however served the objectives of the whole network of arenas. 
It could be argued that one of the main differences between Putnam's and Tsebelis' 
conceptualisation of a game taking place In more than one levels, 13 the following: In the 
two-level game the Influence of the domestic constituents Is perceived as an acceptance 
or rejection of an international policy and alms at meeting domestic Interests. 
Consequently, the International actors 'will aim at maximising their own ability to satisfy 
domestic pressures' (Putnam, 1988: 434). In the nested game the background arenas 
represent mostly another level of the main actors' preferences and Interests. In this case 
what might appear an Irrational decision Is not a resultant of background pressures, but 
rather a strategic or sophisticated move (as opposed to sincere) In order to obtain a 
more preferred outcome (Tsebells. 1990: 3). On this basis, the Idea of the nested game 
represents a better coordination of Interests between the different games of the network 
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than the parties Involved In Putnam's two-level game; and It appears to be in line with 
what Scharph describes as the 'composite actors'. 
Schapf's notion Implies action on two different levels as well and Is organised In an 
outside-inside or a micro-macro relationship. His inquiry lies In the main actor being 
perceived both from the outside as a composite one with certain resources he or she 
employs for strategic action; and from the Inside, as an Institutional structure within 
which Internal actors Interact to produce the strategy of the composite actor (1997: 52). 
In this case, the game Is reflected on one level In the number of Internal actors that 
coordinate their preferences and Interests, and on a second level In the strategic action 
produced by the Internal Interactions as a whole. The 'macro' version of the composite 
actor could also be perceived as a nested game, In the sense that the different arenas of 
the network consist of such composite actors. 
The description of the above three models serves in providing a basis to understand the 
progress of games In more than one level, and based on this narrative, to Identify the 
location of the media In the political game between two national governments. The 
model that this thesis will employ combines elements from the three paradigms 
described above. I shall employ the example of the Cuban Missiles crisis game as a 
reference point for the understanding of the Interrelation between the various actors and 
arenas. In this case, the Cuban Missiles crisis represents a broader, International game 
played between the two national governments and unfolds In three Interconnected 
Interactions that represent the different arenas of the game. The game develops as 
follows: 
Arena 1: Interaction between the two governments, Le. USA and USSR 
Arena 2: Interaction between each government and the American and Soviet media 
respectively 
a Arena 3: Interaction between the national media and the respective audience/public 
The third Interaction between the media and the public Is rather one-sided since the 
public! s views are here conceptuallsed as being shaped by the media frames. However, 
It Is Important that we specify the components of this Interaction too, since the existence 
of the public Is actually playing a critical role In the Impact of the media as a whole. 
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Therefore, the media's profile as a player In arena 2 derives from their Interaction with 
the public In the sense that the media frames are perceived by the decision-maker as a 
source of information for the public. 
The three arenas represent the network of games that are nested within one another, 
while the media's Impact on the governmental decision-making results from a sequence 
of Influences that occur between the three Interactions, starting from arena 3 and moving 
towards arena 1. More precisely, the interaction between the media and the audience 
(arena 3) shapes the media coverage of the crisis and therefore their Interaction with the 
government (arena 2), which Is then expected to Influence the progress and the outcome 
of the Interaction that runs In arena 1. In other words, arena 3 Is nested In arena 2, which 
13 nested In arena 1. Given that arena 2, which embodies arena 3, Is running In both 
countries separately, we have an International game In which the Interaction between 
the two national governments Is Influenced by the outcome of two respective additional 
arenas, where the national media are located as determinants of the public's views. 
At this stage, It Is essential that we Idenfify the exact nature of the Interaction In arena 2. 
In game theoretic terms, the media and the government could be approached as two 
players who employ their strategies toward each other aiming at reaching an agreement 
and/or maximising their payoff as well. Within this context. their best decision would be 
decided through a communication procedure In the form of bargaining. However, In this 
Interaction the media's strategic action Is embodied In the Information they convey as a 
reaction to specific policy decisions the government makes In the International arena, 
rather than as a move that alms at'confronting' the adversary directly. 
It Is Important to note that the media frames. through which this Information Is 
disseminated, are employed In accordance with the media's Interests and preferences 
and with a set of norms that define the news construction and framing procedure. Such 
norms represent Ideological lncllnaVons that are often related to the political preferences 
of the owner of a media organisatlon. They are also reflected In the specific 'unspoken 
and uncritically accepted routines, procedures and rules' through which the news Is 
constructed. (Cook, 1998: 75). These routines dictate that the Information Is packaged 
Into a narrative that will Involve the protagonists, conflicts and drama required for the 
production of o'newsworthy' story. When combined with the Increasing concentration on 
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ownership and profit-oriented management and the financial reliance on advertisers, the 
news values and production routines result In the production of further commercialised 
news (Bennett, 2005, Sparrow, 1999, Cook, 1998). In other words, the media operate 
and make decisions Independent of the governmental decisions and within a specific set 
of rules that defines their preferences, payoffs and strategies. 
The critical attribute of this action Is however that the decision maker's payoffs will still 
be affected by It. The most accurate way to conceptualise this Interaction In game 
theoretic terms Is as a one-person game against Nature. In this the government 
represents the main player in the game while the media stand for Nature. The 
conception of the media as a so-called Ifictitious' player serves In Incorporating their 
Impact In the International political Interaction as a set of rules and norms that 'interferes' 
with the decisions of the government. The outcome of this Interaction derives partly from 
the decisions of the decision-maker and partly from Nature's moves without necessarily 
one being directed to confront the other. 
The outcome of the level 2- Interaction Is produced In three Interrelated stages that 
develop as follows: 
@ Stage 1: the commercial Interests and preferences of the media define the frames 
through which they disseminate Information In the form of the news 
Stage 2: the news frames target the public 
Stage 3: through the public! s attention and perception, the news frames create 
conditions of audience cost for the decision-maker, given that the government Is aware 
of both the media frames and what the public knows. 
The outcome of the Interactions In arena 2 and 3 Is here conceptuallsed as an 
extornality (Figure 3.3). The term oxtomality Is used In the context of Tsebelis' usage 
and definition and It reflects 'the consequence to third parties from the Interaction 
between two other parties' (1990: 59). In this case, the media's Impact on the 
government's decisions unfolds In the following two externalities: 
Externality 1: domost1c cost -) outcome of the media-audienco Interacuon (arena 3) 
Externality 2: Intomational cost 4 outcome of the media-government Interaction 
(arena 
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On the one hand it Is their Interaction with the audience that composes the externality by 
producing the expectation of media punishment through the audience cost and the 
expected domestic opposition. This Is depicted In the diagram as externality I and 
constitutes Information that affects the payoffs of the decislon-maker domestically. On 
the other hand, this type of Interaction between the media and the decision-maker Is the 
second externality that affects the decision-maker's International strategy and therefore 
their payoffs on an International level as well. The level 2 Interaction Is produced by the 
coordination on the one hand of the commercial preferences and Interests of the media 
and on the other of the decision maker's Interests both vis-A-vis the media and their 
International adversary. What one can notice here Is the role of the audience as a 
common reference point for both politicians and the media, which is of high Importance 
In the Impact the media would ultimately exert on the government's decisions. 
----------------------------- 
Externality I (Arena 3) 
................................ ............. 
Media Frame 0 Public Minion 
I 
Externality 2 (Arena 2) 
Decision makýer 
L -------------------------------- I 
Figur* 3.3: The Nostod Game 
It Is a coordination that Is largely built on the expectaUon of media punishment and 
defines the strategy of the government on level 1. This argument Is In line with Putnam's 
observation regarding the critical Impact that the expectation of the level 2 interaction 
alone Is likely to have on the decisions made on arena 1, even before any action has 
taken place on arena 2. Given that any decision that Is made by the two national 
governments on arena 1 Is In line with the arena 2 Interaction, it should be evaluated In 
relation to the outcome and payoff It would yield for all actors and on both levels. That Is 
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to say. a seemingly Irrational International move should be examined In terms of a 
sophisticated and not sincere move, according to Tsebelis'definition. 
The media's Impact Is reflected In the sophisticated move of politicians that decide 
against their International preferences in order to meet domestic objectives, or avoid 
domestic costs. This observation renders the media's role a 'strategic! one as opposed 
to the cognitive role that prospect theory would Imply. The following sections will attempt 
to unfold this strategic role and Impact the media have on decision-making processes. 
Because the media are primarily carriers of information, It Is the type of Information they 
disseminate and the way they frame it that defines their strategic role to a large extent. 
Information Is a vital component In the progress of a game as well, which provides 
Incentive for a thorough consideration of the media's role In relation to the Information 
they convey. 
3.6 Game Theory and the role of Information 
Information plays a vital role In the process of decislon-making and becomes even more 
crucial In games where the actors' choices depend on one anothees. Information Is also 
the media Instrument that this thesis will study In relation to their strategic action In 
conflict situations from a game-theoretic theoretic approach. 
At this point we need to Identify two types of Information that becomes a component of 
the political game and that will help theorise the media roles In that. In game theoretic 
terms, the role of Information Is of strategic nature. On a general basis. Information may 
be about the structure of the game. In this case, it describes the amount of knowledge 
that actors have of each other's preferences, payoffs and of the outcomes that the 
combination between particular decisions have; or It may be Information about what 
other players are choosing to do with that structure (Hamburger, 1979: 179). The 
distinction between games of complete and Incomplete Information describes the 
amount of knowledge the players have about the rules of the game as well as how likely 
it Is that their opponent will be a player of one type or another and vice versa (Heap & 
Varoufakls, 1995: 29). Information can also Indicate the advantage that players can gain 
In relation to their position towards their adversaries. Rasmusen refers to games of 
perfect Information In order to demonstrate the Importance of a game with no 
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simultaneous moves since each player knows exactly where he/she Is In the game 
(2001: 48-56). 
A second type of Information may also be described as communication In the form of the 
passage of Information from one party to the other (Hamburger, 1979: 179). which can 
also be the case of a bargaining situation. Political actors Involve In an exchange of 
signals, threats and messages that can be truthful or not and that would ultimately 
determine their moves towards one another. A general principle In bargaining Is that the 
participants would wish to reveal Information selectively according to the response they 
want to draw for their advantage, creating situations where certain players have different 
information from others. In this case Information can also be distributed symmetrically or 
asymmetrically Indicating the possibility of certain players having an Informational 
advantage over others. Equally Important Is the amount of Information that a player has 
or doesn't have about the other players' state of Information (Hamburger, 1979: 116). 
Information and beliefs about Information can be Interrelated In such a complex way 
rendering the manipulation of Information a game for Itself, engaging the players In 
strategies and decisions for the type and amount of information they will reveal (Dlxit & 
Skeath, 1999: 21-22). 
3.6.1 Media entries In the political game 
Information Is a core feature In a game affecting directly the position of each player and 
defining her or his strategy. It could therefore be argued that the amount of Information 
available to a player can pave the way to rational action, assisting them In approximating 
as accurate calculations as possible. This central role of Information creates scope for 
the media to be located In the game In an Interaction with the decislon-maker that attains 
a 'strategic' quality. The present section will suggest three possible routes through which 
Information disseminated by the media Is Integrated In the decision-making process In 
an effort to explain and justify why the media are strategic players In the political game. 
The Instrumental Impact 
To begin with, the media can function as sources that Inform the Involved players about 
the adversarys Intentions and as communication channels for sending and receiving 
signals. This role refers back to the media becoming diplomatic tools In the hands of 
politicians. I call this an Instrumontal Impact In the progress of the game. There Is a 
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certain strategic element In acting as diplomatic Instruments since their employment 
serves the achievement of strategic ends. However, the fact that In this case the media's 
faction' Is mostly controlled by politicians, who decide upon the media's usage, does not 
portray the real dimensions of their role as It diminishes the significance of their 
Influence. 
The CognitIve Impact 
The cognitive dimension of the media frame was discussed In chapter two, within the 
framework of prospect theory. This role Is centred In the media's predisposition to have 
preferences and make choices In the reporting of Information. This explains their 
Inclination to select the elements of the news story that will become more eminent In a 
given text. The Impact of a news frame that promotes a given problem definition and 
prognosis, would lie In the wording and In the effect that this wording could have on the 
Interpersonal processing of this Information by the decision-maker. This process Implies 
a change In the actor's framing and perception of the situation. The Idea of the cognitive 
impact may also be elaborated through the concept of 'cheap talk, ' costless signals 
(Sartori, 2002: 124). The media frames convey messages that have no direct effect on 
either the sender's or the recelver's payoff (Gibbons, 1992: 212). The significance of 
such Information lies In the possibility that It changes an actoes belief about the 
adversary and therefore changes his action too. Such a strategy change will ultimately 
affect the outcome of the game and the players' payoffs as well. Although the effect that 
such a process may have reveals the crucial role of the media In decislon-making 
processes, the fact that It Implies an 'unconscious' Impact of the media frames, 
demonstrates a media role that Is not analysed and justified systematically. 
The StratogIc Impact 
The strategic Influence the media can have on decision-making processes Is the focal 
point In this thesis and It also demonstrates the Input and aptness of the game theoretic 
approach to this role. Although the key feature Is again the media's Inclination to make 
choices In what Information to frame and how to frame It, the main distinction with the 
cognitive dimension lies In focusing on what drives these choices. The strategic 
approach underlines the purposeful selection of frames and the pursuit of particular 
organisational and commercial objectives, targeting large audiences and high 
circulations. The Idea Is that due to these forces the dissemination of Information will 
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ultimately turn Into a process of strategic Influence on the declsion-maker. This process 
involves the translation of the media's preferences and choices Into costly Information for 
the decision-maker. What the preceding chapter described as an Indirect cognitive 
Impact of frames here Is approached from a rational perspective. This Is done through 
the Impact of the media frames on the public's beliefs, which generates an expected cost 
from the media's reaction to certain official decisions. The contrast with the cognitive 
approach Is that the framing of the Information In terms of a diagnosis and/or prognosis 
does not directly change the decision-maker's perception of a given situation. To put It 
differently, the media frame Is not acknowledged by the decision-maker just as framed 
information that reflects Ideological dispositions. 
On the one hand it Is perceived as a product of the media's rationallsed preferences and 
objectives vis-A-vis the audience. At the same time, it Is acknowledged as a source and 
foundation of the public mood regarding a given Issue. It Is the case that especially In 
International crises, domestic audiences become likely to 'punish' leaders for 
unsuccessful policy decisions, such as backing down from a threat (Martin 1993, Schultz 
1998). The central Impact of the media frames In this case Is that they compose a crucial 
piece of Information; which the decision-maker will have to take Into account before 
deciding upon a strategy, In order to avoid the domesticlaudience cost. This Is the case 
of a player, such as the decislon-maker, having Information about what another player, 
such as the audience, knows, and deciding accordingly. The decision-maker Is not 
affected by the frame directly as the cognitive approach suggests. Yet It Is affected by 
acknowledging the Impact of the frame on the audience and the public mood and the 
reaction this can generate. This Information becomes significant when one considers 
that 'the greatest fear of a modem politician is to get caught In the middle of a media 
feeding frenzy over a disastrous policy (Van Belle, 2004: 21). In this case, the media's 
Impact Is by 'coercing' the decision-maker to consider the frame before proceeding with 
a decision; and most Important, the decision Is made consciously and after estimating 
the cost Inherent In failing to consider the media coverage. 
3.6.2 The Media's Strategic Impact 
At this point It Is essential to define the nature of the media Influence on the 
governmental decisions. One way Is to see it as a coordination of Interests between the 
two arenas. That Is to say, the government makes a decision In the International game 
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that reflects a balance between their Interests and preferences on both arenas; and this 
Is In order to avoid the audience cost. In this case. the media's strategic role Is 
conceptualised as entering the calculations of the government with regard to their 
International action. But, the media Influence can be more substantial than that. The 
Interaction between the two arenas of the political game Indicates that the official 
International policy Is In fact decided through the progress of this Interrelation and most 
Importantly, according to what yields a payoff on both arenas at each given point In time. 
This assumption Implies that, as part of this Interrelation between domestic and 
International Interests, a media Influence can be exerted Independent of the degree of 
policy certainty at hand. What the game theoretic approach offers here Is to enable a 
diverse interpretation of the correlation between media frames and policy formation as 
suggested by the CNN Effect theory. 
As described in chapter one, the theory conceptualises media Influence In the form of a 
policy change, which becomes possible through the combination of empathy framed 
coverage on behalf of the media and lack of a firm and settled policy on behalf of the 
government. Ultimately, any media Influence Is excluded In the occurrence of policy 
certainty but this Idea becomes void through the game theoretic approach. On a first 
Instance, let us recall the possibility of political action In equilibrium. The concept Implies 
the actors' Involvement In a recurring course of action that 9) Is constantly changing as 
the options available to the players also change and so do their payoffs and b) when It 
reaches an equilibrium point, It signifies the selection of a strategy/behaviour and the 
production of an outcome that none of the players have any Incentive to deviate from. 
The key assumption In this case Is that any policy or behaviour change would Indicate 
that the previous behaviour was no longer optimal. On these conditions the policy 
certainty argument becomes complex and difficult to prove systematically. This Is 
because what the analysis of a mixed-motive game shows Is how political actors reach 
an outcome after having completed a sequence of moves, and how these moves are the 
resultant of continuous adjustments to one another's preferences and Interests as well 
as to changes produced by third parties. If policies are decided through this process, 
then no policy can be perceived as settled at the beginning of the Interaction since It Is 
bound to undergo changes by the end of It. 
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Consequently, a different perception of the media's Impact on the poliUcal decision- 
making process Is established. Their Influence Is Inherent In the Information they 
disseminate through the fames they employ. the expectation of an audience cost that 
this Information generates and the coordination of Interests between the media and the 
government It leads to. This Interaction Is then likely to generate changes In the ranking 
of preferences and In what Is considered as optimal for the actor. Ultimately, the media's 
strategic role In the political game acquires a new dimension. It suggests a strategic 
impact that Is unseen from the observers point of view but which becomes evident 
through the systematic analysis of the media-politiclans Interaction that the game- 
theoretic approach provides. 
3.7 Summary 
The Interaction between media and politicians Is here portrayed through what I have 
called a strategic model that entails a strategic media Impact on the political decision- 
making process. The term Is basically employed to dist, ingulsh between the cogniflve 
Impact that frames exert on the Information processing and ultimately on the perception 
one has of a given situation and the Impact that Is exerted on the calculations made by 
the political actor. The latter aims at emphasising the conscious evaluaUon of the 
media's presence by the decislon-maker, as part of his strategy selection. The key Idea 
Is Inherent not only In the Information the media convey through the employment of 
frames, but also In the Information that their InteracUon both with the audience and the 
decision-maker produces. 
The contribution of the model lies In that it Identifies the position of the media In the 
political process in relation to the decision-maker. It Is Important that although the media 
frames are not perceived as targeting the government, they are still taken Into account; 
and this model unravels the process by providing a systematic connection between the 
decision-maker, the public and the media frames and Identifying the Input of each In the 
decision-making process. 
In the remaining chapters the thesis will attempt the application of the game theoretic 
model on the media-government Interaction In two Greek-Turkish conflict situations. The 
analysis Is built on the hypothesis that the game theoretic approach will provide a 
rigorous assessment of the political crises that will help Identify a correlation between the 
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strategic moves made by the two governments and the employment of the respective 
media frames. The application will ultimately serve In demonstrating the effectiveness of 
the model In practice; and In drawing Inferences that could create a consistent 
framework of those conditions that determine the media's profile as political actors, as 
well as provide a better understanding of the media-government interaction In foreign 
policy and conflict situations. 
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4 Methodology and Design. A Case Study Research 
4.1 Introduction 
The theoretical model analysed In the previous two chapters, comprises the first part of 
the Inquiry made In this thesis, while the remaining chapters compose the empirical part 
The latter serves In providing the context within which we can obtain a better 
understanding of the function of the game-theoretic model and of the media's role In 
political decision-making as well. In parftular, the empirical part of the study will seek to 
demonstrate the aptitude of the game - theoretic approach to explain Interactions 
between media and governments; and to provide evidence of the media's potential to 
strategically Influence political decision-making through the examination of the media 
coverage of two conflict situations. For this purpose. the empirical part of the study will 
examine two Greek - Turkish territorial crises and the coverage they attracted from the 
national press within the game-theoretic framework. 
The present chapter will therefore describe the research strategy employed for the 
investigation of the media - government Interaction In the specific two cases and for 
providing answers to the research questions In relation to the media's potential Impact 
on political decision-making. The Investigation will be conducted with the employment of 
a mainly qualitative research method described as 'ease study, which In this case 
Includes both the game-theoretic analysis of the two Greek-Turkish case studies and the 
content analysis of the press coverage of the specific cAses. The following sections will 
offer a detailed description of the combination of these two elements of analysis. It 
needs to be clarified that the research design will be described relative to the theoretical 
framework that was built In the chapters two and three. Given that theory represents a 
key component In the development of a research design, the existing model will serve as 
a reference point. 
4.2 Case study method 
Case study Is here employed as a qualitative research method that Is concerned with the 
profound study, explanation and Interpretation of specific social phenomena. Stake 
suggests that It Is particularly the cause-and-effect relationships that case study seeks to 
Identify, which can be important for the understanding of phenomena (1995: 41). 
Although as Stake claims, 'case study Is not a methodological choice but a choice of 
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what Is to be studied' (2000: 435) case study has become a widely used way of 
conducting qualitative research. 
A case study can be an Individual. an organisation, a process or a programme, to name 
but a few examples. In this thesis, the case study Is represented by two territorial crises, 
two events that embody the Interaction among several variables, which In this case 
require explanation and interpretation. One of the functions that case study method 
serves in relation to this thesis Is to Illuminate a decision or a set of decisions (Schramm, 
1971 In Yin, 2003: 12). With the focus of the Inquiry being placed on decision-making 
processes and the role of the media in them, case study can provide a practical tool In 
the analysis and understanding of such situations. It Is often argued that case study 
research can Investigate causal processes In the real world rather than artificially 
created settings (Hammersley & Gomm, 2000: 5). which would Justify the employment of 
such a method for the Investigation of two real-world conflict situations. Case study also 
Implies the collection of unstructured data and qualitaflve analysis of this data 
(Hammersley & Gomm: 2000: 3). This would not only apply to the analysis of a decision- 
making process but also to the analysis of data In the form of content as disseminated 
by the press. 
For the present thesis, case study Is an appropriate method due to Its usefulness 
particularly in terms of theory development and for enabling the Investigation of complex 
phenomena that Incorporate complex causal relations (George and Bennett 2005: 22). 
The game-theoretic model built In the previous chapter, represents both a process of 
theory development and a blend of complex causal relations and Interactions that the 
case study method can accommodate. George and Bennett Identify three more 
advantages In the employment of case study. The first advantage concerns the 
conceptual validity that researchers are able to achieve. Due to the fact that many of the 
variables that social sciences are concerned with are difficult to measure, case study 
allows for the rigorous consideration of contextual factors that will ultimately permit the 
4 measurement' of specific phenomena. A second advantage refers to the potential of 
case study method to Identify new variables and hypotheses during the course of the 
research -4. e. during Interviews or archival research. This Is an advantage that statistical 
methods lack since the use of databases offers no means of Identifying left-out 
variables. A third advantage Is that case studies can examine the operation of causal 
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mechanisms, which the present study Is also concerned with. Even within a single case 
study one can identify a number of Intervening variables and If and how they can 
acflvate a causal mechanism (2005: 19-21). 
Case study Is a more suitable instrument also when compared to other types of 
methodology, such as a history, due to Its nature as an explanatory research device that 
allows for dealing with oxplanatory questions and with contompor-ary events as well as 
Including methods of direct observation of the events being studied (Yin. 2003: 6-8). Yin 
Identifies particularly the direct observaVon and the study of contemporary events as the 
main difference between case study and history, although he claims that very often the 
two methods overlap. There are however further differences between the types of study 
that these two strategies offer. For Instance, the development of a theorefical framework 
Is a key element In the employment of case study but not In history, while the findings of 
a case study often build theoretical assumptions that aim at being generalised. Yin 
himself Identified Graham Allison's study of the Cuban Missiles Crisis as one of the most 
successful case studies. The analyst In this case deals with a historical event but aims at 
an explanatory and not just descriptive study. At the same time, 'the lessons from the 
case study are intended to be generalisable not only to foreign affairs but more broadly 
to a whole variety of complex governmental actions' (Yin, 2003: 4). 
Another element that makes case study the right method for the Inquiry of this thesis Is 
the study of the media, the press In particularly. Although the examination of the content 
of the press coverage can be easily described as another form of documentary analysis, 
it Is different from the conventional historical document analysis. In this thesis, It Is not 
merely the content of the media that Is being studied, but rather the whole process of 
news-making that urges to view the media as organisations employing strategies and 
pursuing objectives. In this case, the study of the media takes the form of observation of 
a participant rather than simply of content analysis. Moreover, the recognition of the 
media not just as institutions or organisations but specifically as political Institutions and 
the journalists as 'professional politicians' (Tuchman, 1991: 80) enhances the Idea of 
news reflecting something more than just content. 
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Apart from providing a profound analysis of the declsion-making process In the two 
crises and Interpretation of the press coverage, the specific case study Is also aimed at 
extracting some generallsation with regard to the media - government Interaction during 
conflict situations. For this purpose, the case study employed here Is best described as 
an Instrumontal case study (Stake, 2000: 437). Stake described this type of case study 
as of serving to facilitate our understanding of something else. That Is to say, the specific 
case has been selected not because of Interest In itself but because It serves In 
advancing the understanding of the media roles In political decislon-making. which Is the 
main Interest In the present research. Stake differentiates this type of study from what he 
calls the MUM* and colloctivo case study. The former represents the case that Is 
undertaken because of the researchers particular interest In the case study Itself while 
the latter refers to the employment of a number of cases and serves In the study of a 
more general condition. The selected Greek-Turkish cases could also be seen as a 
means to provide a better theorlsing about a wider collection of similar cases. However. 
It Is the particular interest In the media's action, which the selection of the two cases 
supports, that would best describe the case study as an Instrumental one. It needs to be 
mentioned though that even If the main focus of the Inquiry Is not In the case study but In 
the media, the context within which the media action develops remains highly significant. 
This is because another factor that makes the case study an Ideal method for the Inquiry 
of the present thesis Is Its emphasis on the context within which a specific Issue or 
phenomenon develops; and that Is especially when the boundaries between the 
occurrence of the phenomenon and the context are not clearly apparent (Yin. 2003: 13). 
Uke most other methods, the case study provides a strategy to examine an empirical 
Issue through a series of procedures that compose the research design of the study. The 
following section will therefore describe the design of the present study In an effort to 
provide a better understanding both of the function of the theoretical game model 
developed earlier, and of the Incentive In the selection of the press coverage of the 
territorial crises for the examination of the main research Inquiry. 
4.3 Research design 
'... The design Is the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study$ Initial 
research questions and, ultimately, to Its conclusions' (Yin, 2003: 20). Yin identifies five 
components In the development of case study design namely the studys questions, 
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theoretical propositions and/or hypotheses, unit of analysis and the linking of data to 
propositions and the criteria for Interpretation of findings (2003: 21). Having these 
components as a guide, I will therefore describe the design for the present study. 
4.3.1 Research questions 
The questions that the present Inquiry alms at answering have already been described In 
the introductory chapter. The nature of the research questions corresponds to the 
explanatory disposition of the case study method and alms at Identifying the 'if, 'how' 
and 'why the media develop a strategic action during times of International crises as well 
as the Impact that this action exerts on decision-making processes. 
4.3.2 Hypothesis and theoretical propositions 
The setting of a hypothesis and theoretical propositions Is a fundamental stage In the 
Investigation of an Issue. These provide more specific directions about what needs to be 
studied In order to answer the defined research questions. A hypothesis and a 
theoretical proposition represent a statement that will be tested through the research and 
the Investigation of the empirical part of the study. A hypothesis may therefore function 
as a departure point for the Investigation while the assessment of Its validity and truth 
will shape the answers to the research questions (Yin. 2003; Silverman, 2DOO). It Is 
Important to state at this point that although hypotheses are distinguished from theories 
In the sense that unlike the former, theories cannot de disproved (Silverman. 2000: 78), 
the setting of a hypothesis presupposes the building of a theoretical framework which 
would also show the researcher where to look for evidence. 
On the basis of the theoretical model described In the chapters two and three, the main 
hypothesis set In the present research suggests that the game theoretic approach of the 
media-govemment relationship demonstrates the strategic action of the media that 
results In Influencing decision-making processes as well. As one can notice, this Is a 
proposition that embodies a theoretical and empirical hypothesis. That Is to say, the 
present study 81M3 at testing both the application of the game-theoretic model on media- 
government relationships and on the basis of that model, test the media's strategic 
Impact on the political process. What one can see In this case Is that the case study as a 
whole involves the building of theoretical model that Is anyway a pro-requIsite for the 
testing of the hypothesis. This Is an Important observation that helps define the type of 
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case study employed In this thesis, In relation to the role that the theory plays in 
answering the research questions. Therefore, the case study could be Identified as a 
combination of a discipfinod. conrigurativo study and a houristic caso study (Eckstein, 
2000, Mitchell, 2000). 
The former type of case study assumes the availability of some 'general laws' of theory 
that might need supplementing and reconsidering. According to this type of case study, 
the InterpretaUon of cases may lead to ad hoc additions to exisUng theories. It Is not 
about building theory but about charging established theories, if they ought to fit It but 
they don't, and poinUng up the need for a new theory. or even supplementing existing 
theories. The Inquiry runs from comparatively tested theory to case Interpretation and 
thence via ad hoc additions to new candidate theories (Eckstein, 2000: 134-135). The 
definition and basic norms of a discIplined-configurative study can be said to partly 
correspond to the theoretic development In the present thesis too. That Is to say, the 
thesis alms at building a theoretical model but based on already existing theoretical 
laws; and In response to the relative deficiencies In the existing literature and theoretical 
framework with regard to the media's role and Influence In the polit. 1cal process, and 
foreign policy In particular. Hence, the case study Is tied Into theoretical Inquiry. but only 
partially, since It Is based on existing theories and general laws. The case study can be 
described as a disciplined- configurative one when seen within the wider context of the 
existing theory on media-government relationships and media effects on foreign 
policymaklng. 
The latter category Is distinguished from the former In that the case study Is deliberately 
selected to build theory (Mitchell, 2000: 173). Heuristic means 'serving to find out' and 
such case studies are less concerned with overall concrete configurations than with 
potentially generallsable relations between aspects of them. They are tied Into theory 
building less passively than disciplined configurative study because the potentially 
generallsable relations do not turn up but they are deliberately sought out (Eckstein, 
2000: 137). The case study employed In the present thesis Is partly heuristic because It 
considers existing theories with the objective of building a now game-theoretic 
framework with specifically defined norms. The press coverage of the two crises also 
serves in the more precise definition of the norms that compose this theoretical 
framework, which would then be possible to generalise to other similar cases. The 
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present thesis Includes both the examination of existing theories, which are aimed to be 
supplemented; and the building of a new theoretical model, which can then be 
generalised further. The reason the present thesis does not entirely fall under the scope 
of either of these types Is that it embodies two tightly Intersected processes that 
correspond to both the disciplined- configurative and heuristic type of case study. 
4.3.3 Unit of analysis: the employment of qualitativo content analysis and 
process - tracIng method 
In the case study method, the unit of analysis reflects what the case actually Is. A case 
study can be an Individual, a group, or an event and In this the unit of analysis, and 
therefore of the case, Is related to the way the Initial research questions have been 
defined (Yin. 2003: 23). Following the theoretical propositions defined above, the unit of 
analysis In the present thesis consists of the strategic analysis of the decision-making 
process that took place In the two Greek-Turkish crises as well as the press coverage 
they attracted. The determination of this unit of analysis presupposes a sampling 
procedure first In relation to the selection of the cases to be Investigated. In this study, 
the sample consists of two Greek-Turkish territorial crises occurred within a time span of 
nine years, In 1987 and 1996. It Is here Important to clarify the motivation Inherent In the 
selection first of the Greek-Turkish example as a whole and second of the two specific 
crises. Therefore, apart from the personal concern and practicality reasons In selecting 
to Investigate the Interaction between these two countries, the Greek-Turkish conflict 
was selected also because It offers a context of an Interaction among states that 
develops on a multilevel basis: not only as a conflict among nation-states but also as a 
socio-cultural conflict between Greece and Turkey (Gialouddis. 2001). 
Hence, the Greek-Turkish conflict provides a wider framework of an Interaction that 
develops Involving the media as well. The examination of the press coverage of the two 
crises within this context becomes particularly Important If we consider that both In 
Greece and Turkey, journalists are a significant constituent of those elite groups that 
shape public opinion. At the same time, the Greek-Turkish conflict represents an 
Interaction between two states the governmental structure of which results In a different 
degree of influence that these media elites are expected to exert on decislon-making 
processes. More precisely, the estimated Impact of the media on foreign policy Issues Is 
less significant In Turkey than It Is In Greece: and this of course Is an Implication of the 
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more authoritarian and highly centralised Turkish political system as opposed to the 
openly democratically structured Greek state (Glatouddis. 2001: 18-19). 
The selection of the two crises signifies the employment of a so- called 'multl-case study' 
(Yin, 2003) that will provide grounds for a comparative analysis of the media - 
government Interaction In that. The selection of these two crises among a series of 
conflicts that the two countries have Involved In, Is basically deliberate due to offering, If 
not contrasting, to a certain extent different situations that can serve for the comparative 
purpose and the extraction of more accurate and representaflve findings. Moreover, the 
selection of the two cases has taken place with prior knowledge of their outcomes while 
the multiple-case study Inquiry focuses on why and how the outcomes relate to the 
media coverage of the each crisis. 
Another feature of the case study employed In this research that Is significant for its 
analysis Is Its embedded nature. Contrary to the so-called 'hollstic' design that examines 
the case study as a single unit, the embedded case study Is analysed across a number 
of Individual units that compose the case as a whole. (Yin, 2003: 42). In this study each 
Greek-Turkish crisis comprises the main unit of the case that unfolds In the press 
coverage of the event that takes place In two separate countries, while the press 
coverage In each country unfolds further Into the coverage provided by two separate 
newspapers. As a result of that, each case Includes two embedded units. One unit 
encompasses the press coverage that materiallses within the framework of the country 
and another unit embodies the press coverage within the framework of the newspaper. 
Figure 4.1 depicts the structure of the embedded multi-ease study. 
The Importance of treating the study as a mult. 1-case and as an embedded one Iles In 
providing scope for comparative analysis on a 2x2x2 basis. Firstly, this allows for a 
compadson between the press coverage of the two crises as a whole that will help 
Identify the development of the media's action within the peflod of nine years that 
intervened between the two events. Secondly, it will permit the conduct of a comparison 
between the Greek and Turkish press coverage within each of the two crises that will 
shed light on the way the media's role Is shaped within the two political systems. 
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Theoretical context and analysis 
Case 1 
The 1987 011-Drllllng Crlsls 
The press coverage 
Greece 
Eleftherotypla 
Turkey 
I Horrfyel 
The 1996 Imia-Kardak Crisis 
The press coverage 
or"Co 
Elafthe"IS 
Twkoy 
Figure 4.1: The multi-cass, embedded case study 
Thirdly, comparing the coverage between the newspapers Will offer a comprehensive 
picture of the way In which their organisational structure and political Inclinabon define 
the media's selection of frames and consequently potential effects on declslon-making 
processes. The Information obtained through these comparisons will consequently help 
Identify the media's potential to affect decision-making processes In conflict situations 
and shape the media's profile as strategic actors. Moreover, the multi-level approach 
will here serve In obtaining greater generalisability of the findings that the analysis will 
produce to a wider population. As Perakyla puts It 'The comparative approach directly 
tackles the question of generallsability by demonstrating the similarities and differences 
across a number of settings (1997)' (Silverman. 2000: 104). In the present study the 
mode of generalisation that the two cases can offer may be described as 'analytic 
generalisation' In which the empirical results of the study will also be compared to a 
previously developed theoretical framework (Yin, 2003: 32-33). 
On the basis of the units embedded In each case, the analysis Is org3nisod In two main 
stages. The first stage comprises the application of a game-theoretic approach to the 
territorial crises under Investigation. This will Involve the analysis of the decisions and 
moves made by the two governments as well as the outcome of each crisis and the 
payoff and cost It entailed for the two players. The analysis will be conducted within the 
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context of the theoretical model developed In chapters two and three. according to which 
each Greek - Turkish crisis Is examined as a 'nested game'. The objective of this 
analysis Is to provide a stage for the Introduction and Investigation of the media's role In 
the progress of each crisis, while it also serves In providing the first level of the above- 
mentioned nested game. 
The second stage embodies the analysis of the press coverage of the two cdses. The 
analysis of the press coverage presupposes the Introduction and employment of 
qualitaUve content analysis as a method that Involves analysing content. Content 
analysis Is here Introduced as a method that 13 encompassed In the case study as part 
of the unit of analysis embedded In the overall case study. Content analysis has been 
defined as a systematic. replicable technique for compressing many words of text Into 
fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding (Berelson, 1971; Krippendorff, 
2004, Weber, 1990). It 13 distinguished In quantitative and qualitative and the present 
thesis will engage with the latter since the main Inquiry 13 proportionally less Interested In 
content Itself, but Interested In the content as the expression of specific phenomena. It 13 
also concerned with the use of the media content for the extraction of Inferences about 
other properties of the media, such as its behaviour and Impact during situations of 
conflict. The main Idea of the procedure of qualitative content analysis Is here to 
preserve the advantages of quantitative content analysis as developed within 
communication science and to transfer and further develop them to qualitative. 
Interpretative steps of analysis, (Mayring, 2000: 1). 
The press coverage of the two crises will be examined here In an attempt to Interpret Its 
content as the outcome of specific media motivations. this will effectively help translate 
this content Into potential effects on the governmental decision-making. In this case the 
content analysis of the press coverage will aim at evaluating the so-called 'latent' content 
of the media. This Is In relation to what Becker & Ussmann (1973) have Identified as 
levels of content. The themes and main Ideas of the text reflect the primary content while 
context Information Is the latent content. Similarly, Hancock claims, 
'rho content can be analysed on two levels. The basic level of analysis Is a descriptive account of 
the data: this Is what was actually said with nothing read Into 4 and nothing assumed about 
it ... The higher level of analysis is Interpretative: it is concerned with what was meant by the response, what was Inferred or Implied. it is sometimes called the latent level of analysis' 
(2002: 21). 
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For the conduct of qualitative content analysis, two basic procedures are required, 
namely the collection and sampling of the related newspapers as well as the 
categorisation or coding of the related content. Starting off with the explanation of the 
sampling procedure, It needs to be mentioned that sampling can be carded out either on 
a random or a non-random basis. The former represents a selection of data that Is 
determined by chance while the latter, which Is also referred to as 'Judgemental' or 
'purposeful', Indicates a deliberate selection of data (Dear-on, 1999). The present study 
has employed a non-random sampling procedure that Is also most commonly featured In 
qualitative research. 
For the Investigation of the media's role In situations of conflict, and particularly In the 
two Greek-Turkish crises, as a total range of content the present study looks at the press 
coverage of the two events. The press was selected here for reasons of pracucality and 
due to time constraints. This Is because the Investigation of the television coverage In 
both countries would require additional time, given that the analysis requires translation 
of the transcripts as well. Moreover, the press coverage provides In depth analysis and 
thematic framing of the events, as well as opinions and evaluations. These are elements 
that are difficult to obtain through the speedy and live transmission of Information via 
television networks. One could argue of course that as a medium the press appeals to 
the public to a significantly less extent than television and radio. However, It Is still read 
by a specific (elitist) group of people who represent or even form a very Important part of 
public opinion (Glalourld1s, 2001). 
For the analysis of the press coverage four newspapers were selected, two from Greece 
and two from Turkey. The selection was based on criteria of circulation and criteria of 
acceptance by the public. The latter becomes Important when one considers that elites 
are also Interested In what the public thinks. A newspaper that Is read by a large part of 
a countrys population would effectively be more likely to be targeting the government as 
well. In the selection of the Greek newspapers the political Inclination of the papers was 
also taken Into consideration given the degree In which party preferences are reflected In 
the coverage of a large part of the press; which however Is less obvious In the case of 
Turkey. Although this specification does not help the comparative analysis between the 
press coverage as conducted In the two countries, It Is essential that the press coverage 
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be evaluated In relation to the respective political context. This Is In order to Identify the 
potential impact on the decision-making of the respective government more accurately. 
For the analysis of the Greek press coverage, the newspapers 'Eleftherotypia' and 
'Eleftheros Typos' were selected. It Is Interesting that although the names of both papers 
refer to a similar explanation, that Is 'free press', they represent diametrically opposing 
party Inclinations with the former being classified as of centre-left and the later of 
conservative disposition. Both are amongst the 3-4 newspapers with the highest 
circulation In Greece (Gialouddis, 2001: 90). In Turkey. 'HOrdyer that stands for 
'Freedom' and Milliyet that stands for 'Nationality are the newspapers selected for 
analysis. HUrriyet Is the newspaper with the highest circulation In Turkey. It Is mainly 
distinguished for pursuing the coverage of Impressive stories Illustrated with large 
pictures. Milliyet Is a liberal-conservative newspaper and plays a crucial role In the 
formation of public opinion due to Its famous commentators and political correspondents 
(Glalouddis, 2001: 92). 
With both crises having been escalated and resolved within a period of one week or 
even shorter, the press coverage of the events will be examined from the first day the 
two main Issues that led to each crisis were reported, unfil after the crises were resolved. 
The objecflve Is to examine the content of the press along with the progress of the crisis 
In order to obtain a complete evaluation of the coverage and framing of the events. It 
could be said that the sampling time period Is actually defined by the crisis Itself and 
given that we are Interested In drawing Inferences about the media's role In the 
escalation and resolution of the event the analysis would ultimately be conducted within 
the departure and ending point. As for the elements of the press coverage to be 
examined, the sample will Include any form of Informat, ion disseminated by the press 
during these days Including titles, reportages, editorials and analyses. 
A required procedure for the conduct of content analysis Is the coding or categodsation 
of the content. It needs to be clarified at this point that the organisation of the content 
Into categories Is done In a more general manner than In quantitative content analysis. It 
serves not In 'quantifying' the content but rather In Identifying data that Is Informative In a 
specific way and to sort out the Important messages always In relation to themes, 
concepts and questions that have been determined beforehand. As Mayring puts It, 
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'classical quantitative content analysis has few answers to the question from where the 
categories come, how the system of categories Is developed'. He explains though that 
within the framework of qualitative approaches It Is of central Interest, to develop the 
aspects of Interpretation, the categories, as near as possible to the material. to formulate 
them In terms of the material, or with prior formulated, theoretical derived aspects of 
analysis, bringing them In connection with the text. In the former case the development 
of categories Is considered as Inductive while the later Is described as deductive (2000. 
4-5). 
In the present thesis, the categorisation of the press content will develop through a 
deductive procedure. The examined material will be organised Into categories that will 
be defined according to a specific theoretical framework that In this case derives from 
framing theory and In particular, Robert Entman's definition of media framing, as 
explained In chapter two. This categodsation alms at capturing certain elements of the 
press coverage that may match previously defined aspects and dimensions of the 
media's power to Influence decision-making processes. The developed categories do 
not serve In counting the content of the press but In organising it In a way that elevates 
Important messages for the Identification of Its Impact on the two governments. The 
organisation of this framing device Is explained In chapter six, as part of the main body 
of the analysis. 
When the decision-making process In the two crises has been analysed and the press 
coverage of the events has been org3nised In categories, the main part of the case 
study Is then conducted. The objective Is to Investigate the Interaction that takes place 
between the media and the government In each case and In each country as well, and 
Identify the extent to which this Interaction constitutes one of the causes that led to 
specific decision outcomes. For this purpose, process-tracing (George and Bennett, 
2005)' Is here introduced as a method that will help explain the outcomes of the crises In 
terms of an Interaction not just of the Greek and Turkish governments but of an 
1 The process-tracing method attempts to Identify the Intervening causal process - the causal 
chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome 
of the dependent variable (George and Bennett. 2005). In our case, considering that the media 
represent the Independent variable and the decision-making process equals the dependent 
variable, the employment of a method such as process-tracing will help investigate the causal 
mechanism between the two and the extent to which decisions were made due to media 
Influences. 
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interaction between each government and the respective press as well. Process- tracing 
will in particular help analyse the outcomes of the two crises as a resultant of potential 
cause-effect relationships between the media content and the governmental decisions. 
This way, it can help establish the degree in which the media-government interaction is 
amongst the forces that produce the outcome of a territorial crisis and if so, under which 
circumstances. It needs to be clarified of course, that the method is here employed 
within the context of the game-theoretic analysis of the two crises. What process-tracing 
will offer mostly is to generate questions and observations from the game-theoretic 
analysis that will then be linked in a particular way to explain the media's role in the 
decision-making process. Explaining the media-government interaction and the media's 
role in the process of decision-making will effectively facilitate the testing of the game- 
theoretic model as well. 
4.3.4 Linking data to propositions and criteria for Interpretation of findings 
A key contribution of a method such as process-tracing is that it enables the linking of 
the empirical data to the theoretical predictions developed in the first stages of the 
research. Given that the objectives and the design of the case study were based on a 
set of theoretical propositions that also reflected the respective research questions, 
these same propositions are also the basis for the analysis of the findings the case study 
produces. Process-tracing is particularly suitable for the objectives of the present 
research for the reason that, as George and Bennett argue, it is compatible with rational 
choice approaches (2005: 208). As the two authors claim, it provides scope for the 
empirical testing that is required for analysing and explaining complex events such as 
decision-making processes. In this thesis, the game-theoretic model constitutes a 
framework of decision-making that is built in a deductive way and in a way that implies a 
specific cause-effect relationship between the media and the government. In this case, 
the Process-tracing method is used to organise the available material with regard to the 
media-interaction in the two crises and countries and identify the degree of accuracy in 
the causal mechanisms predicted by the game-theoretic model. The method will 
combine elements from the strategic analysis of the two crises and the press coverage 
in order to test whether the observed interaction between the two matches the 
predictions made by the game-theoretic approach. 
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The method will Include the description of the findings that result from the examination of 
the press coverage of the two crises as part of a game-theoretlc model; which perceives 
the media as a strategic player In a crisis that is here approached as a 'nested' game. 
The analysis will be conducted with the employment of an explanation building 
technique, which as stated by Yin, Is mainly relevant to explanatory case studies. and 
with the use of a logic model (Yin, 2003: 120-127). The main objective In this type of case 
studies Is to develop some Ideas for further study, which Is what the present research 
endeavours to achieve. The explanation building process will be carded out not as an 
individual segment of the case study but will commence along with the analysis of the 
two crises and continue through the examination and analysis of the press coverage. It 
is during this analytical process that causal links of the findings that each stage of the 
analysis generates with the predefined theoretical propositions will be set. That Is to say. 
the objective Is to Identify the connection between what the present case study 
demonstrates as a media role In conflict situations with the hypothesis of the media 
acting as an actor that strategically Influences foreign policy decision-making. Such 
causal links would ultimately reflect some critical Insights Into the foreign policy process 
and the way It develops with the media having become Integrated In the decision-making 
process. 
This critical explanation Is likely to result from what Yin describes as a series of Iterations 
(Yin, 2003: 121). These Include 
a Making an Initial statement or proposition regarding the media's estimated Impact on 
the decision-making processes during the two Greek-Turkish crises and particularly on 
the escalation of each crisis 
Comparing the findings of the first case against the theoretical proposition 
Revising the theoretical proposition 
Comparing the revision to the facts of the second case 
This is a gradual explanation process that will of course Involve embedded comparisons 
between the press coverage In the two countries as well as between the two 
newspapers In each country. Yin Identifies that a potential problem that might arlse with 
the employment of this technique Is that due to the much onalyUc Insight required, the 
Investigator might gradually drift away from the Initial topic of Interest. The problem can 
be handled with regular reference to the main purpose of the inquiry and clarification of 
the objectives the study aims at achieving. 
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The second technique refers to the employment of logic models that'consist of matching 
of empirically observed events to theoretically predicted events' (Yin, 2003: 127). The 
development of the game-theoretlc model described In the previous chapters will In this 
case serve the purpose of the logic model. As explained In the following chapters, the 
analysis of the two Greek-Turkish crises as the International levels of a nested game will 
be followed by the formulation of a media-government Interaction template that reflects 
the second, 'domestic!, level of the game. This will serve not only In organising the 
'moves' made by the two parties In the model of a strategic Interaction, but also In 
Identifying expected outcomes stemming from specific combinations of moves. In other 
words, the game embodies a theoretically predicted event that will be compared to the 
findings of the empirical observations made through the analysis of the press coverage. 
The linking of the findings to the previously developed theory will ultimately verify the 
validity of the game-theoret1c model by strengthening of weakening the explanations 
provided by It. This will Include Identifying the range to which the findings should apply 
and whether and how the scope conditions of the theory could be expanded or 
narrowed. 
4.3.6 The Issue of validity 
The Issue of validity In the case study and In any form of qualitative research method Is a 
concept that relates to judging the degree of quality or else the degree of 'truth' and 
accuracy Inherent In the findings produced by a given study, The possibility for the 
validity of an explanation to be doubted generates the necessity for the researcher to 
ensure the conclusions valid. In explanatory case studies similar to the one employed 
here where the case study alms to determine a causo-effect relationship between two 
factors, It Is the 'internal' validity that becomes a concern (Yin, 2003: 36). It becomes 
essential to be able to justify the Inferences made regarding the media content as a 
factor that influences decision-makIng. In the present study the Issue of validity can be 
tackled through the explanation building process described above and partculady 
through the employment of the game-theoretic model as a logic model. 
The Issue of validity can also be satisfied through the comparative procedures employed 
as part of the study, on a first level between the two cdses and on a second level 
between the embedded data fragments, as it was explained earlier In this chapter. 
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4.3.6 Reporting the case study 
One last remark to be made Is In relation to the composition and the reporting Of the 
study and Its results, which In this case combines three different structural elements. 
First, the present thesis follows an overall theory-building logic according to which the 
structure and sequence of the chapters Is organised. Within this structure. and as 
Illustrated In the preceding chapters, the analysis has been organised based on a linear 
structure, which Is the second element, starting with the Identification of the issue being 
studied and a review of the relevant existing literature. The two following chapters are 
then concerned with the theory-building element, presenting the main theoretical 
argument that sustains the Inquiry. Last, the analysis and evaluation of the two crises 
and the coverage they attracted. Involves a comparative element as well, according to 
which the game theoretic model Is applied twice, each time on a different crisis. The 
purpose of this 'repetition' Is to Identify the extent to which the specific model fits each 
crisis and vice versa. (Yin, 2003: 151-14). The reporting of the case study will be 
completed with the description of the overall results of the analysis of the two crises In 
relation to the press coverage. The results will be evaluated In relation to the pre-defined 
theoretical propositions, including some suggestions for further generallsation of the final 
observations. 
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5 The Greek-Turkish Conflict and the Media. A historical 
account of the two crises and their coverage by the national 
press 
5.1 Introductlon 
The Greek-Turkish conflict has been on the policy and media agenda for at least three 
decades. Ever since the Turkish Invasion In Cyprus, In 1974, the relaUonship between 
the two countries has flared up Into a major Issue In their foreign policy and the national 
media has closely followed It too. The two countries have been through armed struggles 
against one another and this has ultimately determined their relationship and their 
national Identities as well (Ozgunes & Terzis, 2000). The Impassioned coverage that the 
relationship has often attracted by the media has played a vital role In preserving a 
sense of national antagonism between the two peoples; and has also turned this 
relationship Into an attractive news story. 
The present chapter attempts to portray some of the most decisive stages In the 
formulation of the contemporary Greek-Turk1sh relationship. Two of the most crucial 
phases In this relationship are the two crises employed as case studies for the purposes 
of this research. They will be presented In detail Including the press coverage they 
attracted by the Greek and Turkish press. This will help formulate a historical and 
political background that will then help P13CO the media-government Interaction In the two 
countries, In the context of the nested game. 
6.2 Media. State relationships In Turkey and Greece 
At this point It would be useful to briefly present the basis on which the media's 
performance Is shaped in the two countries. Particular attention Is given to the role that 
the state holds In the production and construction of news, and the extent to which the 
commercial profit has become the media's primary Incentive. 
The way the media-state relationship Is formed and the role Wt the press holds In the 
two countries Is a fundamental aspect In analysing and comprehending the role the 
media plays In the political world of each country. The Intervention of the state In the 
press reporting Is often described by journalists as the 'stick and carrot' policy, reflecting 
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the treatment that the press receives from the state according to Its compliance with the 
governmental line or not. Apparently, the implementation of the specific tactic differs 
significantly In the two countries (Tilig, 2000). 
In Turkey, under the suffocating regiment that was Imposed In 1980. journalists were 
forbidden to write anything against the military governing. The press owners were forced 
either to comply with the military line or to close down their newspapers and most of 
them chose to do the former. The elections that were held In 1983 and were won by the 
party of Turgut Ozal, created better conditions for the performance of the press, which 
however lasted for a limited period of time. Ozal's personal relations with some of the 
country's newspapers launched a new type of journalism In which the close relationships 
that journalists developed with the governing circles became a decisive factor In the 
construction of news. The outcome was that several journalists would simply write 
whatever those governing elites dictated (Tilig, 2000: 397). In 1984, the armed fight 
against the Kurdistan Workers Party, PKK, 6 began and along came the new state 
restrictions on the freedom of press. In general, during the first five-and-a-half years of 
Ozal's governance, 458 publications were seized 39 tons of newspapers, journals and 
books were burnt and total prison sentences given reached 2000 years (Tanor, 1997: 
142). The press gradually became the main target of the state leaders and between 
1979 and 1998, more than 40 journalists had been assassinated. while since 1996 
Turkey has had the highest number of Imprisoned journalists In the world (Tolig, 
1997: 365). Most of assassinations occurred In the years 1992 and 1993. In 1994 the 
6 The Kurdistan Workers Party (Kurdish: Partlya Karker6n Kurdistan). also known as KADEK and 
Kongra-Gel, Is a paramilitary organization dedicated to creating an Independent socialist Kurdish 
Republic In the Near East. Its Ideological foundation Is revolutionary Marxism-Leninism and 
Kurdish nationalism ethnic secessionism using force and threat of force against both "! an and 
military targets for the purpose of achieving its political goal. By virtue of the PKICS strategic use 
of fear-inducing violence In its pursuit of its political objectives, the PKK Is characterized as a 
terrorist organisation by the European Union, the Unitod States, and several other countries (total 
list of states). Its main objective Is the creation of an Independent Kurdish state In Kurdistan, a 
territory that consists of parts of south-e3stern Turkey. north-eastern Iraq, north-e3stem Syria and 
north-western Iran. However Its actions have almost excjusively taken place Turkish soil, 
although It has on occasions co-operated with other Kurdish nationalist paramilitary groups in 
neighbouring states (http: //en, wikipedia. org). 
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number of journalists killed was reduced but the repression against the media 
maintained (Tilig, 2000: 401). It needs to be mentioned that during this period It was 
basically the peripheral media and those journalists that supported the opposition parties 
and the Kurdish movement that suffered the restrilctions. At the same time, the bigger 
media organlsations continued to support the regime totally. (Tilig, 2000: 404). 
Apparently, the media-state relationship In Turkey leaves limited scope for journalists to 
report 'the truth'; and this Is particularly obvious when the news concems the Greek- 
Turkish conflict. In a series of Interviews Ozgunes and Terzls conducted with Greek and 
Turkish journalists In order to Investigate the role of the media In the Greek-Turkish 
conflict, one Turkish journalist claimed: 'I am always thinking of our national Interests 
and the Interests of my newspaper when I am reporting Greek-Turkish affairs. At the end 
of the day, I don't want to criticlse my government because my'objective' reporting might 
be used wrongly by the other side', and she added, 'No foreign correspondent from my 
country would dare to write anything against the governmental foreign policy, unless 
there Is advice by the headquarters bark home' (Ozgunes & Terzis, 2000: 405426). 
The situation In Greece Is significantly different and the stick policy Is rarely Implemented 
and only In cases of national taboos.? Other than that no Greek politician was ever 
recorded among the biggest enemies of the press. Moreover, since 1974 when 
democracy was re-established, there were no journalists reported Imprisoned. It Is true 
that the media organisations In Greece are related to the political parties, and this 
relationship occurs within the context of the so-called 'patronage relations' that 
developed In Greece In the 1980s. when Papandreou's political party promoted Its 
supporters to positions In the public service, In order to secure their support and 
therefore remain In power (Mitsos, 1994: 444). It Is due to this type of media-state 
relationship that governments assist the media organisations that support them by 
offering them the carrot. $ 
1 Do0an Tiliq reports that on 18'h February 1997 a radio station of the TuWsh minority In West 
Thrace was barred from transmitting. The official explanation was that It had secured no 
permission from the state, but the true reason was thought to be that ft broadcasted In the Turkish 
language, given that the same year a number of Greek stations continued to broadcast without 
legal permission (2000.410). 
6 The government's aid to media organisations In the form of the carrot Includes the tax-free 
Import of printing equipment or discounts In the phone and postal services (Stangos, 1988: 78), 
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But generally speaking, the government rarely shows preference to any of the media 
conveyors and most of the newspapers are actually privileged by the financial support of 
the government (Tilig, 2000). Stangos reports that there might be speculations that the 
financial aid the government offers alms at turning the press Into a governmental pawn. 
However reasonable thls\may sound, there seem to be no Instances of media 
organisations that serve and support the government In response to the financial aid 
they receive. This of course does not Imply the absence of those journalists that operate 
as the government's helpers, facilitating its effort to Influence the press. But this sort of 
mutual exploitation develops through personal relationships rather than In the form of 
financial aid (Stangos, 1988: 14). 
6.2.1 The press legislation In Turkey and Greece 
With regard to the existing press legislation In Turkey and Greece, the two countries 
represent two diametrically different situations. Although, as the Greek journalists claim, 
there seems to be no legislation that controls the operation of the media In Greece, 
Turkish journalists complain for being restricted by at least 150 different laws. It Is 
Interesting to see that, although the articles 25 and 26 of the 1982 Turkish constitution 
guarantee freedom of speech, article 26 In particular recites special regulations that 
effectively restrict this freedom. It therefore states that although censorship Is forbidden 
by the law, the freedom of speech can still be reversed In the name of the domestic and 
external security of the state. A number of Turkish journalists Interviewed by U19, 
admitted they felt restricted by the legislation, which prevented them from being sincere 
and reporting the truth (Tilig, 2000: 424-425). 
In Greece, Stangos reports that the picture one has about the press legislation might 
seem muddled but the truth Is that there Is no doubt the press Is absolutely free of any 
legislation (1988: 16). Tiliq states though that. when Greek journalists claim the absence 
of legislation they also explain that they personally feel no legal pressure In their every 
day practice of journalism by specifically two laws that exist only on paper. The first 
regulaflon states that newspapers have no right to publish anything other than news and 
Information, Implying the prohibition of any commercial and advertising offers. The 
second regulation forbids the publication of any announcements carried by terrorist 
groups. However, as Greek Journalists revealed. no one In Greece Is really concerned 
with such laws (Tilig, 2000: 425). 
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Apparently, the journalists In Greece have the freedom to do their jobs with no 
Interventions from the government. However, even in Greece there Is not much scope 
for objective reporting. The production and dissemination of news undergoes constraints 
that derive mainly from the commerclallsation of the media, which was the outcome of 
deregulation of the media sector In the 1990s. In fact deregulation was not a 
liberalisation that opened the sector to competitive practices. It was the Installation of 
ready-made commercial media oligopolies and conglomerates, and this was an Issue 
that actually occurred In Turkey as well (Sahin & Aksoy, 1993; Daremas & Terzis, 2000). 
In the beginning of the 1990s the bigger media organisations shifted from state 
ownership to the new owners who were mainly Involved In economic acUvities and 
aimed mostly at making profit. The outcome of this new ownership was the development 
of Interdependent and patronage relationships of the media owners with governments In 
order for the former to meet economic needs with the aid of the government, Le. secure 
loans from state banks (Kaya, 1993: 89). 
An ultimate resultant of the privatisation of the media In both countries was the 
commercialisation of the news Itself. For fear of losing the ratings and therefore their 
jobs as well, journalists In both countries are after the fast and superficial news stories 
that sell and bring the ratings up. The Implications of this phenomenon specifically In the 
coverage of the Greek-Turkish conflict Is reflected In the words of a Greek journalist that 
states, We don't report news about Turkey outside crisis periods because our audience 
Is not Interested... ' (Ozgunes & Terzis, 2000: 417). Additional to the Issue of 
Comm erclallsation, another common element In the performance of the media In both 
countries Is the degree of nationalism Inherent In the national Ideology and media 
culture, which leaves reporters with little scope about how to report, especially during 
times of Greek-Turkish tenslon (Ozgunes & Terzis, 2000). 
These are some observations that shed light on the arena within which the media 
perform both in Greece and Turkey, and how the domestic environment where the news 
Is produced and disseminated affects the coverage of the crisis pedods. The objective of 
this section Is to offer a general picture of some of the most significant and common 
constraints that news reporting faces In the two countries, especially In terms of the 
coverage of the Greek-Turklsh conflict. These are factors that will help In the 
Investigation of the press coverage of the two case studies and the application of the 
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game model presented In the previous chapters. This will ultimately help In making 
better sense of the media's role In the escalation and resolutIon of the two crises and In 
political decision-making from a wider perspective. 
6.3 The Greek-Turkish relationship 
The relationship between Greece and Turkey has developed though a series of conflicts 
over Issues Including Cyprus, the Aegean Sea, airspace and minority rights. On 22 
October 1951 the two countries signed their membership In NATO confirming their wish 
for a closer future cooperation. These optimistic speculations however were proved false 
and the two countries were Involved In a continuing tension. Admittedly. Cyprus has 
played a crucial role In the formation of a foreign policy In both countries. Cyprus 
became a central problem for the two states not only In their relationship with one 
another but also with other countries and coalitions Including USA. NATO and the 
European Union. The repercussions of this conflict often ripple through foreign policy 
circles In Europe as well as the United States, keeping International concern about ft 
conflict alive (Williams, 1997, Kurop, 1998; Ozgunes & Terzis, 2000). 
With the Turkish Invasion In Cyprus In 1974 the relationship deteriorated while the 
'declaration' of the 'Turkish Republic of North Cyprus' on 15 November 1983 made the 
perspective of a Greek-Turkish dialogue even more unlikely. The Issue of Cyprus along 
with other tensions that arose particularly In the Aegean brought the two countries on the 
verge of war repeatedly after 1974. The tension has escalated again In 1976,1987 and 
most recently In 1996. The crisis that occurred In March 1087 was a landmark In the 
Greek-Turkish relationship that prompted the commencement of a diplomatic 
communication between Ozal and Papandreou who wished to ensure that a future 
tension similar to the 1987 crisis would be avoided. This Initiative led to the Davos 
Summit where the two governments attempted to redefine the relationship emphasising 
their objective to solve future potential differences with the employment of peaceful and 
diplomatic means. Apparently, the now policy line Introduced In Davos was not entirely 
ratified either In Greece or In Turkey and W33 considered as unsuccessful by domestic 
circles In both countries. The era that followed the Davos Summit marked the escalation 
In the tension between the two countries, which climaxed again In 1996 with the Imla. 
Kardak crisis (Glallouddis, 2001). 
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From the long-drawn Greek-Turkish conflict this thesis has chosen the two most recent 
crises, namely those of 1996 and 1987, to Investigate and apply the game-theoretic 
model to. The next sections will offer a description of each crisis, Identifying the main 
causes that led to the escalation of the tension In each case. The chronicle of those 
events will be presented along with the press coverage that each crWs attracted In a 
step-by-step description. 
6.4 The oil-drilling crisis 1987 
5.4.1 Tho crisis and Its roots 
The 1987 oil-drilling crisis has been described as one of the most serious ones In the 
recent history of both countries, bringing them on the verge of war over the Aegean oil 
deposits. The planned and firm strategies employed by the two countries confirmed the 
gravity of the situation and the military preparations on both sides signalled an Imminent 
war. However, It Is a noteworthy factor that the actual cause of this crisis was rather a 
misunderstanding. It seems that the Turkish government's decision to authorlse a vessel 
for oil prospecting In the disputable area, was based on a misapprehension of the Greek 
real Intentions that led to a drastic reaction from the Greek side and the escalation of the 
tension. 
The reason for the Initiation of the crisis lies In the NAPC consortium's Intention to 
proceed with further prospecting for new oil deposits In a position east of the Island of 
Thassos and further than the six nautical miles. ' This decision was against the Bern 
Agreement, signed by Greece and Turkey According to Article 6, 'both 
countries are obliged to refrain from any Initiative or action related to the Aegean shelf 
that could offend the treatment' (Article 6, Bern Agreement). It has to be mentioned that 
In 1982 the Greek government proclaimed that they did not recognise the Bern 
Agreement. The reason was the Ineffective negotiation process between Greece and 
Turkey concerning the shelf, as the Turkish government refused to accept the legal 
resolution of the Issue In The Hague Court (Giallouddis, 2001). 
" The Canadian North Aegean Petroleum Company (NAPC) compflses a consortium of 
companies that, along with American and Greek companies, operate the Prinos fields In the 
Aegean Sea off the coast of Kavala, where Greece's oil production comes from. 
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At this point It Is useful to explain the role and the Importance of the continental shelf of 
the Islands, which Is one of the reasons that create further controversies between the 
two countries. For the Greek views and Interests the shelf of the Islands Is a major Issue. 
Turkey refuses to accept the existence of a shelf around the Islands. According to the 
criteria that define the term 'shelf more than half of the Aegean Sea Is supposed to 
constitute Turkish shelf. However, given the demand of the Greek side for the 
recognition and definition of the Greek shelf as well - this concerns the Greek Islands 
situated near Anatolia -, this will Inevitably restrict Turkey within a six-mile-narrow. Thus, 
the main reason of the disagreement concerning the shelf Is the fact that any attempts to 
sort out the specific Issue, In the long run It will lead to a legal border line that will define 
sovereign rights for each country. In other words, defining the shelf for both countries 
means dividing and distributing the Aegean Sea. 
(www. ksg. harvard. edu/kokkolisAeaders_akiman. html; Soltaddis, 1988). 
In order to prevent the NAPC consortium from proceeding with oil prospecting In the 
area, the Greek government attempted to buy the majority of the consortium's 
shareholding but with no success. The anticipation of new oil deposits In the area 
rendered such a repurchase Impossible. Therefore, the Greek government proceeded 
with a direct nigotlatlon with the Denisson Mines Corporation hoping to buy the 
company's hold shares. What the government attempted to clarity was that It was not 
possible for Greece to consent to the oil prospecting beyond the six nautical miles, due 
to the gravity of the Greek-Turkish relationship. This was the reason why the Greek 
government attempted to buy the company`3 shareholding In Greece. The President of 
the Denisson Mines Corporation was however convinced that once the shareholding 
was repurchased, the Greek government would proceed with oil prospecting within a 
month's time. The cause of the crisis was the conviction of the Turkish government that 
further oil prospecting was Imminent while at the same time the Greek opposition party 
was accusing the government of compliance due to the fact that they were trying to 
prevent any search for oil In the area. (Giallouddis, 2001,, Soltaddis, 1988). 
In the meantime, the managing director of NAPC. Parmeli, Ignoring the decision of 
Greece to buy Denlsson's shareholding out and have share In the consortium, 
announced that NAPC was about to proceed with oil drilling In the area east of Thassos 
Island. On 4h March 1987 It was reported In the Wall Street Journal that the Aegean oil 
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was about to escalate a new Greek-Turkish crisis. Turkey Immediately sent a boat to 
conduct oil prospecting In the disputable area. In order to avert this possibility, Greece 
sent two military ships In response. The speculations of Wall Street Journal were further 
enhanced with a telegram sent by the Greek embassy In Ankara, stating that an 
emergency meeting was held by the Greek Ministers of Defence and Foreign affairs In 
order to deal with the latest developments (Glallourldis, 2001). 
6.4.2 The chronicle and progress of the crisis and the press coverage 
25 March 1987. the crisis Initiates with the decision made by the Turkish National 
Security Council to authorize the Sismik 11, a research vessel escorted by warships, to 
explore for oil In the disputed continent shelf around the Islands of Lesvos, Lemnos and 
Samothrace. The reason lying behind this decision was the belief of the Turkish 
government that Greece Intended to attempt oil drilling In the disputable area. Such an 
attempt meant the automatic violation of the Bern agreement on behalf of Greece; and 
Turkey responded to that by proceeding with a mutual violation. The Turkish move was 
later Interpreted by the Greek government and the media as an effort of the Turkish 
government to utilize the controversy that arose between NAPC and the Greek 
government so as to serve Its own objectives In the Aegean, and achieve the 
commencement of a new negotiation round regarding the shelf and the Aegean Islands. 
(Glallouridis, 2001). In order for this possibility to be prevented, the Greek government 
employed a defence plan stating clearly that in case the Turkish vessel entered the 
disputable area, there was going to be a war. Let us now examine how the crisis 
unfolded reaching Its peak and the press on both sides also covered how the sequential 
moves made by the two governments. 
The same day, the Turkish National Security Council meets and decides to search for oil 
beyond the Turkish territorial waters as a response to the Greek violation of the Bem 
agreement. At the same time, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Informs the 
ambassadors of the European Union and of NATO that Greece 13 following an offensive 
policy. The Turkish government mobilizes armed forces In the area of East Thrace and 
around the coast of Asia Minor while the Turkish fleet Is concentrated In the Marmaras 
Sea. On the Greek front, the Prime Minister Papandreou, assembles a meeting and 
decides that Greece will not accept any violation of their sovereign rights, or the 
response will be drastic and vigorous (Glallouridis, 2001). 
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The following day the Greek newspapers referred to the new Turkish threat stating, 'the 
Turkish provocative moves continued yesterday when two Turkish aircraft violated the 
Greek air space' (Eleftherotypia, 26 March: 5). There Is also reference to the Greek 
domestic cdsis that has been created between the government and the church and that 
absorbs the government. Also the press reports statements of the Turkish Prime Minister 
Ozal saying that 'Ozal states that Greece Is just putting Itself In trouble by violating the 
Bem agreement. There Is no reason for the two countries to fight' (E. Typos. 26 March: 
9-11). 
In Turkey Mill1yet concentrates on the Bern agreement and the possibility of war as well 
as on Greece being the responsible for the escalation of the crisis. It reports that, 'The 
minister of foreign affairs warned the countries members of NATO & EU that if Greece 
does not comply with the Bern agreement, Turkey will take the necessary action to 
protect their sovereign rights In the Aegean'; 'According to the Bern agreement Greece 
cannot drIll oil from the region beyond the 6 miles. But If they do so, then we will also do 
the same'; 'Papandreou Is trying to create the tension In order to make the Turkish EU 
candidacy difficult and benefit from it' (Mililyet, 26 March: 9-15). Also, HOrdyet reports, 
War screams In Athens and possible scenarios for war'; 'The tension Increases but 
some people believe there will be no war. This Is because war can only have cost for 
Greece and will jeopardise the new economic reform that the government Is trying to 
apply' (Hordyet, 26 March: 8-12). 
26 March 1987. the Turkish Security Council sends the research vessel 'Sismik' to 
explore for oil and at the same time the Greek drilling ship escorted by a cruiser wa3 on 
its way towards Thassos. The Prime Minister Turgut Ozal threatens to attack In case 
Greece obstructs the prospecting process. The Turkish vessel that Is also called 'Hora', 
arrives and anchors at Canakale port (Glallourldis, 2001,, Milllyet. 29 March). 
In response, the Greek Prime Minister states that once the Turkish vessel commences 
the oil prospecting, It will be attacked and scuttled. In particular, the Greek government 
proceeds with two risky but decisive moves. 
I. Prime Minister Papandreou orders that the operation of one of the most crucial, In 
terms of position, American Military Bases near Athens be Suspended, confirming the 
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crucial nature of the situation. This was a message sent to the USA government 
attempting to keep them out of the game. 
2. Foreign Minster Papoullas goes to Sofia for further negotiations with the Bulgarian 
government. A potential cooperation between a NATO member like Greece and a 
country of the Warsaw Pact would be a cause for alarm In the circles of NATO, and 
would give ground to the threat that In case of a Greek-Turkish crisis, NATO's southeast 
coalition would collapse, given the positive and supportive response of the Bulgarian 
government (Giallouddis, 2001). 
The following day the Greek press refers to the possibility or war for the first time, with 
Eleftherotypla stating that 'The Greek armed forces are mobillsed'; 'Turkey Is provoking 
a war by sending Hora out'; War Is In the aie (Elettherotypia, 27 March: 14). There Is 
reference to The Hague Court, In particular 'The Greek government keeps Inviting 
Turkey to refer the shelf issue to The Hague Court and warns that If the Turkish ship 
proceeds with the oil prospecting, the Greek government will do whatever It takes to 
protect the Greek sovereign rights' (Eleftherotypla, 27 March: 5-8). There are also 
questions as to the possibility that this Turkish hostility Is related to an encouragement 
activated by USA. Eleftheros Typos also reports that 'Turkey aims at exploiting the 
mistakes made by the Greek government In the handing of the situation' and 'The 
opposition accuses the government of causing national division' (E. Typos, 27 March: 7- 
9). 
In Turkey Milliyet again refers to the violation of the Bern agreement as the Justification 
of the Turkish moves and the promptness of the country for a war. Some statements are, 
Tecause Greece refuses to comply with the Bem agreement. the Turkish Security 
Committee allowed the Turkish vessel to start searching for oil In the Aegean': 'If Hora Is 
attacked, we are ready to take any action against Greece'. The Turkish newspaper also 
stresses the negotiation process as being the best way to resolve the crisis and the 
support that the opposition parties are ready to offer the government It Is stated that, 
'The Turkish government however believes that the problem can be solved through 
negotiations. Even the opposition party In Turkey believes that there should be a 
peaceful solution* and "the Turkish government Is fully supported by the opposition 
parties In the policy they pursue'. Milliyet blames Papandreou of creating the crisis 
stating 'The crisis has been prepared by Papandreou before hand, who had been 
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seeking for an excuse to attack Turkey (Milliyet, 27 March: 10-15); while Hordyet reports 
'Papandreou Is crazy' (HOrdyet, 27 March: 1). 
27 March 1987. 'Hora' Is about to enter the International waters while the exchange of 
threatening messages between the two countries continues. The general secretary of 
NATO Lord Carrington requests the two countries to commence negotiations for the 
resolution of the crisis and offers to play a mediating role. The same day NATO's military 
committee meets and the Greek representative clarifies that Greece has so far made no 
attacking moves whatsoever; so the Issue In question Is 'not Turkeys reaction, but 
action'. 
At the same time, Lord Carrington convinces the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
Geoffrey Howe to Intercede With the Turkish prime Minister Turgut Ozal, who happened 
to be In London. The same evening, Turgut Ozal states on BBC that the research vessel 
'Hora'Is not going to proceed with oil prospecting, unless Greece attempts to commence 
the prospecting first. This statement Is actually the first step towards the resolution of the 
crisis. He states, 'If they do not sail outside their territorial waters, we will not sail either. 
But the moment they decide to do so, Turkey will react very strongly'. 
The press coverage of the events of that specific day appears to be rather extensive on 
both fronts. In the Greek press the emphasis Is put on the sedousness of the situation 
and the probability of a war. Some statements are, 'rho Greek government Is 
determined to prevent 'Hora' from any prospecting'; 'Since yesterday Greece has been 
In fighting trim and ready for everything'; 'The US base in Athens was closed at 
midnight'; 'Hora Is expected to reach the crucial point today; 'Today Is the most crucial 
day of the crisis with the two countries being ready to start a war unless Turkey changes 
Hora's course In the Aegean. The Greek government has already prepared a strategic 
plan for that mattee (Eleftherotypia, 28 March: 1-9 & 24,25). 
Moreover Eleftheros Typos stresses the potential cost of the conflict. 'Even If there Is no 
war, this conflict Is going to have a great cost for us, duo to the huge preparation 
expenses and the decrease In the number of tourist that will visit our country this 
summer; and proceeds with suggestions too, 'At this difficult time Greece has to make 
use of the benefit to be part of EU. However, the government did not ask for European 
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help and therefore this Is an Issue that the opposition has to handle' (E. Typos, 28 Mach: 
3-6). The specific newspaper also accuses the government of creating 'National crisis' 
and being'isolated from their natural European allies'(E. Typos, 28-29 March: 31-34). 
Regarding the Turkish policy, according to the Eleftherotypla, 'It Is very likely that the 
Turkish government Is simply making a war of nerves In order to consume all or oil 
resources'; 'Turkey seems reluctant. It Is said that this 13 In order for the Turkish 
government to buy time and plan the next diplomatic move'; We are not going to war, 
Turkey Is just playing another dirty game' (Eleftherotypla, 28 March: 14 & 24.25). 
The Turkish press refers to the possibility of war but only as a result of a Greek attack. 
Milliyet reports, 'Hands on trigger the army Is alarmed, waiting for the first Interference 
of Greece; 'The Aegean Is about to explode% 'Athens Is mobilisIng the armed forces'; 
War bells: the whole country Is united to face the Greek provocations', 'If Papandreou 
tries to stop Hora, there might be a war' (Milliyet, 28 March: 1-7), while HOrdyet states 
'Papandreou Is ready for war'. But Turkey has no Intention of Interfering with the Greek 
vessels. Turkey Is just taking some pre-emptive action but will not touch the Greek boats 
unless Greece makes the first move. We cannot tell If there will be a war but we hope 
the two countries will find a peaceful solution' (HOrrlyet. 28 March: B-12). 
NATO's offer for mediation Is also mentioned, 'The general secretary of NATO, Lord 
Carrington, Invited both countries to sit on the table and resolve the conflict' (Milliyet, 28 
March: 8). The Turkish press also presents the Greek move to seek for support from the 
East as unsuccessful stating that, 'The Greek Foreign Minister Papoullas was 
disappointed by Bulgaria's neutrality; 'Moscow & Sofia offer no support to Athens' 
(Milliyet, 28 March: 9). On that day, the announcement that Ozal made on BBC Is 
covered only by the Greek press and Is described as an unexpected statement 
28 March 1987. the crisis Is practically resolved. The US ambassador In Ankara Informs 
the Turkish government that Greece Is not planning to proceed with oil prospecting In the 
disputable area. The Turkish research vessel 'Sismik' sails In the Aegean Sea, It 
remains within the Turkish territorial waters and anchors off the Island of Imbros 
(Glallouridis, 2001; Milllyet, 29 March). 
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The press coverage following that day focuses on the resolution and the evasion of war, 
which however Is portrayed through different Interpretations. The Turkish press states, 
'Sensibility was the winner and our determined attitude took Greece bark on track'; 'The 
crisis started to resolve after the Greek government announced that they were not going 
to proceed with oil prospecting in the area' (HOrdyet, 29 March: 1). 'The crisis freezes as 
Greece gives up searching for oil' (Milliyet, 29 March: 1). The Turkish newspapers also 
refer to the way the crisis was perceived by the Western countries and the respective 
media emphasising on the misinterpretation of the situation by the west. As the Turkish 
press reports, 'The Western press presents Turkey to be the one that started the crisis 
and the one that stepped back to avoid the war. This perception Is only partly accurate 
because the Turkish decision to step back was due to the advice of NATO and USA'. 
There is also some criticism on the Turkish policy, 'rho Turkish policy has been 
unsuccessful making the Western world see the crisis as created by Turkey and ended 
In favour of Greece' (Milliyet, 29 March: 5-11). 
The Turkish press also predicts that Papandreou will create similar crises In the future 
and reports, What happens next? There Is no doubt that Papandreou will again try to 
drill oil In the area but if Turkey's stance Is firm, he will not succeed In that. Even now, 
by sending 'Hora' out In the Aegean Turkey exerted pressure on Greece and made them 
make concessions too'; 'Even If there was a war it would not last for more than a couple 
of days. This would benefit Papandreou and this Is why this Is high possibIlity' (Mill1yet. 
29 March: S-1 1). 
Moreover, the press reports Ozal's statements that Papandreou Is a good actor and 
managed to manipulate the public opinion showing that Turkey was the one to violate 
the Bern agreement. This Is something that Turkey failed to do and they did not have the 
public opinion on their side. There are also comments on the Greek Prime Minster such 
as 'Papandreou Is an Insane person who may have a secret agreement with a country 
(Bulgaria) that will support them In the case of war' (HOrdyet, 29 March: 11-13). 
In Greece one can see a lack of consensus when it comes to the presentation and 
Interpretation of the outcome In the press. On the one hand Eleftherotypia refers to a 
Greek victory that was achieved due to Papandreou's firm policy stating 'The country 
has achieved one of the biggest diplomatic victories without a single casualty' 
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(Eleftherotypla, 29,30 March: 1-7). On the other hand Eleftheros Typos describes the 
resolution as 'Fraud of the government'. It accuses the Greek government with the 
following statements, 'The Greek government promised not to proceed with oil 
prospecting beyond our territorial waters and this Is against our Interests'; 'The 
government exploited the tension for domestic purposes and cultivated a climate of war 
even when the crisis was resolved', 'They were hiding the key statement made by Ozal 
for 24 hours'; 'Suspending the operation of the American base was a lie' (E. Typos, 29 
March: 31-34). 
In the aftermath of the crisis, on 29' March, despite the fact that the crisis seems to be 
resolved, the Greek forces remain alamed and the fleet appears to be ready to attack In 
case the research vessel 'Sismik' attempts to commence oil prospecting In the area. The 
same day, the Turkish Prime Minister Ozal returns to Turkey where his supporters have 
prepared a festive welcoming. He states that If Turkey was a member of the European 
Union, this tension would have never been generated (Giallouddis, 2001: Milliyet, 29 
March). 
On the media's side, the Greek press offers 8 more extensive coverage, which again 
offers two contradictory Interpretations of the situation. Eleftherotypla reports 'The Greek 
government has achieved an Important diplomatic victory because they faced Turkey 
with determination. At the same time the opposition started accusing the government of 
complying with the Turkish rules. It Is very likely that when the Turkish ambassador gave 
Ozal's message to Papandreou -that the vessel would not proceed with prospecting- he 
also asked If Greece was planning to do anything like that In the future. Would It be a 
betrayal If the Greek government answered that they did not plan any prospecting? At 
this crucial time what was most Important for Greece was to avoid the war with Turkey 
without Turkey violating the Greek shelf (Eleftherotypla, 30 March: 1-7). 
Eleftheros Typos offers a different approach of the issue stating that, 'the crisis was 
presented by the government as bigger than it actually was. The dramatisation of the 
situation served the domestic objectives of the government'; 'The Greek government has 
withdrawn form exploiting the oil deposits In the largest part of the Aegean. this part that 
so far we have claimed It belonged to us% 'Turkey gained some credits out of the 
situation because It ensured that Greece would not go beyond the 6 miles and the Greek 
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territorial waters. But at the same time Turkey put their EU candidacy In jeopardy (E. 
TYPOS, 30 March: 4-6,9.11 & 22-25). 
The coverage of the Turkish press Is less extensive with the main topics being the 
following, 'Papandreou meets AkIman In Athens'; 'A negotiation problem arises as 
Turkey accepts the offer of Lord Carrington to be the mediator but Greece does not, 
'Crisis management, the crisis broke out of wrong announcements made by the Greek 
side, regarding possible oil drilling In the area' (HOrdyet, 30 March: I& 12). 
30 March 1987. the crisis Is resolved gradually and under the control of the Greek and 
Turkish forces, depending on the political progress, the fighting trim and the moves 
made by the forces of the rival state. The Greek forces return to their Initial position only 
on 24"Aprll 1987. On both sides the press makes scarce references to the Issue In the 
first days of Apill. 
5.4.3 Somo gonoral observatlons 
The 1987 oil-drIlling crisis was -ostensibly- generated by the Canadian North Aegean 
Petroleum Company that had made plans to prospect for oil right outside Greece's 
territorial waters. Given the already tense existing situation over the disputed waters In 
the Aegean, the decision of the Greek government to prevent the consorVurn from the oil 
prospecting appeared as a rational move, that was In order to evade further 
complications In the Greek-Turkish relationships. What looked rather odd though was 
the ease with which the Turkish government concluded that this specific Greek effort 
stood for oil drilling on behalf of Greece. This assumption. accompanied with the 
decision of the Turkish government to send out the research vessel was the reason for 
the two countries to reveal a set of well-planned strategies. These strategies would 
ulflm3tely be Interpreted In the real objectives that the two governments pursued. 
At this point one could actually question how a mere misunderstanding led to a conflict 
the main attribute of which was the remarkably carefully planned strategies the two sides 
employed to confront one another. Unless of course this apparent misunderstanding was 
directed by Interior motives of the Turkish government that. as was later said In Greece, 
saw the controversy that occurred between NAPC and the Greek government as an 
opportunity to lead Greece In a new negotiation round over the Aegean shelf. Not to 
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mention that the time of the crisis was particularly favourable for Turkey since It 
coincided with the Improvement of the Turkish-Amedcan relationship that could 
guarantee the USA support. Another coincidence was the domestic crisis In which the 
Greek government was Involved with the Greek Church. It was felt In Greece that had It 
not been for the Internal controversies, the Greek government would not have 
dramatised the situation to such an extent as a tool to attract the public attention away 
from the domestic arena. And this Is an assumption that could also Justify the 
Impressively quick response of the Greek Prime Minster, who confronted the Turkish 
decision with a drastic plan. 
Tho 1996 Ilmla-Kardak' crisis 
6.5.1 Tho emorgenco of tho crlsls 
The 1996 Imla-Kardak crisis constitutes the most recent dispute that arose between the 
two traditional enemies that Is Greece and Turkey, which this time were just one step 
away from war. The causes of the dispute are traced bark In December 1995 and the 
crisis was escalated and resolved In the last days of January 1996. The specific crisis 
appears to differ from the previous ones In the sense that for the first time Turkey 
officially raises an Issue of territorial claims within the boundaries of the Greek state. In 
particular, the claim Is placed over the Islets Imla-Kardak, which are situated 2.5 miles 
away from the Greek Island Kalolimnos and 3 miles away from the Turkish coast. The 
legal sovereignty of Greece over the two Islets Is stated In the following treaties. Initially, 
according to the Lausanne Treaty 1923, Turkey assigned the Dodecanese to Italy. Thus, 
according to Article IS of the treaty, 
'Turkey renounces, in favour of Italy all rights and title over the following Islands: Starripalia 
(Astrapalia), Rhodes, Calki. Scarpanto, Casos, Tilos, Nisyms, Kalyrnnos, Leros, Patmos, Llpsos, 
Siml and Kos which are now occupied by Italy and the Islets dependent thereon and also over the Island of Kastelorlzo' (www. in. uio. no/-dirnitHsArnIa? Lau ssane 1 923. html). 
Due to a disagreement regarding the Status of the ownership of the Islets lying between 
the Turkish coasts and the Kastelorlzo Island, Turkey and Italy signed a supplementary 
agreement In order to fix the territorial waters between Kastelodzo Island and the coasts 
of Anatolia. The agreement was signed on 28" December 1932 and fixed 37 pairs of 
reference points among which, the maritime boundary dividing Turkish and Italian 
territory (which at that time Included the Dodecanese Islands) was drawn. Of these 
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points, it is point 30 that states that the maritime frontier north of Kalymnos passes at the 
median distance between the Imia-Karclak islets (on the Italian side) and Kato island (on 
the Turkish side). This specific point confirms the Italian sovereignty over the Imia- 
Kardak rocks. 
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The Imia- Kardak Islets 
The dotted line signifies the border that divides the Greek from the Turkish territorial 
waters. 
Source: http: //users. med. auth. gr/-tsikaras/mapsAmia. htm 
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The specific agreement was never registered with the Secretariat of the League of 
Nations and this Is what the Turkish government used as an argument In the specific 
crisis. However, according to the League of Nations, Its validity is not at all affected by 
the fact that It was actually never registered (Glallourldis, 2001: 312). 
In 1947 and after the end of World War 11, the Pads Treaty Is signed between Italy and 
the Allied Powers. According to this agreement, Italy proceeds Wth ceding the 
Dodecanese and the adjacent islets to Greece. Consequently and under International 
law, the successor state automatically assumes all the rights and obligations that had 
been established by International agreements between the possessor state and every 
third party that In this case Is Italy and Turkey. 
With regard to Turkey's legal assertions, the basic arguments of the Turkish government 
were firstly based on the fact that the legal procedure of the agreement of December 
1932 Is not completed and Is not registered with the League of Nations. Secondly, 
according to the Turkish claims, the Islets Imla-Kardak do not fall under the category of 
the islets adjoining the Dodecanese and therefore they were never made over to the 
Greek state. This statement Is another of the arguments the Turkish government 
employs, claiming that the Islets Imia-Kardak constitute Turkish territory, (Giallouddis, 
2001. www. tusladus. org/documenWspringtirne. pdf; www. intlacad/follow/9799/keddis. pdQ. 
The cause for the Initiation of the crisis Is given on 25h December 1995 when the 
Turkish cargo boat'Figen Akat' runs aground the Islets Imla-Kardak. The captain of the 
Turkish cargo boat refuses assistance from the Greek authorities claiming that he Is 
within Turkish territorial waters. The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs was Immediately 
Informed about his reaction that was considered as a suspicious move by the Greek 
authorities. Later on the escalation of the crisis was attributed to this view. It was felt In 
Greece that Turkey engineered the specific event In order to lead the two countries to a 
conflict that would add the 'Islet Issue' to the long drawn Greek-Turkish controversy 
(Kourkoulas, 1998; Georgoulls & Soltaridis, 1996). 
It Is only on 28th December 1995 that the boat Is finally freed and towed to the Turkish 
port GQIlQk through the aid of a Greek salvage company. and only after a continuous 
exchange of verbal notes between the Greek and Turkish authorities on who were to 
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rescue the ship. The towing of the ship by the Greek authorities Is described as a 
Osovereign' action proving that the Imla-Kardak rocks constitute Greek terdtory. This 
move also cleared the suspicion of a created event by Turkey. Apparently the Turkish 
side would never generate an event that would prove the Greek position to be right 
(Kourkoulas, 1998). 
On 29h December 1995 the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs sends a verbal note to 
the Greek embassy In Ankara, claiming that the Imia-Kardak Islets constitute a part of 
Turkey's territory; this move made by the Turkish side leads to a new exchange of verbal 
notes between the two states. Form that day and until a month later the two sides 
occupy themselves with the exchange of verbal notes regarding the status of the Islets. 
The Greek and Turkish diplomats talk about'routine notes' and no one seems to believe 
or even realize that the specific event would prove serious enough to bring the two 
states at the brink of a war only a month later (Kourkoulas, 1998). 
At this point It should also be mentioned that the crisis coincides with a period of 
domestic problems and difficulties that both countries had to deal with. On the one hand 
Greece Is at that time faced with the serious Illness and Imminent death of Andreas 
Papandreou who had been the most prominent leader In the modem history of the 
country, while a new government Is forced to form within a short period of time. On the 
other hand tension and anxiety Is culminating In the political world of Turkey, as Tansu 
1; i1ler is unable to form a government. This would enhance the possibility of Necmettin 
Erbakan coming to power again, which seemed to terrify those elite groups that are 
Indeed handling the foreign affairs of the country. The unstable, at that time, prevalent 
Internal situation In both sides, Is said to have Influenced and, to some extent. defined 
the moves made by the two actors (Kourkoulas, 1998). 
On Tuesday 23d January 1996 the newly elected Greek Prime Minister summons a 
meeting. Although the Issue of discussion Is not announced, Information leaked to the 
press confirms that a serious national problem Is about to arise. The following day 
media covers the Issue extensively for the first time and that Is the day that also marks 
the beginning of the escalation of the crisis. 
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6.6.2 The chronicle of the crisis 
The specific event described above was the main cause of a dispute that broke out. The 
crisis was escalated and eventually resolved within the last week of January 1996. 
25 January 1996: four citizens of the Greek Island Kalimnos go over to the Islet and 
proceed with the raising of the Greek flag (Glallourldis, 2001). 
The next day the Greek press reports the Imminent threat from Turkey that Is likely to 
spread to the Dodecanese. It Is mentioned that according to diplomatic sources the Imla- 
Kardak Islet will cause further complications to the Greek-Turkish relationship. Eleftheros 
Typos accuses the government of being Incapable of dealing with the sltuaVon. 
In Turkey the Issue Is mainly covered by Hardyet, which reports, 'Right after Simitis has 
become Prime Minister, he is trying his best to create a conflict between Greece and 
Turkey and has decided that Kardak belongs to Greece' (HOrdyet, 26 January* 8), while 
Mill1yet refers to acdsis'that Is alreadyfour days old'(Milflyet, 26 January: 18). 
26 Januaiy 1996: the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs confirms the exchange of verbal 
notes between the Greek and Turkish government and the generation of a serious Issue. 
At the same time, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs commences 'mapping' the 
Aegean Islets. After the specific process Is completed. the Turkish government 
announces that they will 'Invite' Greece to a new negotiation process regarding the 
Aegean status. This Initiative Is taken due to a decree that had been pronounced In 
Greece with regard to the settlement of the Islets at stake (Kourkoulas, 1998; Georgoulls 
& Soltarldis 1996). 
The Greek press reports some of the statements made by the Greek Foreign Minister 
who hoped that the specific issue was only a bureaucracy Issue raised In the Turkish 
Foreign Ministry. He also states that although it Is the first time Turkey makes a clear 
territorial claim, he still believes It was an accidental event that will not create any conflict 
between the two countries. Moreover, Elettheros Typos reports 'the territorial claim 
Turkey made over the Islet Is just ridiculous' (E. Typos, 27 January: 8). It also openly 
Identifies the Greek government as responsible for the unfounded claims by reporting 
'the governmental dispersal gave Turkey the chance to proceed with further 
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provocations' (E. Typos, 27 January: 9). Eleftherotypla recognises the existence of an 
Issue 'which might create further complications In the relationship with Turkey 
(Eleftherotypia, 27 January). 10 
In Turkey HUrriyet focuses on the Greek government being the one that Is trying to 
create a crisis between the two countries; and also reports statements made by the 
Greek officials with regard to the trivial Issue (HOrriyet, 27 January. 15). Mill1yet also 
reports the 'Increasing tension between Ankara and Athens due to a rock' (Milliyet, 27 
January: 18). 
27 Januaty 1996: a helicopter carrying a group of journalists of the Turkish newspaper 
HOrriyet lands on the Islet. The four journalists raise the Turkish flag in place of the 
Greek one. The Incident Is recorded and shown on the Turkish TV (Giallouddis, 2001). 
The following day the event Is covered only by the Turkish press that describes the 
Greek citizens of Kalymnos Island as 'pirates that left their flag on the rock' (HOrdyet, 28 
January: 5). This Is also the first time that the Turkish press has disseminated 
Information that Is said to come from official sources. According to these sources and as 
reported In HOrrlyet, 'The two sides cannot find a solution through the Increasing tension 
but only through negotiations' (HOrriyet, 28 January. 15). 
28 January 1996: a Greek warship detects the Turkish flag, which the Greek government 
orders Is lowered Immediately. On the same day the Greek government Is Informed 
about a Turkish patrol boat that Is sailing within the Greek territorial waters near the 
Imia-Kardak Islets and refuses to leave. Later in the evening the Greek armed forces are 
alerted on the border with Turkey In the north part of the country and the Islands while a 
team of the Greek forces are placed on the Islets (Giallouddis, 2001; Kouftulas 1998, 
Georgoulis & Soltarldis 1996). 
On 29' January the coverage of the two previous days appears to be slightly more 
extended. Eleftherotypla reports the tension that prevailed In the Ministry of Defence and 
the alert of the armed forces on the Turkish borders. Eleftheros Typos proceeds with 
severe criticism against the government and comments on the raising of ft Turkish flag 
'a http: //archive. enet. gr 
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stating, 'How can Pangalos say there Is no Issue?, We were humiliated by the Turks', 
'Shame' and 'The government delays In responding' (E. Typos. 29 January. B-10). The 
opposition's newspaper focuses7 on the 'weakness of the Greek government that 
encouraged Turkey to escalate the crisis' and expresses the fear that 'there vAll be more 
Turkish provocations In the future' and even 'future rearrangement of the continental 
shelf (E. Typos, 29 January: 10). There are also speculations disseminated by 
Elefthrotypla with regard to the cost that accepting to negotiate will have for the country 
as well as the anticipation of further Turkish provocations. 
In Turkey Hordyet reports, 'The Greeks are again after creating a cdsis'. * 'The tension 
between Ankara and Athens Increases as Greek vessels have surrounded the Islets 
while the Turkish flag was lowered'; 'Athens Is becoming paranoid' (HOrriyet, 29 January:. 
15). Milliyet refers to the American worries about a possible war between Greece and 
Turkey while Ankara is reported as 'remaining calm about the situation'. It Is also stated 
that, 'Although It has been four days since the conflict broke out. the Turkish Foreign 
Minister has not given any formal response to the med13. This Is because the official 
assessment of the situation has not yet been completed'. The same newspaper also 
reports 'the Greek Minister of Defence has already ordered that the sea forces are ready 
for wae (Milliyet, 29 January: 18). 
29 January 1996: the Turkish government suggests that the two countries should 
commence the negotiation procedure, not only concerning the specific Islets but the 
Aegean In general; while the Turkish Prime Minister demands that the Greek nag on the 
Islet Is lowered. Moreover, this Is the day that the State Department makes a first step 
towards Intervention In the crisis and recommends that the two sides remain calm In 
order for the crisis to be resolved. At the same time the Greek government refuses to 
Involve In any form of negotiation regarding the specific Issue. claiming that there Is 
actually nothing to discuss as the Islets constitute Greek land. In particular, the Foreign 
Minister of Greece claims that the specific Issue Is not crucial enough to justify the 
commencement of a new negotiation round (Giallouddis, 2001,, Kourkoulas 1998; 
Georgoulls & Soltarldis 1996). 
The following day the Greek press reports the official Invitation made by the TurMsh 
government for negotiations stating 'Ankara Invites Athens for negotiations In order to 
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change the status quo' (Eleftherotypla, 30 January)". Reference Is also made on the 
warnings made by the Greek Prime Minister mentioning 'Greece would not accept any 
sort of territorial claims made over the Islet' (E. Typos, 30 January: 22). There are 
comments of the traditional tactic of Turkey to exploit 'accidental events In order to 
create bilateral disagreements between the two countries' (E. Typos, 30 January. 22). It 
also refers to the refusal of the Greek Ministry of Defence to Involve Into any sort of 
negotiations since there Is nothing to negotiate about. Moreover, Eleftherotypla appears 
to share the government's position and claim that this Is actually a non-existent Issue 
since the Islets constitute Greek land and the related treaties confirm this. Once again 
the press disseminates a prognosis about the serious Implications 'unless the 
government resists', expressing the fear that the 'Tudey will turn to Thrace next' 
12 (Eleftherotypia, 30 January) 
The Turkish press reports for the first time the statements made by Prime Minister Qiller, 
We will show them our determination. The flag must be lowered and the soldiers 
withdrawn. We are determined to resolve the Issue through the negotiation route' 
(Milliyet, 30 January: 17). The crisis Is described as 'a dangerous situation' which 
however 'occurred by chance' (Milliyet, 30 January. 18). Milliyet also suggests, 'This Is 
what Greece always does when the government wants to send a message to the 
people. They Increase the tension but would not go any furthee (Milliyet, 30 January: 
19). 
30 January 1996: the Turkish National Security Council meets and decides to prepare 
for war. Later In the evening a bigger Turkish fdgate Is sent out to sail near the Islets and 
Is followed by a Greek warship too. Gradually the forces on both sides Increase. The two 
countries proceed with an exchange of threats as Ankara refuses to withdraw unless the 
Greek flag on the Islet Is lowered. On the other hand, the Greek government threatens to 
reconsider their position with regard to the approval of the European Community's 
financial aid to Turkey, unless Turkey stops making provocative moves (Glallourldis, 
2001; Kourkoulas 1998; Georgoulls & Soltarldis 1996). 
11 httpJ/archive. anot. gr 12 htipJ/archive. onet. gr 
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In the meantime, and as the fleet forces are Increased, the government of the United 
States try to persuade the two sides to return to the status quo onto. The US Ministers of 
Defence and Foreign Affairs contact their counterparts In Greece and Turkey asking for 
the crisis to be resolved, while President Clinton comes In contact with the Greek Prime 
Minister, recommending calmness and caution. At this point, It Is worth mentioning that 
the Greek Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs commented on the Initiative of USA 
to Intervene as an unnecessary move that was never asked for (Glallouddis, 2001; 
Kourkoulas 1998; Georgoulis & Soltarldis 1996). 
The Greek Foreign Minister, Pangalos, makes an official request to the countries of the 
European Union to respond to the prevalent situation, which does not turn out to be 
successful. At the same time the NATO members choose to remain silent as well and 
only the United Nations appear to follow the progress of the situation closely (Kourkoulas 
1998; Georgoulis & Soltarldis 1996). 
The following day the press In both countries appears to make a particularly extended 
coverage of the events. In Greece Eleftherotypia describes the situation as War Is In the 
aie claming that, 'according to official sources the Turkish armed forces In the area are 
13 expected to Increase' (Eleftherotypia, 31 January) . It also refers to the discussions that 
Prime Minister Smitis had with Bill Clinton over the phone. The newspaper explains how 
none of the two sides accepts to back down leading to the Increase of the armed forces 
on both sides. It also comments on the situation being 'more tense and serious than the 
crisis In 1987' (Eleftherotypla, 31 January)". Moreover, the statements of both 
governments are reported proving their refusal to compromise. Regarding the 
Involvement of USA, It Is stated 'Ankara cultivates tension with the encouragement of 
Washington' (Eleftherotypla, 31 January)". 
Eleftheros Typos reports, 'Despite the Government's assurance that the situation Is 
under control, the crisis appears to remain out of hand'; 'The US government literally 
degraded the Prime Minister asking him for concessions'; 'The night of the national 
embarrassment', 'The government sold Imia to Turkey': 'The armed forces remained 
13 httpJ/arch Ive. enet. gr 14 http: //archive. onet. gr 15 http: //archive. enet. gr 
The Greek - Turkish Conflict and the Media 140 
mobillsed for ... 12 hours', 'Fears for war'; War rehearsal In the Aegean. The Turks 
continue playing their dangerous games' (E. Typos, 31 January: 23-29). 
In Turkey Milliyet warns, 'We should not get caught In the trap of Slmltis and Pangalos', 
'Hurricane In Kardak but we cannot step back even if it costs us; 'On the way to w3e 
(Mill1yet, 31 January: 4,5). The specific newspaper also refers to the Importance of even 
a small rock and states, 'If we do not defend this Island, this will give Greece the chance 
to proceed with similar moves against us In the future'. It reports the warnings made by 
USA and also exerts criticism on Tansu Qiller stating, 'It Is high time she started using 
her brains, (Milliyet, 31 January: 13,14). NATO's silence Is mentioned as well while 
HOrriyet attempts to shed light on the causes of the tension stressing the 'governmental 
paranoia In Turkey' and 'Pangalos' tendency to create conflicts between the two 
countries'. It also conveys the conviction that Turkey would benefit from a military 
confrontation and reports, 'In case of a military conflict, we will definitely beat them'; 'If 
we attack first, we will wln'(HOrdyet, 31 January: 5,6). 
31 January 1996: Turkish commandos land on the second Islet while the Greek 
government appears unable to react. The Turkish parliament meets and decjdes that It 13 
high time the preparations for a possible war started. Immediately the Turkish army Is 
set on the alert. A Turkish frigate enters the Greek territorial waters while a Turkish 
helicopter violates the Greek air space. Both the Greek and Turkish fleets are placed In 
distance of only three miles. Through a message conveyed by Richard Holbrooke, the 
Turkish Prime Minister, Tansu riller, threatens to attack unless the Greek fleet 
withdraws first. As Holbrooke mentioned later, Q11ler had given the Greek government a 
two-hour notice to make the first step to return to the status quo onto. 
On the same day, In the three-sided telephonic round of negotiations between 
Washington, Athens and Ankara, the disengagement Is agreed to begin later the same 
morning. Richard Holbrooke, Informs the Turkish officials that the Greek forces are about 
to withdraw, and advises them to do the same. At the time of the negotiations, the Greek 
helicopter, that had taken off In order to confirm the occupation of the second Islet falls 
causing death to the three air force officers aboard. 
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The marines of both sides are pulled out of the Island In a 'step-by-step' process, 
returning to the status quo ante. The Turkish side Is celebrating the victory against 
Greece. This was a crisis that confirmed the Turkish position that the Aegean Is full of 
problems that should be dealt with and solved. Not to mention that they managed to end 
the crisis In a way that did not cause any harm to the Turkish Interests. In the Greek front 
the whole Issue Is seen as a disastrous loss, since the Turkish claim was not withdrawn, 
while the Greek government Is accused of betraying the country against the traditional 
enemy (Glallouddis, 2001; Kourkoulas 1998; Georgoulls & Soltarldis 1996). 
The specific day marks both the escalation and resolution of the crisis and therefore 
once again there Is extended press coverage of the events. In Greece Eleftherotypla 
refers to a 'stormy meeting In the parliament' and a 'severe criticism against the Prime 
Minister for complying with the American and Turkish policies'. The situation Is also 
described as a'natlonal defeat' and 'national betrayal' (Eleftherotypla, I February)'O. The 
specific newspaper makes an extended coverage In an attempt to answer the questions 
generated by the government's delayed reaction to the occupation of the second Islet as 
well as clarify to what extent the Greek side made concessions that serve the Turkish 
Interests. The Greek government Is actually described as 'unprepared and unorganised 
In front of the crisis'. 'We did not think of our next move and once again we found 
ourselves Isolated because we failed to Inform the international public opinion about the 
situation' (Eleftherotypla, I February). " 
Eleftheros Typos maintains the critical stance towards the Greek government and 
reports the following; 'The government sold our national Interests; We were humiliated', 
'The new government Is already doddering despite the vote of confidence'; 'The meeting 
of the Council of Ministers revealed crucial aspects of the behind-the-scenes activities 
that lead to our humiliation In the Aegean. The Foreign Minister Pangalos admitted 
having reassured the US government that the Greek flag would be lowored', 'The 
Opposition party plans to take Initiatives In order to Improve the countrys prestige 
abroad'; 'The Prime Minister's Initiative to publicly thank USA became the cause of great 
embarrassment In the parliament'; While the Greek Journalists are not allowed to 
approach the Islet, the Turks are knocking' (E. Typos, I February. 10-11 & 22-29). 
,0 http: llarchlve. enet. gr 17 http: //archive. enet. gr 
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In Turkey Milliyet stresses, 'it Is now time to forget about Kardak and focus on the 
Turkish economy' while the crisis Is also recognised by the press as 'the first problem on 
the way to the EU membership'. The press suggests 'the European governments that 
maintain a good relationship with Turkey must be Informed that we are right' (Milllyet, 1 
February: 4-7). The same newspaper criticlses the decision to occupy the second Islet 
stating that, 'Turkey claimed that Greece had stolen the Turkish sovereign rights from 
Kardak. Occupying a second islet Is certainly not going to give us the sovereign rights 
back. This was not a sensible move' (Milliyet. I February'. 13-17). 
Also, Harriyet states 'Ankara Is relieved', 'A victory for Turkey and a defeat for Greece, 
'USA Intervention resolved the tension'; We did not make any concessions; 'The 
Importance of peace,. Official statements are also reported with the president Demirel 
4 congratulating the Prime Minister and the chief of the military forces for their successful 
dealing with the crisis' (Horriyet, 1 February: 5-8). 
6.5.3 The paradox In the Imla-Kardak crisis and the role of the media In the 
escalation of the dispute 
The chronology of the Imia-Kardak crisis, as shown above, Is an attempt to depict the 
basic facts and events that led to the escalation of the crisis, as seen through literature 
and the press coverage from both sides as well. In an effort to present the progress of 
the crisis In the most neutral way possible, the above events have been 'Isolated' from 
the critical tone of the press coverage and the inevitable prejudice that the Information. 
conveyed through the newspapers, contained. 
As one can notice, In the specific case, a seemingly unimportant event, the raising of a 
flag on a rock, flared up a crisis that nearly led the two countries to war. The 'flag war', 
as It was often called by the media, led to a continuous exchange of threats between the 
two countries concerning the sovereign rights over a rock that had never preoccupied 
any of the two sides before. The two countries would have been Involved In a military 
confrontation, had it not been for the Intervention of USA that convinced them to return 
to the status quo ante, an outcome that generated a 'political storm' In the domestic 
arena of Greece and a festive atmosphere In Turkey. 
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Given the absence of any reference made In the related treaties regarding the sovereign 
rights over the Imla-Kardak Islets, It seems fairly rational to assert that the two rocks 
were ceded from Italy to Greece as part of the Dodecanese Islands. It Is also known that 
the two countries have been traditional enemies and the relationship established 
between them was based on feelings of mutual hostility and mistrust. Yet, the paradox 
remains that both the grounding of the Turkish boat and the raising of the Greek flag on 
the rock, were judged as too trivial as events to bring the two countries on the verge of a 
war. Initially, the diplomats on both sides were themselves talking about routine 
exchange of verbal notes between the two embassies. A month later both sides were 
querying what was the reason that had Inflated the Issue, especially on the Greek TV. 
This query was to a large extent clarified by the revealing Interview given to 
Eleftheortypia by a Turkish journalist named Cesur Sert. on 19" January 1999. Sert was 
one of the journalists In the HUrriyet team that raised the Turkish flag on the Imla-Kardak 
Islets on 2701 January 1996. In the Interview he gave to Eleftherotypia's Stratis 
Mpalaskas, he states, 'it all started when one of HOrriyet's executives asked me and four 
other journalists to fly to the Islet and cover the Issue that the Greek citizens from 
Kalymos had created with the raising of a Greek flag there. We were also given a big 
Turkish flag and were asked to take pictures of It on the Islet. We found a Greek flag 
there, we replaced it with the Turkish one and we were all photographed Individually; 
and he adds, ' on the way back to Smyrna, we called the newspaper to Inform them. 
When we mentioned the Greek flag we had taken with us, I could hear one of our 
colleagues announcing the news and the rest of them screaming and dancing. The 
following day the newspaper was going to feature a great story on the covee 
(archive. enet. gr/1999/01/19/on-line/kelmena/politics/poll. htm). 
Ever since Its resolution, the 1996 Imla-Kardak crisis has been largely seen as a 'media 
war and the Interview of Cesur Sert could only enhance this observation. Of course, It 
would be an exaggeration to attribute the creation of the crisis to the media solely. Their 
role appears to be crucial though In 'legitimising the nationalist positions of the 
governments In both countries' (Ozgunes & Terzis, 2000: 409). Ultimately, being In a 
position to Identify media Influences In the escalation of this crisis offers a solid basis for 
the investigation of the role of the press In political decision-making. It Is particularly the 
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comparison between the press coverage of this crisis and the one In 1987 that will lead 
to more accurate Inferences regarding how far the media can go. 
5.6 Summary 
The present chapter offered an Introduction to the Greek-Turkish relationship from a 
historical perspective as well as In terms of a social and political framework that 
determines the media action In the two countries. It was an attempt to conceptuallse the 
factors that led to the escalation of the tension between the two countries and at the 
same time Identify some Important elements In the media's coverage of this long-drawn 
conflict. 
With the description of the coverage the two crises received by the Greek and Turkish 
press, this chapter offered a general picture of the line the Greek and Turkish 
newspapers followed In their reporting of this national Issue. It also Identified those 
aspects of the story that the press emphasised In both countries. As a next step the 
press coverage will be portrayed through the media frame, which will serve as the main 
Instrument of the media's role In these two political games. The media frame will be 
presented In terms of the domestic game of the game - theoretic model that will be 
applied to the two crises. This will be addressed In the following chapter along with the 
Investigation of the media - government Interactions In the two crises as political nested 
games. 
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6 Greek -Turkish Games and the Media as Strategic Actors 
6.1 Introduction 
The chapter presents the examination of the two Greek-Turkish territorial crises and the 
coverage they attracted by the respective national press, as described In chapter five, 
through the game-theoretic model that was developed In chapters two and three. The 
application of the game theoretic model serves In the systernafic and rigorous analysis 
on the one hand of the two crises and on the other, of the media - government 
Interaction In them, In order to justify the media's role as actors and Identify the strategic 
elements In that. At the same time, the analysis aims at demonstrating the aptness of 
game theory as an alternative way of examining and explaining media effects In political 
decision-making. This can lead to a more rigorous understanding of the role the media 
play and the extent to which they can even function as tools for analysis of decision- 
making processes. 
The chapter Is divided In two main parts. The first section of the first part features the 
application of the norms of game theory to the Greek-Turkish relationship. In the context 
of the nested game the two crises represent the International arena or the main game. 
The game theoretic analysis offers a detailed account of the options available to the two 
players and the ones that were eventually selected. This will also offer as accurate an 
explanation as possible of the outcome of each game. 
The analysis reveals the great similarity In the way the two crises were escalated and 
resolved, which illustrates the degree to which the two countries have become traditional 
enemies after being Involved In a long drawn and full of tension relationship. This 
signifies the 'familiarity' the two actors have developed in terms of each othees strategic 
behaviour. It also facilitates the analysis of the actors' decisions making their 
calculations more obvious and explainable. In terms of this tradition, the crises between 
the two countries are related to territorial claims and attempts made for the change of 
the status quo. Being more powerful on military terms, Turkey Is the side that challenges 
the status quo to a large extent. Among some of the countrys traditional tactics Is to 
create fait accompli on a diplomatic basis. It Is however a rational actor that would not 
proceed with an attack unless certain that the long term diplomatic and economic payoff 
will be greater than the cost. (Ifestos & Platias, 1992: 186). Turkey sought to change the 
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status quo In the two crises this thesis examines. This would actually place Greece In 
the position of the defending player. However, which side challenges the status quo is 
not always as straightforward; and Is also one of the reasons why the two countries 
found themselves Involved in a conflict twice. This Is explained by Jervis' statement that 
$war and conflicts are more likely when both sides believe they are defending the status 
quo'(Jervis, 1992: 192). 
The strategic analysis of the two crises will be followed by the description of the 
domestic game, which will model the media - government Interaction. The domestic 
game reflects the organisation of the media's preferences and Interests In relation to the 
governmental strategies as they develop In the International arena. The game serves In 
Identifying the connection between media preferences and governmental strategies In 
order to understand the strategic nature of the media's action and the conditions on 
which a media effect on the governmental decisions would occur. The domestic game, 
which comprises a game that is nested In and runs along the International crisis, will also 
provide the basis for the examination and evaluation of the press coverage In relation to 
the progress of each crisis. 
The second part of the chapter comprises the actual analysis of the press coverage 
within the context of the two gameslcdses, and will therefore merge the two game 
models. The press coverage and the frames through which the Greek and Turkish 
newspapers portrayed the two crises are examined as part of a game that Is nested 
within and develops along each crisis. The analysis alms at comparing the progress of 
both the decision-making process and the press coverage In order to detect correlations 
between the governmental decisions and media frames that could explain potential 
media effects. The chapter concludes with an overall evaluation of the press's strategic 
role In the two crises. Through the Identification of the similarities and differences In the 
progress and coverage of the two crises, It attempts to create the profile of the media as 
a strategically Involved actor and Integral part of the decision - making process. 
6.2 The Greek-Turkish International games 
The two Greek- Turkish crises presented In this section represent the type of game of 
the status quo. In this, one of the sides Is Interested In maintaining the status quo and 
therefore Is adopting a defensive policy while the other Is the one that 'attacks' first and 
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aims at changing the existing situation. The main objecUve of the player who Is 
defending Is to repulse or deter any provocative moves that could lead to the change of 
the existing situation. On the other hand, the attacking player aims at forcing the 
defending player to back down or to compromise. 
In such types of games, It Is usually the 'attacking' player that appears to'have the upper 
hand' always depending on the amount of force he/she employs. Scarpf claims that 
there Is a maximum level of overt conflict that a relationship can bear and If that level Is 
exhausted unilaterally, then the other side must either give In or Initiate war (1997: 78). 
This Is the basically the case In games that fall under the category of 'Chicken'. which 
Colman describes as a dangerous game. This Is because, by trying to get the maximum 
payoff for himself, the attacker not only harms the other player but he also exposes both 
himself and the defender to the risk of a disastrous outcome. In line with Scarpf s 
argument, Colman explains that such games are of compulsive character, In the sense 
that It Is Impossible to avoid playing with someone who Is Insistent. because a person 
who has refused to play chicken, has effectively played and lost (1992: 99). Initiating war 
Is therefore the only option a player, who does not Intend to give In. has. When such 
games are played In sequence, then the first mover will win at the expense of the other 
side (Scarpf, 1997: 78). The reason being that the player who gains an early lead Is 
likely to maintain It given that on the one hand he gains confidence In his ability to get 
away with the risky strategy; and on the other hand. he makes his opponent more 
apprehensive of retaliating with the risky strategy (Colman 1982: 100). 
However, one should also consider the long-term cost that such solutions may have for 
the defender of the status quo. The defending player. bearing In mind that a possible 
withdrawal In a similar crisis could trigger off further withdrawals In the long term, might 
then become more determined to defect even if this results In a conflict. As Robert Jervis 
(1982) claims, the 'security dilemma' of a specific country becomes even more crucial 
when a state that defends the status quo Is forced by factors like the national 
commitments and strategies, to adopt an offensive strategy. If that Is the case, even If 
none of the two sides aim at a territorial expansion, the national strategies are shaped 
based on the fear and the possibility that there will be drastic redistributions of territory 
and clout The possibility of withdrawing is likely to affect future issues and conflicts 
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between the two sides. Therefore, both players appear to be unwilling to proceed with 
any compromising that would alter their values and objectives. 
A crucial factor In the solution of the two crises Is the amount and type of Information the 
two players have at their disposal about one another at the beginning of the game. The 
two countries have been historical enemies. Involved In a long -drawn controversy 
largely related to territorial claims and Issues of sovereignty. Inevitably, the two enemies 
became familiar with certain strategies the adversary pursued, which could be easily 
identified after repetition. The repeated crises - games between the two countries 
resulted In a certain reputation that the two actors acquired In the eyes of the adversary 
with regard to their traditional objectives In their relationship. Reputation would ultimately 
add to the amount of Information available to the two actors and assist In explaining their 
selection of strategies. 
In general, game theory Is known to explain the ranking among the outcomes of a game 
for each player, but It offers no help In explaining the value that specific outcomes may 
have for the players. For this reason, the empirical Information we have about the two 
crises and the strategies that the two players are traditionally known to employ, will 
provide some Indication about the preferences of the two players and will help acquire a 
better understanding of the progress and solution of the games. This Information will 
also assist In the translation of the game theoretic approach Into an analysis that will 
create scope for and shed light on the media's strategic action In their progress and 
solution. 
6.2.1 Tho 1987 oll-drilling crlsl3 
The 1987 oil-drilling crisis represents a rather complicated version of the chicken game. 
However, even If Chicken Is the nearest of the four game models In the literature to 
describe It, the specific crisis embodies certain features that produce a game different 
from the archetypal. The game will first be presented In Its normal form In order to obtain 
a first picture of the moves that are available to the two actors and the outcomes they 
lead to when combined. The next step will be to present the same game In an extended 
form with the employment of the decision tree. This will offer a more detailed account of 
how each move led to the other and ultimately resulted In the resolution of the crisis. The 
extensive form of the game will also help Identify the entries for the med13. The media's 
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Influence on the International level derives from the domestic arena and from the Impact 
they have on the decision-making process by acting domestically. 
The game matrix Is the form of the game that displays the names of the players, the 
options available to them and the way in which these options may Interact and produce 
certain outcomes. Given that a situation such as the Greek-Turkish crisis requires action 
and a set of decisions and moves In order to be resolved, the game matrix converges 
the possible combinations of these decisions In six basic outcomes and represents the 
summary of Important Information from which we can then extract the preferred 
strategies of the players. It Is therefore essential that we present the game In Its normal 
form, based on which the strategic analysis of the crisis will be conducted. Figure 6.1 
displays the normal game matrix of the 1987 crisis. In this game, Turkey Is the player 
that aims at changing the status quo and moves first by announcing an Imminent oil 
prospecting within the disputable continental shelf. The main objective of the Turkish 
government Is to force the adversary Into a negotiation process that will consequently 
lead to the rearrangement of the continental shelf. On the other hand, Greece represents 
the 'defender' of the status quo and aims at deterring Turkey from entering the 
disputable area as well as Involve In a negotiation round. 
In this game Greece and Turkey can select between two or more strategies. On the one 
hand Turkey can choose between utilising its threat and proceeding with oil prospecting, 
and the decision to withdraw. On the other hand, Greece can choose between three 
alternatives. It can accept to negotiate with Turkey regarding the resolution of the shelf 
Issue, It can attack the Turkish vessel or It can refuse to negotiate without proceeding 
with any other action. 
There are six possible combinations of the actors' decisions that result In four outcomes. 
Starting from the top two cells of the matrix. It appears that If Greece chooses to 
negotiate, this would leave Turkey better off, regardless of whether Turkey decides to 
withdraw from oil prospecting or not. In the former case (AIA) Turkey achieves Its most 
preferred outcome In a more effortless way and gets 4, while the latter option represents 
a less comfortable strategy since It requires some action on behalf of Turkey to get the 
adversary to cooperate and therefore gives a payoff of 3.5. 
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Turkey 
A: withdraw from B: proceed with 
Greece 
oil prospecting oil prospecting 
A: accept to negotiate 
13: attack the Turkish 
research vessel 
C: don't attack and 
refuse to negotiate 
2.4 2.3,5 
4,1.5 1.1 
4.2 3.3 
(2) 
(2,5) 
(3.5) 
(2,5) (2,5) 
Figure 6.1: The '011-drilling'game In the normal form 
The numbers in brackets indicate the average payoff that each move yields for the two 
players and on this Instance It appears that the average payoff for Greece if It accepts to 
negotiate Is the lowest It can receive (2). Moving to the middle row of the matrix, a 
possible Greek decision to attack the Turkish vessel can result In the worst possible 
outcome for both countries, which Is war, if Turkey proceeds with the oil prospecting (1, 
1). If on the other hand, Turkey withdraws Immediately after Greece attempts an attack, 
then the crisis ends with Greece being better off (4,1, S). This explains the higher 
average payoff that this move can yield for Greece (Z5). 
The last row of the matrix portrays the potential outcomes of the Greek decision to 
simply refuse to negotiate In combination with Turkey's decision to either withdraw from 
or proceed with the oil prospecting. In the former case the outcome reflects the 
maintenance of the status quo In the Aegean since the two players return to the status 
quo onto without the occurrence of either negotiation or oil prospecting. However, as the 
matrix displays, the specific outcome leaves Greece better off for the reason that the 
defence and maintenance of the status quo Is valued more by the Greek government. 
The matrix Includes two potential Greek victories both of which result In the status quo. 
The difference Is that the outcome depicted In the middle row Involves action In the form 
Of a military attack that forces Turkey to withdraw. The second Greek victory Involves no 
action but Is Interpreted as such due to meeting the preferences of the Greek 
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government. The last cell of the matdx displays the outcome of the game when the 
action Is unilateral and only from the Turkish government that proceeds with the oil 
prospecting; while the adversary remains firm to Its decision not to Involve In any 
negotiation but without Initiating a military confrontation. This 13 not the best outcome 
either for Turkey (3) because It does not achieve the Initiation of the negotiation round 
that It was aiming at; or for Greece (3) that, although refuses to negotiate, also allows 
the violation of the Greek territorial waters. The outcome represents a compromise that 
Is made by both sides but without signifying an official agreement. 
The organisation of the crisis In a game matrix allows for the calculation of the average 
payoffs the two players get from each decision. The average payoffs are the numbers 
displayed In brackets and they also indicate the dominant strategy for each player. The 
term dominant signifies the strategy that will leave the player better off. Independent of 
what the opponent chooses to do (Tsebelis, 1990: 64). As Scharpf puts it 
Dominance Implies that In choosing between two strategies an actor should always select the one that provides payoffs that are superior or equal to the payoffs provided by the second strategy for 
all options the other parties might exercise (1997: 103). 
As the matrix shows, the dominant strategy for Greece Is C. If the Greek government 
refuses to negotiate, on average It will be better off than In any other case, Independent 
of the Turkish response. On the contrary, the matrix displays equal sum-totals for both 
Turkish strategies as both the decisions can render the player better or worse off, 
depending on the response of the adversary. In this case, Turkeys strategies can be 
described as 'best response' strategies In the sense that what the player does depends 
on what he expects the adversary to do (Hargreaves Heap & Varoufakls. 1995: 44). 
Therefore, for Turkey strategy A Is best response for Greece's strategy A, while strategy 
0 Is best response for Greece's strategy A and C. On this basis the cell that Indicates 
dominant strategy for both players Is located In the bottom right box of the matrix (3,3). 
This is the outcome that renders both sides better off than In any other outcome. For a 
player to select their dominant strategy Implies a rational action In the sense that the 
player calculates the expected outcomes of all combinations and selects the strategy 
that eliminates the risk In his decision. A mutually rational action would also Imply that 
the game reaches equilibrium. Tsebells defines as equilibrium solutions the stable and 
mutually optimal outcomes because no player has an Incentive to deviate In strategy If 
the opponent does not change strategy (1990: 64). Or to put It differently, the players 
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understand that a unilateral change of strategy at a given point In the game, will not 
Improve their payoff, 
As portrayed In the matdx, there Is technically one equilibdum point that Is located In the 
flght cell of the bottom row (3,3). What Is Important In understanding this equilibdum Is 
that the specific game Is an Iterated one, In the sense that It Is played a number of times 
before the two players reach a solution. In this case, and given that the players' moves 
may be conditional until the next round, once they reach the specific cell In the matrix, 
they would be better off staying there than unilaterally switchIng to another strategy. 
The game matrix helps Identify the outcomes, which are expected to occur when the 
specific strategies available to the two players Intersect, as well as the strategies that 
would Imply rational action and would lead to a rational solution. Therefore, according to 
the outcomes of this game as shown In the respectIve matrix, If Greece and Turkey 
acted as rational players, they would avoid the combinations that were expected to yield 
the worst possible outcome. However, one of the prime dynamics In the solution of such 
games lies In the preferences of the two players, which define the ranking of the 
outcomes for each of them, Understanding the preferences of the two players 13 
compulsory In order to understand the progress and solution of the game. The ranking of 
the preferences requires a more In depth and extensive analysis of the crisis as a game, 
which will be conducted with the aid of the extensive form of the game and the decision 
tree. A game tree, or else a decision tree, Is 'a graphical form representing the structural 
model of a decision situation' (Singleton & Tyndal. 1974: 20). It constitutes a more 
extensive description of the game and contains the following Information: Whose choice 
Is It at any particular point of time? What alternative actions are available to each player 
at any particular move? What does each player know about the other person's prior 
choices? What are each person's preferences over outcomes? (Ordeshook, 1986). 
An extensive analysis of the game becomes essential when one considers that a 
player's relative preferences among outcomes may be based on any factor whatsoever 
that influence the player's degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the possible 
outcomes (Colman, 1982: 20-21). This undedines the qualitative nature of outcomes to 
which players attach a given value that would drive their decisions. In other words, the 
desirability of an outcome Is subjective - and Is known as 'utility'; and although modem 
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utility theory enables numerical utilities corresponding to degrees of preference to be 
assigned in games with qualitative outcomes (Colman, 1982: 18), the numerical 
representation of these outcomes and the players' preferences as depicted In the game 
matrix, do not adequately Incorporate factors such as the Information each player has 
about the adversary's prior choices or the number of acUons available to each player at 
each point In the game. Not to mention that, an Important contribution of the decision 
tree In this case Is that it demonstrates the sequence In which the two players move and 
which would ultimately play a crucial role In understanding how and why certain 
decisions are made. The availability of Information regarding the sequence of moves or 
the time Intervals that elapse between moves as well as the occurrence of external 
Interventions provides a more accurate Illustration of the players' preferences and the 
ranking among outcomes. 
The game matrix shown above displays the potential outcomes that derive from the 
possible combinations between the strategies available to the two countries as well as 
the action required for a rational solution. The matrix serves In providing a compressed 
and general picture of the ways In which the crisis could be resolved. The extensive 
analysis will then demonstrate the progress of the crisis through which the final outcome 
was achieved as well as reasons that led to that specific outcome and the extent to 
which It corresponded to the players' preferences. The extensive analysis of the crisis 
will be conducted on the basis of a step-by-step description of the decision tree. This will 
help analyse the preferences of the actors along the course of the crisis, and Identify the 
ranking of the outcomes as part of the explanation and analysis of the solution of the 
game. It is also Important that we Identify the way In which the two players Interpreted 
the action and the preferences of the adversary as this will prove crucial In 
understanding their ranking among the outcomes. Before the media's role In the solution 
of the crisis is Investigated, we need to understand why the actors chose the decisions 
they did, whether they chose their dominant strategies and If the game reached 
equilibrium. This will be an Indication of their rationality In relation to which inferences 
about the media's strategic role will also be extracted. 
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6.2.2 The analysis of the 1987 oil-drllllng game In Its extensive form 
The 1987 oil-drilling crisis comprises an Ideal game for strategic analysis due to the well- 
planned tactics that both governments employ. This Is a crisis In which the two countries 
confront each other over the status quo In the Aegean. The change and the 
maintenance of the status quo reflect the two opposing goals In the crisis according to 
which the preferences of the two players are shaped. With the Initiation of the crWs we 
know that Turkey Is the player that alms at changing the status quo and Greece at 
maintaining it. Therefore the preferences are shaped as follows. 
For Turkey, the main objective Is to Initiate a negotiation round regarding the re- 
Organisation of the continental shelf, which will ultimately lead to a change of the status 
quo and will entail the minimum possible cost and no military Intervention. Turkey would 
even be satisfied with a mutual compromise between the two countries, as this would 
signify the departure point of future negotiations regarding the continental Issue. This 
Information leads to the assumption that from the outcomes displayed In the game 
matrix, Turkey's ranking order appears to develop In a logical sequence and according 
to the payoff each outcome entails. The Ideal solution would be the outcome depicted In 
the top left cell (2,4), which presupposes the acceptance of the Greek government to 
negotiate. The second preferred outcome Is again placed In the top row (2.3, S), this 
Ume with the commencement of oil prospecting on behalf of Turkey as a move that will 
ultimately force Greece to accept the Initiation of a negotiation round. The last two 
preferred outcomes are the possibility for a compromise (3,3) that could set the 
conditions for future negotiations, and lastly, war Is the least preferred outcome for 
Turkey, for the reason that changing the status quo at that specific moment would not be 
worth the risk of a military confrontation. 
The Turkish Intentions are translated Into the creation of a talt accomp1l. an Issue to be 
solved In a diplomatic way and without the legal authorities being Involved. 11 The 
Turkish strategy at this point lies In making use of the disagreement and tension that has 
'I In the Greek-Turkish long drawn-out conflict, the Greek side demands that the main mechanism 
of solving the specific differences between the two countries Is The Hague Court while Turkey 
suggests that the two sides should solve any differences through 'bilateral negotiations'. The 
argumentation of the two sides Is obviously different. On the one hand, Greece defends the 
status quo and therefore becomes stronger In a process that Is based on the International law. On 
the other hand, Turkey attempts to avoid The Hague Court due to their Inability to adduce legal 
reasoning in order to defend their positions. 
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already been Initiated between Greece and NAPC and agree to send the research 
vessel 'Sismik 1171-lora' for oil prospecting within the Greek shelf. This move Is a threat 
against the Greek government. Under the pressure of Imminent oil prospecting, they aim 
at forcing the opponent Into backing down and accept to resolve the Issue through the 
diplomatic way. 
It needs to be mentioned at this stage that the Turkish strategy is based on Interpreting 
the Greek attempt to buy the holding shares of the Denisson Mines Corporation as an 
Intention of commencing oil prospecting within the disputed continental shelf. Such an 
attempt would ultimately mean the violation of the Bern agreement which constitutes the 
grounds for the Turkish government. Their argument Is, 'If they violate the Bern 
agreement, we will do the same'. With the employment of this strategy, Turkey moves 
based on the expectation that Greece will violate the Bern agreement and places Itself In 
the second column of the game matrix waiting for the Greek response. Turkey appears 
ready to proceed with oil prospecting unless Greece opens negotiation. Given that the 
Greek government had made no announcement of Imminent oil drilling, Turkeys 
decision to Interpret the Greek intentions as such reflects the creation of a fait Occompy 
against which Turkey alms at Justifying its action. This can be described as a 'lactical, 
misperception; and given that Turkey did not really feel threatened by an Imminent 
Greek oil-prospecting, this justifies the fact that Turkey would be safisfied with a 
compromise. 
On the other front, Greece alms at maintaining the status quo and appears to be 
Involved In this crisis due to Turkey's decision to change the existing situation. 
Maintaining the status quo is priority for the Greek government even if this requires the 
Initiation of war. For Greece, the prestige and determination of the country In terms of 
their relationship with Turkey, Is worth even the risk of Involving In a war. This Is because 
a possible compromise or withdrawal could mean the beginning of a series of 
compromises in case of future conflicts. This Is a typical example of a political leader 
who would rather engage in a risky behaviour only to avoid a retr83t from the Status quo 
(Levy. 1992). 
On this basis, to deter the Turkish government from commencing oil prospecting, without 
having to proceed with an attack, is the outcome ranked first for Greece (4,2),, while even 
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what Is rationally considered as the worst possible outcome (1,1) Is ranked higher than 
the possibility of accepting to negotiate or even compromising. Greece's location In the 
matrix Is therefore In the second and third rows, since the government does not appear 
to consider accepting the negotiation route. 
In order to prevent the status quo from changing. Greece has to employ a strategy that 
will stop Turkey from sending the research vessel In the disputable continental shelf and 
from forcing the Greek government to Involve In a new negotiation round that might 
change the status quo. Greece Is interested In the solution of the continental shelf Issue 
through a legal process, which Is exactly the opposite from what Turkey Is aiming at. 
Let us know examine how the strategies unfold with the aid of the decision tree (Figure 
6.2). What one can see In the figure Is an Interaction commencing between the two 
players that may or may not result In a war. As it was mentloned earlier, It was the 
Turkish move to authorise the research vessel that caused the crisis to flare up and the 
game Is officially initiated with the Turkish announcement that oil prospecting Is 
imminent. Greece will then have to either do nothing or respond to the Turkish 
announcement. At this stage, the Greek government demands that the Turkish vessel 
does not sail beyond the Turkish territorial waters. Turkey will then have to respond 
either by accepting to withdraw from the decision to commence oil prospecting or to 
Insist. Turkey responds to the Greek warning with a persistent policy. Not only does It 
refuse to withdraw from the oil prospecting, but also It carries out the Initial plan and 
orders that the research vessel start sailing In the international waters. The Turkish 
strategy becomes more risky since It Increases the possibility of war. In terms of the 
game matrix, at this stage the crisis progresses In the bottom right cell (3,3), since both 
countries appear unwilling to back down but without a military mobilisation. 
Once the Turkish research vessel Is authorised to commence oil prospecting In the area, 
the Greek government responds by adopting the policy of counteroffensive deterrence 
and warning the adversary that In case the Turkish vessels sails In the disputed area, It 
will be attacked. What the Greek officials attempt to achieve Is to convince the opponent 
that war Is likely and that the cost of Involving In a war at that time, would be much 
greater than the profit. Therefore, It would be wiser for Turkey to act rationally and back 
down on time. 
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The Greek government, In other words, raises the cost of a possible attempt to 
commence oil prospecting within the disputable area, which will certainly result In a war. 
Greece Is counting on the fact that Turkey Is after creating a fait accompll that will lead to 
a negotiation process and would not take the risk of war. This constitutes knowiedge that 
one player has obtained about the other through their long - drawn relationship and In 
this case, Greece Is utilising this knowledge and proceeds with a threat that will make 
Turkey understand there Is great chance of commencing a war. 
In order to make the threat credible, the Greek government proceeds with two moves. 
First, they decide to suspend the operation of one of the most crucial, In terms of 
position, American Bases near Athens, confirming the crucial charactertnature of the 
situation. As It mentioned earlier In the description of the crisis, with this move the Greek 
government sent a message to the US government that any mediation from their side 
would be undesirable. This was also a decision that aimed to overt any military 
Interference that the military base would cause during a possible war between the two 
countries. 
Second, the Greek Minster of Foreign Affairs goes to Sofia for further negotiations with 
the Bulgarian government. With this move (balance of power politics)" the Greek Prime 
Minister alms at creating an alliance with the Bulgarian government It becomes a cause 
for alarm In the circles of NATO and gives ground to the threat that In case of a Greek- 
Turkish crisis, NATO's southeast coalition would collapse. If Bulgaria gives a positive 
and supportive response. The essence of this decision lies In the supposition that a 
Potential cooperation between a NATO member and a country of the Warsaw Pact could 
entail the leak of NATO's strategic Information on behalf of Greece. TNs policy Is followed 
up with specific military manoeuvres that mean to show the country Is preparing for war. 
This Is clearly defective move that escalates the tension and automatically moves the two 
countries to the cell that signifies the worst possible outcome on the game M3tdX (1.1). 
The next move Is to be made by Turkey that will respond to the threat either by 
withdrawing from the decision to explore for oil or by Insisting, while the Turkish research 
11 The balance of power politics represents the tactic that aims at 'borrowing power from foreign 
countries' In order to create supportive alliance$. 
Greek - Turkish Games and the Media as Strategic Actors 159 
vessel Is sailing towards the International waters. Meanwhile, the General Secretary of 
NATO Lord Carrington and the British Foreign Minister Geoffrey Howe has Initiated 
negotiations with the Turkish government In order to prevent any war possibility. The 
arrow In the left-hand side of the decision tree Indicates the time point In which the 
Intervention took place. In response to the Greek threat and the NATO Intervention the 
Turkish government selects a more moderate direction and argues that It will withdraw If 
Greece guarantees that will not proceed with oil drilling In the disputed area either. The 
Turkish decision Is the resultant of the NATO Intervention that raised the cost of a 
potential military confrontation for Turkey and led to its shift on the game matrix, from the 
right column and Its defective policy, to a policy of cooperation. The crisis officially ends 
with the last move made by the Greek government that Informs the Turkish government, 
via the US ambassador In Ankara, there Is no Intention of oil prospecting In the disputed 
area. The game ends with the return of the Turkish research vessel to Its departure point 
and with the two countries moving to the cell that signifies the placement of the two 
players In the bottom left box In the game matrix (4,2). 
The outcome of the game leaves the Greek government better off for two reasons. 
Firstly, It Is the most highly ranked outcome for Greece that desired the maintenance of 
the status quo. Secondly, Turkey's change of policy Indicates the selection of an optimal 
strategy and when Greece was preparing for an attack, withdrawing was a rational move 
to make. However, It also signifies compromise and a situation In which Turkey Is worse 
off than Greece, since It did not achieve any of its objectives. Although technically the 
game did not reach an equilibrium point, as demonstrated In the game matrix. the 
Identification and evaluation of the preference order for the two players highlight a 
rational solution since both players selected mutually optimal strategies. 
6.2.3 Tho 1996 Imla. Kardak crisis 
Similar to the previous game, the 1996 Imla-Kardak crisis represents a game that 
embodies elements of the Chicken, but In its normal form It is significantly more complex 
than the original. What one can see In the game matrix In figure 6.3 Is that each player's 
option to cooperate or defect consists of a combined move that describes two sequential 
steps. For example, Turkey Is considered to defect when It demands that the Greek flag 
Is lowered and, unless this Is done, proceeds with an attackAnvasion. Turkey defects 
when both moves are completed. Similarly, Greece's cooperation takes place when the 
Gmok - Turkish Games and the Media as Strategic Actors 160 
actor lowers the flag and also accepts to negotiate. Moreover. because of the sequential 
moves In which the game Is played and because Turkey Is the player that first makes a 
threat to attack, the game matrix would correspond to the crisis when the outcomes are 
examined with Turkey always having moved first. 
Turkey 
Greece 
k lower the flag and 
accept to negotiate 
13: refuse to lower the 
flag or negotiate 
C: lower the flag and 
refuse to negotiate 
A: demand the flag 0: demand the flag 
Is lowered and Is lowered and 
don't attack Invade 
2.5 2.3.5 
5.2 1.1 
4.4 3.3.5 
(2) 
(3) 
(3.5) 
(3,6) (Z 7) 
FIgur* 6.3: The Imla-Kardsk game In the normal form 
In this game, Turkey Is Interested In the rearrangement of the sovereign rights In the 
Aegean, which Is translated Into forcing Greece Into a negotiation round. On the other 
hand, Greece alms at an official recognition of the Pads Treaty according to which the 
specific Islets were ceded to Greece by Italy along with the Dodecanese. Similar to the 
1987 crisis, the action of Turkey Is organised In two moves. The first move Is to withdraw 
from the territorial claims once having demanded that the Greek flag Is lowered or'not 
attack' (A), and the second one Is to attack the adversary (0). Greece can choose 
between three ways to respond to the Turkish moves. It can lower the flag and accept to 
negotiate (A), refuse to either lower the flag or negotiate (B) and lower the flag but refuse 
to negotiate (C). The payoffs for the two players are ranked from I to 5 as the 
combinations of their moves result In a greater variation of outcomes than In the first 
crisis. 
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If we look at the outcomes that this matrix produces, it appears that the first row renders 
Turkey better off since a Greek acceptance to commence negotlations pays off 
Independent of whether an attack has preceded. However. when Turkey succeeds In 
getting Greece to negotiate with strategy B, that Is with an attack, Turkey gets a lower 
payoff of 3,5, contrary to the payoff it gets from strategy A. This Is because an attack on 
Greece could clearly harm Turkey's Intemational reputation. On the contrary, the middle 
row portrays an overturn In the outcomes since a Greek refusal to lower the flag and 
negotiate will either result In the worst outcome (1,1), If Turkey attacks and given that 
Greece also responds; or it will leave Greece better off since failure of Turkey to respond 
drastically will signify the establishment of the Greek sovereignty over the Islet (S. 2). 
The outcomes portrayed In the bottom row Indicate concessions made by both sides. 
The bottom left box Is best described as a compromise (4,4) due to the partly 
cooperative strategy of both players. On the one hand Greece accepts to lower the flag 
but refuses to commence negotiations. This might not harm Greece's Interests but It 
does signify a compromise that paves the way for future concessions as well. It also 
signifies an outcome that leaves Turkey in a better position than In the outcome 
displayed In the middle left box, but It does not entirely meet Its Interests either since 
Greece Is still refusing to negotiate. The last box (3.3, S) although results from the same 
Greek strategy as above, It renders Greece worse off than a compromise due to the fact 
that it proceeds with the lowering of the flag only after a Turkish att3ck has preceded. 
This Is an outcome that works better for Turkey that gains the 'upper hand' In the 
relationship, but still putting Turkey's International reputation at stake. 
As shown In the sum-totals of the two players' moves. strategy C Is the dominant one for 
Greece - on average the player will be better off by lowering the flag and refusing to 
negotiate - and for Turkey the dominant strategy Is A. that Is to demand the lowering of 
the flag but without attacking. Consequently, the dominant strategy for the two players Is 
the bottom left box of the matrix (4,4). 
The matrix Includes two equilibrium points. The first one Is located In the middle left (5, 
2) box. This outcome represents the equilibrium point In a one-shot Chicken game 
where, provided that the adversary does not switch strategies, none of the two players 
has an Incentive to deviate from their choices since such a decision would render them 
worse off. On the one hand, Greece would risk suffering a loss or getting a compromise, 
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on the other hand, Turkey would Involve In war. The second equilibrium solution Is 
located In the bottom left cell of the matrix (4.4), which represents the dominant strategy 
box as well. Similar to the 1987 oil-drilling crisis, this Is an equilibrium that results from 
Iteration. If the two players reach that outcome, they will have no Incentive to switch to 
another strategy, which could entail the risk of war. 
6.2.4 The analysls of the 1996 Imla-Kardak game In Its extensive form 
The 1996 crisis provides evidence of the repetition of the games In which Greece and 
Turkey are Involved since it demonstrates great similarity with the first crisis In terms of 
the two players' Interests. Once again Turkey Is after creating conditions for the 
commencement of official negotiations regarding territorial rights In the Aegean. 
Interestingly, similar to the 1987 crisis, Turkey appears to pursue Its Interests through an 
indirect route and by exploiting a specific event that will generate tension and, Ideally 
would force Greece into negotiations. This would generate the following ranking order of 
the possible outcomes as portrayed In the matrix. To force Greece In the lowering of the 
flag and Into a negotiation process without having to launch an attack Is the most 
preferred outcome for Turkey (2.5), followed by the same outcome but with the 
Involvement of the attack (2,3,5). In the first case Turkey achieves Its major objective 
without its Interests being affected, while In the second It puts Its International reputation 
at risk. The next preferred outcome is located In the bottom left cell of the matrix (4,4) 
which meets the Turkish objective only partly with the Greek agreement to lower the 
Greek flag, but which still leaves the player better off than when Greece refuses to make 
any concession whatsoever. A somewhat lower payoff Is obtained through the outcome 
located In the bottom right box (3,3.5). The Involvement of military force here justifies 
the lower ranking of the specific outcome. As for the outcomes located In the middle row 
of the matrix, given the determination the Turkish government demonstrates, It would be 
more willing to attack Greece If the latter refuses to make any compromise than withdraw 
from Its claims, which Is the outcome that derives from failure to attack. Therefore, war 
(1,1) Is In this case ranked higher than withdrawal (5,2), which Is the least preferred 
outcome for Turkey. 
In Greece, the primary Interest of the government lies In avoiding any negotiation with 
Turkey and maintaining the existing situation unchanged. For the Greek government. the 
status quo Is translated Into the International recognition of the Pads Treaty, which 
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establishes the Greek sovereign rights over the Islets. It therefore Indicates that the 
maintenance of the status quo serves the Greek Interests, which Justifies the Initial 
decision of the government to Ignore the Turkish moves and demands. On this basis, the 
most preferred outcome for Greece Is located In the middle left box of the matrix (5,2). 
which Is the outcome that renders Greece better off than any other combination. The 
outcome located In the bottom left box (4,4) should be ranked as second because 
despite the concession regarding the lowering of the flag. Greece would still remain firm 
to Its refusal to negotiate, while Turkey would have also stepped back. The outcome 
located In the bottom right box (3,3, S) appears logical to be ranked third for the reason 
that lowering the flag would follow a Turkish attack. If however, It still refuses to 
negotiate, this would still pay off more than if it refuses to make any concession, which 
would lead to war. 
So far, the ranking of the outcomes demonstrates a logical sequence that corresponds 
to the preferences of the player but without entailing great risk. However, the Greek 
government appears equally determined to protect Its territorial rights as Turkey, which 
leads to the preference of the worst possible outcome (1,1) over the possibility to 
cooperate and accept to Involve In a negotiation process, with or without being attacked, 
which would yield a payoff of 2. Although both countries appear determined to rather 
Involve In a war than withdraw from their positions, the matrix displays a number of 
outcomes that pay off more than war and are mutually optimal, to a certain extent. It Is 
therefore sensible to assume that the two countries considered the possibility of war as 
the last resort for the solution of the game, which became evident In the official 
statements made In the beginning of the crisis as well. 
The ranking of the outcomes for Greece appears to correspond to the sum- totals of 
each move. The figures In the brackets Indicate that strategy C would payoff more than 
the other two since both outcomes located In the bottom row are ranked higher while 
both Outcomes located In the top row are ranked lower than war. In the case of Turkey, It 
appears from the sum totals that not attacking, which Is strategy A, Is a more beneficial 
choice. 
Figure 6.4 displays the decision tree for this Crisis. In this, Turkey Is shown to be the 
player that moves first and demands that the Greek flag Is lowered. This verbal move 
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has actually been preceded by the sending of a Turkish patrol boat in the area which 
refuses to leave unless the flag Is lowered and which Increases the cost of defection for 
Greece, which will then have to choose between accepting to lower the flag and refusing 
to do so. The Greek government Insists on keeping the flag on the rock. The Greek 
response results In the first sub-game of the decision tree being located In the middle left 
box of the matrix (5,2); leaving Greece better off, at least for the time being. 
In this sub-game the Greek government is actually 'Ignoring' the Turkish demand since 
the Issue Is believed to be only a fabrication of the Turkish side and there Is nothing to 
be negotiated. This response of the Greek government may also be Interpreted Into a 
lack of consistent and planned strategy since by Ignoring the Turkish provocation the 
player Is rather encouraging the adversary to become more persistent and therefore 
more likely to switch to the defective strategy. However, the specific sub - game 
demonstrates the way In which the dominance of strategies changes from one stage to 
the other, when the game Is played In sequential moves. That Is to say, although In the 
normal form of the game the Greek decision to Ignore the Issue appeared to produce a 
lower sum-total than the decision to lower the flag. the same move becomes dominant at 
this stage when the Turkish government has not yet proceeded with an attack threat. 
At this stage, It would be Interesting to see how the Information that the Greek 
government has from previous Interactions with Turkey, Le. the 1987 crisis, might have 
Influenced its decision. This can be explained with the use of a type of reasoning that 
Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis describe as backward Induction (Hargreaves Heap & 
Varoufakls, 1995: 80). The authors explain how In sequential games, an Instrumentally 
rational player would ask what the adversary's response would be to each of the 
strategies that the former selected, and calculate the payoff accordingly before acting. In 
this case, Instrumental rationality Is guided by Information about the adversarys 
preferences and traditional tactics, that Greece could consider before choosing the most 
beneficial strategy. Therefore, knowing from past experiences that Turkey would push 
for negotiations but not Involve In war, Greece's assumption would then be 'If I choose 
strategy 13, Turkey will choose A', which would generate the most preferred outcome for 
Greece. 
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The following sub - game as depicted In the diagram begins with a strategy switch for 
Turkey, from A to B as shown In the matrix, which responds to the Greek defection with 
a war threat and a gradual preparation of the forces, after a decision was made by the 
National Security Council In Turkey. With this move, Turkish Prime Minister PlIer selects 
a largely risky strategy and apparently proves Greece's calculations wrong, at least In 
the current sub-game. At the same time, she creates a talt accompff that serves her 
Interests for the Initiation of a negotiation round, which reinforces the defecUve strategy 
as a more dominant one. With this move, the two players automatically move to the 
matrix cell that reflects the worst possible outcome (1,1), unless Greece switches to 
another strategy too. 
As a next move, the Greek government may now choose between the three strategies 
as depicted In the matrix as well. By selecting strategy B, Greece threatens to respond 
to any Turkish attack and places a team of rangers around the Islet With this latest 
move, Greece accepts to take a great International risk and seriously prepare Itself for 
the possibility of war, a move that appears to be Incompatible with their original 
preferences. This Is a suboptimal move that confirms the two players are placed In the 
box that signifies the worst possible outcome they could get. In other words, although 
according to the ranking order of the outcomes, the possibility of war appeared as less 
preferred than half the outcomes produced In the matrix for both players. the two 
countries found themselves choosing a suboptimal strategy and heading for war. 
This action occurs In terms of the second sub-game of the decision tree, which unfolds 
further than the two escalating moves described above. In fact, Turkeys response to the 
Greek decision to mobilise the armed forces. Is to send warships In the area as well and 
therefore confirm the predictions that war Is Imminent. This move Is followed by the 
Increase of the Greek armed forces In the area as an attempt to make a credible threat 
that would force Turkey Into backing down. At this point both countries attempt to employ 
a strategy of deterrence. On the one hand, Turkey attempts to force the adversary In a 
negotiation process under the threat that a war would be a more costly choice. On the 
other hand Greece raises the stakes In an effort to convince the Turkish government that 
the islets are not negotiable. The extended escalation of the tension reinforces the 
suboptimal or even Irrational nature of the selected strategies as the two players remain 
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In the box representing the technically least preferred outcome and the second least 
preferred outcome according to their preferences. 
The solution to the game Is given by the Intervention of a third player, the US 
government that In this case acts as an arbiter. It needs to be mentioned that by the time 
the two countries have turned a trivial Issue Into a reason for war, a new status quo Is 
created, the retreat from which would then entail greater cost than war. In this case, the 
role of the US government Is to restore the order of the outcomes and the cost and 
payoff attached to them. In other words, the US Intervention raises the cost of defection 
for both players and makes cooperation a more attractive option. Therefore, we see a 
switch In the strategy of the Greek government that agrees to lower the flag but without 
agreeing to commence negotiations with Turkey. Similarly, the Turkish side IS OISO talked 
out of attacking the Greek forces. In terms of the game as depicted In the matrix. the two 
players move from the box that represents the worst possible outcome. to the dominant 
strategy box (4,4). The outcome is best described as a mutual compromise due to the 
fact that It offers no authorlsation of one of the two countries' sovereign rights over the 
Islet. This signifies a concession made by Greece by lowering the flag and automatically 
raising questions regarding the sovereignty over the Islet. At the same time, the 
withdrawal of Turkey raises questions regarding the authenticity of the threats and the 
value of the Islet for Turkey. The game also reached an equilibrium solution. which 
enhances Its nature as a rational outcome since the two players chose a mutually 
optimal strategy. 
The 1996 Imla-Kardak crisis features some key differences compared to the 1987 oil- 
drilling crisis. Although both games developed on the basis of the same Interests and 
preferences of the two players and were solved with the Intervenflon of an external 
player that Influenced the ranking of their preferences, the way the two crises evolved 
differs significantly. In 1987 the two countries, Greece In particular, adopted clear-cut 
strategies that corresponded to their preferences and resulted In a mutually optimal 
solution of the game. Even If Ozal's decision to withdraw appeared as the outcome of 
Lord Carrington's Intervention, given Turkeys preferences It seems that the Intervention 
defined the timing of the withdrawal rather than the decision por so. 
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On the contrary, the 1996 Imla-Kardak crisis found the two governments Involved In a 
game Instigated by a flag that a group of journalists raised on a deserted Islet, which 
would then cause their traditional preferences and Interests towards each other to 
resurface. Although, from a first point of view, Turkey appeared to be following a strategy 
similar to the one In 1987, the governmenrs aggressiveness and lack of a solid 
argumentation led to what seemed as an Irrational escalation of the tension. At the same 
time, Greece's lack of strategic planning generated what was later described as 
spasmodic moves that resulted In what was referred to by the Greek media as a defeat 
In game-theoretic terms, the main difference between the two crises 1103 In the degree of 
rationality Inherent In the players decisions and the solution of the game. That Is to say, 
although In 1987 the two countries were engaged In a rather logical sequence of moves, 
the Imia-Kardak crisis Is a demonstration of moves that no rational calculation would 
predict. It needs to be clarified here that In this thesis the two countries aro not viewed 
as Instrumentally rational players. However, given the availability of Information 
regarding their preferences and Interests, they are expected to move In a way that can 
be described, If not as rational, at least predictable. On this basis. their strategies In the 
1996 crisis could then be Identified as non - predictable, considering the cause of the 
problem that brought them on the brink of war. 
Interestingly, after the 1996 crisis was resolved, It was described by analysts In Greece 
and Turkey as the 'media cdsis', Identifying the exaggerated media coverage as the 
main cause. This Is an observation that provides a hypothesis that the game theoreVc 
approach of the crisis and the press coverage Is therefore called to jusbty. 
6.3 The domestic game 
Chapter three presented the Integration of the media In a political decision-makIng 
process, such as an international crisis. and explained the different stages through which 
the effect of the media frames on the government's decisions Is produced. The current 
section approaches the medla-government Interaction as a domestic game In an attempt 
to systematise the 'action' of both the media and the government towards one another, 
and the cost and payoff this action entails for each party. Chapter three Identified the 
Interaction between the government and the media as a game the former plays against 
Nature. It was explained that to Identify the media as Nature servos In the more accurate 
conceptuallsation of their Interaction. The relationship that the government develops with 
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the national media during conflict situations such as International crises is here 
approached not as a confrontation but as an Interaction where the Interests and 
preferences of one party affect the decisions of the other. 
This Interaction could also take the form of a mixed motive game, where the Involved 
players are motivated partly to cooperate and partly to compete with one another 
(Colman, 1982: 93). However, to conceptualise the media as Nature serves In Identsfong 
the dependence of the government's decisions In the International game, on 8 Player 
that 'moves disinterestedly according to the laws of probability' (Colman, 1982: 6). 
Obviously, the media coverage of an Issue such as an International crisis cannot be 
described as random move, which Is what the concept of Nature as a player Is Idenbfied 
with. The concept of probability, with which Nature moves, Is hero replaced with the 
given set of rules and motivations based on which the media's reacGon to governmental 
decisions derives, always In the form of news content. Although these are not associated 
with the decislon-making process that evolves In the International arena In the form of an 
Interdependence of choice, they can still affect It, the same way that Nature arranges the 
deck In a particular order, In a Poker game (Colman. 1982: 6). Nature In this case, does 
not play a part In the game by making strategic moves, but It does affect the outcome of 
the game In a certain Indirect way. In a similar way, although the media do not move 
against the governmental moves, they can still Influence them and consequently the 
progress and outcome of the International game too. This Influence, which also 
corresponds to the Idea of Tsebells' oxfornality, can ultimately define the media's 
strategic Impact on the solution of a game such as a crisis. 
The domestic game is organised as a strategic game with the aid of the matrix shown In 
figure 6.5, which could however appear contradictory to the conception of the media as 
Nature, since the latter does not move strategically. What needs to be clarified is that the 
media act strategically but they do so towards their competitors rather than the 
government. The media 'exPloit' the governmental moves to produce media coverage 
that will yield a high payoff In relation to their competitors. It Is their strategic action 
towards competition that drives their response to the government's moves and Is 
therefore expected to produce specific payoffs - gains or losses. Those payoffs might bo 
endogenous to the game and predictable to the government, which raises questions as 
to how accurate the association of the media as Nature could be. What needs to be 
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understood though Is that the media's strategic action Is directed to their competitors but 
the outcomes of this action Is also affecting the government. The media act strategically 
for their competitors but they act like Nature for the govemment. In this case. the game 
matrix serves In organising the outcomes that derive from the payoff s they media get In 
their strategic game against competition and how these outcomes are then translated 
Into payoffs for the government. In other words, the matrix Is most effective way to 
organise both the media's game against their competitors and their game as Nature with 
the government. 
The Idea of the domestic game attempts to organise diverse types of media reaction Into 
'moves' and Identify all the possible outcomes that these moves can produce once 
combined with the policy moves made by the government In the International game. The 
outcomes of this game will then be evaluated In relation to the outcome of the 
International game. A central feature of the domestic game Is that although the Involved 
actors are not similar In their characteristics or preferences. which Is also one of the 
reasons why the game cannot take the form of a confrontation or a bargaining situation - 
they could represent two actors whose utility functions are Interdependent In such a way 
that certain acts by one player are likely to Increase or decrease the likelihood that the 
other will act In the same way. This Is an observation Inherent In the macro-micro link 
described by Scharpf, according to which the close Interrelation between the domestic 
and International arena Increases the possibility of a policy decision that conforms to the 
media reaction (Scharpf, 1997: 53). 
In the domestic game. the actions of the media are purposeful In the sense that their 
moves are Interpreted as directed to the attainment of a goal and the fulfilment of 
specific Interests (Ordeshook, 1986). This Will also provide Incentive to Identify their 
preferences as they develop In this context. If the media are conceptuallsed as a soclo- 
Political Institution, then to put It In Scharpf s words, their Interests can bo described as 
related to the production function of social Institutions. For actors like the media, the self. 
Interests could be Identified with the conditions of organisational survival. autonomy and 
growth (1997: 64); or they may reflect a given Ideology or even the Incentivo to maintain 
a cooperative relationship with the government at all costs. Obviously, such Interests 
would appear to cancel out one another, since to pursue an organisational and 
Commercial Interest could signify the production of news that follow a profitablo rather 
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than an Ideological line. Or to put it differently, a media organisation that remains firm to 
a certain Ideology that appeals to only a segment of the audience. will Inevitably sacrifice 
part of the economic benefit. 
In reality, the Interests and preferences of media organisations comprise an Interrelation 
of the above, which would make It hard to discern what preferences drive their decisions 
on news construction and coverage of specific Issues at each Ume. For reasons of 
Simplicity the thesis focuses on potential media preferences In times of International 
crises. The hypothesis In this case Is that when the government 13 Involved In a 
controversy with a rival state, the media preference that prevail$ 13 the one over a drastic 
governmental action and confrontation of the adversary, rather than the option of 
compromise or de-escalation. In cases of national prestige, the media's function as 
guardians of the national and public interest Is Intensified. By employing their'mission' of 
watchdogs, the media' are therefore likely to challenge the government suggesting 
radical policy solutions. 
At the same time, the media are likely to approach the Issue 03 an attractive news story. 
subject to their commercial Incentives. The editorial values and required drama Inherent 
In the construction of news justifies why a form of controversy such as an international 
crisis could produce a story that meets the media's circulation needs. In other words and 
as a re-interpretation of Scharpfs words. the media's Interests are here defined In a 
$quasi- objective' way since we are not assoclating the concept with the full range of 
concepts that enter Into the preferences that determines the media's action (1997: 64). 
As far as the government's preferences are concerned, always In relation to their 
Interaction with the media, what is particularly Important hero Is the fact that the 
requirements associated with the Interests of the media are transparent to the 
government and so Is the connection of the media with the public. This would ultimata 
make the media's moves less random than how the moves of Nature would be perceived 
but It would also facilitate the detection of the media's strategic Impact as an Integral 
part of the governmental calculations. On this basis, It Is reasonable to assume the 
government would prefer to walk through the crisis enjoying the media, and as an 
extension, the public support. This Is also supported by the media-govemmont dynamic 
relationship described In chapter one. which clarifies the government's effort and desire 
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to'Instrumentalise' the media In order to meet Its own ends. This would make any media 
opposition highly undesirable and strategically dangerous. Hence. the domestic game 
can systematise the conditions on which the likelihood for the government's decision to 
be affected by the media coverage increases. In the matrix below the preferences of the 
two parties are organised Into moves, the combinations of which result In four outcomes 
regarding the possibility of a media effect on governmental decisions. What needs to be 
clarified Is that the government Is here presented asplaying'with the same moves as In 
the International game; that Is to say, It Is expected to select between confronting the 
adversary and de-escalating the crisis. Subsequently, the media's moves are considered 
as a response to the above governmental decisions. The media can therefore choose 
between supporting and opposing a given decision. 
A clar1fication Is here needed with regard to the support/oppose divide that defines the 
media's options In the game. Within the structure of the domestic game the media's 
decision to choose a 'strategy' reflects their response to governmental policy decisions. 
and Is shaped according to whether or not a policy decision corresponds to the media's 
organisational and economic Interests. This means that the frames employed by the 
media towards the governmental handling of the two cdses are not expected to derive 
from any form of media bias or partisanship, but rather from their desire and pursuit of 
newsworthy stories and nationalistic predispositions related to the Greek-Turkish 
relationship. However, considering on the one hand the Inclination of many Greek 
newspapers to support preferences and goals of one party or another and on the other 
hand the Improbability of the Turkish press to proceed with harsh coverage - given the 
respective media-state relationship - to assume that the support/oppose divide results 
only from organisational and economic interests leads to the formulation of another 
hypothesis; that Is, In situations of International Crises the media act and decide primarily 
as profit-making organisations. It remains to find out to what extent the Greek and 
Turkish media coverage verify this hypothesis, as this would provide sound indication of 
their autonomy from the government and would enhance their potential to Influence the 
government strategically. 
On this basis and as a resultant of their Interests, the media's behaviour Is thapod 
according to their preference for confrontation rather than withdrawal. and according to 
their pursuit of an autonomous role In the process of political communicaflon. Given that 
Grook - Turkish Gamos and tho Modis as Stratogic Actors 173 
the media would favour a drastic governmental action against the adversary. one would 
then expect them to support a move of confrontation and oppose a move of do- 
escalation. As shown In the matrix, the first combination yields the highest payoff (4) 
since It secures the desired news story. In the latter they gain the second higher (3) for 
the reason that by opposing a decision for de-escalation the media maintain their role as 
advocates but lack the attractive news story that a confrontation could produce, Looking 
at the remaining two combinations, It appears that to oppose the official policy would pay 
off for the media even when the government chooses to confront the adversary (4). In 
this case, along with the desired news story, the media enhance their position as a 
defender of the public Interest towards the risk of war. 
Media 
De-escalate 
Government 
Confront 
Support Oppose 
4,1 1.3 
4.4 3.4 
(z5) 
(3.5) 
(2,5) (3,5) 
Figure 6.5: The media- government Interaction In the domestic game 
On the contrary, to support a decision for de-escalation yields the lowest payoff (1) since 
it portrays the media as followers of the official policies and It generates no controversial 
news story. Based on the matrix and the outcomes It produces. It appears that the 
dominant strategy for the media In situations of International crises Is to oppose the 
official decisions, the average payoff of which (3,5) Is higher than to support either of the 
governmental decisions (2,5). 
The hypothesis made here Is that the media's dominant strategy Is transparent to the 
government and Is also expected to affect the ranking of the preferences of the lattor. 
The media's Impact would fie In rendering the confrontation of the adversary as the 
dominant strategy for the government, by creating public expectations and conditions of 
domestic/audience cost If the government failed to meet these expectations. In case the 
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media choose to support the decision, the government receives the public support as 
well and protects Its prestige, which Is translated Into the highest payoff (4), while even If 
the media choose to criticise this policy, the payoff for the government Is still higher (3) 
than if It de-escalates the crisis (1). In the former case the media criticism Is expected to 
be milder than In the latter, since the media would prefer the confrontation. To do- 
escalate the crisis pays off for the government only If the media supports the decision 
(4). The average payoff of the de-escalation as a strategy Is lower (2,5) than that of 
confrontation (3,5), which Justifies confrontation as a dominant strategy for the 
government. 
The matrix of the domestic game comprises a demonstration of the way In which the 
analysis of the Interactions between the media, the public and the government In chapter 
three Is translated Into what we called a 'suboptimal' decision for the government. The 
domestic game represents that level of the crisis on which the government has an 
Incentive to choose confrontation as Its dominant strategy that pays off and secures the 
media and public support. The organisation of the media-politiclans Interaction In the 
game matrix concentrates the effect of the media and the cost they attach to a given 
official decision In the government's dominant strategy, on the domestic front. to proceed 
with a confrontation. 
The observation that confronting the adversary Is the government's dominant strategy, 
once the media are Involved, is enhanced by the iterated nature of the domestic game. 
In a situation such as an International cdsis, the game between media and government 
Is played a number of times from the day the cdsis Initiates until It Is resolved. If the 
game Is organlsed In rounds, the repetition enables the players to condition what they do 
In one round on what the opponent has done In previous rounds. Players loam things 
about their opponents from their past behaviour (Hargreaves Heap & Varoufakis, 1995: 
167-194). On that basis, the game Itself becomes a leaming process for the government 
that may move around all four cells of the matdx and will experionco both the support 
and the criticism of the media before It reaches the outcome from which it will have no 
Incentive to deviate. In other words, through the repeated play, the government Is not 
only aware of the media's preferences and Interests but also of the Implications of these 
preferences and Interests on the government's domestic reputation. As Rasmussen 
claims, In picking her/his action, a player looks ahead to Its Implications for the future 
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periods; it Is therefore easier to act by understanding the end of the specific game (2001: 
110). If the government Is In the position to utillse the knowiedge gained from the 
Iteration In order to look ahead In the cost that specific media coverage may entail. then 
It becomes unproblematic to justify why confronting the adversary In the International 
game Is the dominant strategy. 
6.4 Strategic analysis of the media coverage 
The International games/crIses and the domestic game described above represent the 
two arenas of nested game model, as it was analysed In chapter three. Each crisis Is 
perceived to be progressing In both arenas simultaneously In both countries. A domestic 
game as the one described previously Is therefore 'nested' In the crisis both In Greece 
and Turkey. The objective of the present section Is to demonstrate the media's strategic 
role In the progress and solution of each crisis through the analysis of the press 
coverage on the basis of the Interaction between the International and domestic arena. It 
Is also to Identify the conditions under which we can evaluate the media frame through 
which the crisis was portrayed, according to Its Impact on the governmental decisions 
and the progress of the crisis. 
Based on the game matrix that represents the domestic Interaction between the 
government and the media, a potential media Impact on the progress of the International 
arena Is perceived as the selection of a strategy by the government that meets the 
media's Interests and the domestic payoff that derives from them. In order for this 
governmental strategy to be regarded as the resultant of a media effect It will have to 
represent a change from an Initial policy that did not serve the media's Interests, to a 
policy that does and Is therefore supported by the media. This Impact Is then most likely 
to derive from the media's opposition to a cooperative official policy that aims at de. 
escalating the tension. On these terms, we would consequently expect that a strategic 
media Impact would take place only on the occasion of a policy change. 
This observation Is problematic for the reason that. as the game theoretic approach also 
demonstrates, policy change signifies change In the ranking of a piayees preferences as 
well as In what he or she considers to generate cost of payoff. There may be a number 
Of factors that force a government to a policy change and the adaptation of a more 
beneficial strategy during the course of a crisis, which suggests that the occurrence of a 
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change In the government's strategy per se, will be difficult to be evaluated as an 
Indication of media Impact. However, there might be some particular parameters of a 
policy change that provide an indication of whether the media have been amongst those 
factors to cause such a change. Considering the media's ability to generate an audience 
cost for the government, then a policy change that has been the result of media Impact 
could embody: 
An apparently suboptimal strategy 
A strategy that Is apparently Incompatible with the government's original 
preferences 
According to the concept of the nested game, a decision that does not look optimal to 
the observer might prove optimal when the Interests of the player In the background 
arenas are examined. This should give Incentive to examine whether whenever the 
government 'commits, a seemingly Irrational decision, this corresponds to the prevailing 
domestic conditions created by the media frames. A hypothesis and a departure point 
for the detection of the media's strategic role could be that a media Impact would lie In 
raising the cost of de-escalation and giving the government Incentive to proceed with a 
defective decision In the International arena, In order to avoid the domestic cost of do- 
escalation. The game theoretic approach will In this case allow the evaluation of each 
official policy In relation to the domestic cost and payoff It yields; which would also be 
associated with the Importance of public opinion and the Impact of the public 
expectations, as created by the media frames, on the government. 
The analysis will be based on a comparison of the govemmental International 
preferences with the media's preferences, as shaped by the domestic game. A potential 
discrepancy between the preferences of the two sides as shaped In the beginning of the 
game provides the basis to Investigate the occurrence of a govomment's movement 
during the course of the International game that appears to be analogous to the media's 
preferences. Consequently, the occurrence or not of the government's movement 
around the cells of the International game matflx will function as a departure point for the 
Investigation of a connection between this movement and the domestic Payoffs. The 
findings will then guide the Investigation of the media frames In relation to the 
government's moves. 
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6.4.1 The media frame 
The media frame will be organlsed and examined in terms of whether the media support 
or oppose a given official policy such as de-escalation or confrontation. The main way to 
distinguish the frame from the rest of the news Is by its capacity to stimulate support of 
or opposition to certain policy decisions (Entman, 2003). To capture the degree of 
support or opposition employed by the media during the two crises. their content Is 
organised according to four framing categories that are Initiated from Entman's definition 
of media framing. The main Idea Is to evaluate the media's content In terms of the 
Indirect support or opposition towards a given policy. The diagnostic and prognostic 
frame helps detect the type of pressure the media exert on the government and Identify 
when and how this pressure transforms Into domestic cost. For Instance, to publicly 
disseminate a prognosis of the International cost that a given policy decision Is likely to 
have, Is expected to create public expectations for a certain type of official action and 
consequently, conditions for domestic punishment as well. 
The Information that composes the frame In question consists of those word 
combinations that describe what the problem Is and how serious It Is, who the 
responsible for the tension Is; the options available to the two actors, the expected risk, 
cost and pay-off for each outcome of the game; the best solution for the crisis. The frame 
Is organised In two main categories, the diagnostic and prognostic frame. The former Is 
further organised In the problem definition and causal responsibility as Entman's 
definition of the frame underlines. In the definition of the given problem, the frame 
consists of this Information and statements that describe how seflous the Issue that has 
Just arisen Is. The causal responsibility frame concentrates the Information that Indicates 
who the responsible for the crisis Is (E. g. the adversary or the government). and what 
those factors that have led to the escalation of the crisis are. In several occasions 
though, the statements that the press conveys Include Information that Incorporate both 
the definition of the problem and the causal responsibility. Or, they can simply be 
Interpreted In terms of both the subcategories. 
The prognostic category compresses what the press considers to be the strategic 
alternatives available to the two actors and the risk and cost entailed In each of them. 
The strategic alternatives are coded In terms of the course of action that ft government 
should follow. This Information Is not as direct and cJear as the remedy suggestion. yet. 
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by stressing the risk and cost entailed In each alternative the press IndirecUy Indicates 
which decision Is preferred. This Is also In terms of the general prognosis that the media 
attempt and adds to the pressure exerted on the government, when It Is not aligned with 
the government's position. As for the payoffs, these refer parficularly to the option of 
war, as the most crucial outcome In the game. The objective Is to collect the Information 
that evaluates the choice to defect even If that leads to war, and Investigate how risky 
this option Is considered by the press, particularly In comparison to the poliftlan's 
preferences. The last subcategory in the prognostic frame Is the remedy suggestion and 
Indicates what the press regards the best possible solution for the game. AppendIx 
presents the media frame for the two crises, organised based on the coverage of the two 
Greek and two Turkish newspapers. 
Therefore, the media frame and the diagnostic and prognostic categories In which the 
Information Is organised, compose the main Instrument that the press employs In order 
to meet Its objectives. It has already been discussed that in the coverage of an Issue and 
the Information disseminated by the media, one can actually recognise the Interests of 
the media as conglomerates and the objectives they pursue. 'Joumalists do go through 
some strategic thinking In deciding how to frame their stories... ' (Entman, 2003., 422). 
The media frame also reflects the contextual background of the domestic game. to a 
certain extent. It composes a set of information that reflects the media's public rabrication 
of any decision that the government makes; and, given that poliUcJan3 do care about the 
media's critical coverage, the calculations that the press makes with regard to the 
escalation and resolution of the crisis are then expected to Impinge on the govemmental 
calculations. At this stage, it Is essential to point up the particularly critical role of the 
Greek and the Turkish public opinion. This Is because the long and 'turbulent' 
relationship that has developed between the two countries has Inevitably produced 
stereotypes and nationalistic attitudes of the two peoples towards each other. These 
were basically transferred from elitist groups to the public opinion through Institutions like 
the media (Glallourldis, 2001: 24); and have generated a highly 'sensitised' public 
sentiment In relation to the 'traditional' adversary. Consequently, both the government 
and the media become even more likely to consider the reaction of an already pro- 
empted public opinion, such as the Greek and Turkish. when deciding upon a strategy 
towards the traditional adversary. 
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Before we proceed with the analysis of the media - government Interactions In the two 
crises, it Is essential that we begin with a more specified hypothesis. It was theorised 
earlier that In situations of International crises the frames employed by the media are 
driven primarily by organisational and economic interests. Through their Impact on the 
Public! s perception of the given situation, this framing Is then likely to result In the 
generation of certain expectations and In a strategic Impact on the government. As It was 
explained In chapter five, the privatisation and commercialisation of the media 
organisations In Greece and Turkey occurred In the 1990s that Is after the oil-drilling 
crisis had already taken place. On this basis, the hypothesis here Is that the press 
becomes less likely to employ highly controversial and over dramatised audience - 
driven frames In 1987. A media strategic Impact of this nature Is therefore less expected 
In the oil-drilling crisis. 
6.5 The 1987 'oil-drilling' crisis 
The analysis of the coverage the specific Crisis attracted from the Turkish and Greek 
newspapers will be conducted on the basis of the description of the domestic Interaction 
between the media and the government and with the aid of the respective game matrix. 
The government's moves of 'de-escalation' and 'confrontation' will be replaced with the 
actual moves of each government In the specific crisis. The Idea Is to examine the 
government's movement In the matrix In relation to the press coverage. As It was 
explained In chapter three, the media are in this case approached 83 Nature and their 
coverage of the government's decisions Is perceived as a series of 'random' moves In 
the sense that It Is done In accordance to own objectives and Interests and not as a 
confrontation to the government. Therefore, their strategic role will be evaluated as a 
result of the Impact that these random moves have on the governmental decisions and 
of the extent to which the government Is considering the media coverage when 
Calculating its moves. The analysis will begin with the evaluation of the Turkish press 
coverage; and once the press coverage In both countries Is complete, the analysis will 
conclude with some comparative final remarks regarding the media's strategic role In this 
crisis. 
6.6.1 The press coverage In Turkey 
To start with, we will need to Identify the preferences of the two parVes In the specific 
crisis with the aid of the matrix shown In figure 6.6. This Is a replicat, ion of the domestic 
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game as described earlier In this chapter, which has been adjusted to the International 
strategies available to Turkey for this crisis. It needs to be mentioned at this point that 
during the 1980s the Turkish media were largely subordinated and stdcUy controlled by 
the state, which would make opposition to the governmental decision not a preferred 
option. In this case, the media's payoff Is depending entirely on the government'$ move 
and it will be evaluated accordingly. Within the context of the specific crisis and under 
the specific regime, the media would be better off supporting the government They 
would therefore prefer that Turkey selects strategy B and proceeds with the oil 
prospecting since this Is expected to produce a more controversial news story and a 
higher payoff whether they choose to support or oppose the decision. 
In case the press chooses to oppose the decision. although it risks getting the 'stick' 
from the government, it would still be better off than If the government chooses to 
withdraw from its claims (Strategy A). it needs to be reminded that the media's payoffs 
are estimated according to their Interest In audience-driven news stories, Independent of 
their relationship with the government. In other words, the most preferred outcome for 
the media Is B/A with B/B the second best. The governmenfis preferences remain stable, 
as specified In the description of the domestic game. Even If In the specific example, 
Turkey should not expect to receive opposition from the press, it would still hurt more to 
be criticised for remaining Inactive and choosing strategy A, than proceeding with 
strategy B. 
This would render strategy B as the dominant one, but perhaps the most accurate way to 
Identify the government's preferences In this Interaction, given the small probability that 
the press would oppose, would be to consider both strategies as yielding equal payoffs. 
Considering that Turkey does not have a dominant strategy In the International game 
either, it would be Interesting to see how the media frame Is formed on this respect. 
Moreover, under this specific regime, it would be meaningless to expect a media 
Opposition, which consequently makes the outcome of this Interaction predictable and 
the media's Impact unlikely. However, it would be still Interesting to see the frame 
through which the media portray the crisis and the governmental action and Identify the 
extent to which it reproduces the political frame In accordance with the media's Interests. 
The frame of the Turkish newspaper could produce some useful Information and 
Inferences that can be carded over for the analysis of the second crisis. 
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Modla 
Turkey 
A: Withdraw from 
Oil-prospecting 
0: Proceed with 
Oil- prospecting 
A: Support 0: Oppose 
4.1 1.3 
4,4 3.4 
(2,5) (3-5) 
Figure 6.6: The 1987 media - government Interaction In Turkey 
(2-5) 
(3.5) 
The Turkish government Is the player that makes the first move In this Interaction with 
preparing to send the research vessel in the Aegean. On 2511 March. the Turkish 
government mobillses armed forces In the area of East Thrace and around the coast of 
Asia Minor while the Turkish fleet Is concentrated In the Marmaras Sea. This move 
Places Turkey in the B strategy row, which would produce a high payoff In the domestic 
game, if the press supports this decision. What needs to be reminded at this stage Is 
Turkey's objective In this crisis. The reason why Prime Minister Ozal announces an 
imminent oil prospecting Is based on the argument that Greece Is about to violate the 
Bern agreement. It Is therefore Interesting to see that on 26" March, tho press 
disseminates a diagnosis that on the one hand, appears rather exaggerating developing 
war scenarios; and on the other, It attributes responsibility to Papandreou for trying to 
create tension... In order to jeopardise the Turkish EU candidacy' (MilliyeL 26/3). This Is 
a frame that even contradicts Ozal's statements, who claims both countries are In need 
of peace and would not risk a war, and the political frame regarding the causo for the 
Turkish announcement to commence oil. prospecting In the disputed area. 
Although the frame Is apparently supportive of the government. it also encourages a 
defective strategy by providing a diagnostic frame that Identifies one additional reason 
why Turkey should respond promptly. it also shifts Turkeys position to the domain of 
losses and frames It as being the defender. The frame does not expllcitly signify a 
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domestic cost for the government, but If we consider that the public Is also watching, It 
does create a diverse Impression of what the reason for the Turkish decision Is as well 
as the seriousness of the situation at this stage. It could therefore result In the public 
expectation for a confrontation of the adversary by all means. Not to mention that, as the 
Turkish press prognoses, 'war can only have a cost for Greece, since It will jeop3rdise 
the new economic reform that the Greek government Is planning to apply' (Milllyet, 2613). 
It could be that the specific newspaper attempts to predict a possible Greek bluff and fait 
8CCOMP11, Implying that the Greek government aims at deterring Turkey with the war 
threat, which however will never happen. In other words, the Turkish press. even without 
opposing the governmental handling of the case, conveys a message that encourages a 
more drastic action, even if that has to be a war, that could be translated Into a domestic 
expectation for a firm and uncompromising stance so that Oz3I will not be caught In 
Papandreou's bluff. The specific frame can be Interpreted as an Incentive for the 
government to remain firm to their strategy and carry out their warning. This Is also a 
frame that fits the media Interests as defined In the domestic game and It produces a 
high payoff for both the government and the media (4,4). 
On 26"' March before Greece has made a move, Turkey sends out Sismik 11 to explore 
for oil and Ozal, who had previously stated he was after a peaceful solution, threatens to 
attack Greece In case It obstructs the prospecting process. Ozal remains firm to a 
strategy that pays off domestically, even after Greece has employed Its counteroffensive 
strategy that places the two countries In the box with the worst possible outcome (1.1) of 
the International game. The press maintains its support to a confronting strategy and on 
271" March It diagnoses, 'Papandreou Is crazy (HUniyet), 'Greece refuses to comply with 
the Bern agreement' (Milliyet), 'The crisis has been prepared by Papandreou who was 
seeking for an excuse to attack Turkey' (Harriyet). 'Papandreou Is believed to have 
created the crisis to serve domestic Interests' (Milliyet). Also, HOrriyet speculates that 'If 
Hora Is attacked we are ready to take any action'. Once again, apart from framing the 
official Justification regarding the alleged Imminent Greek violation of the Bem 
agreement, the press Is offering three different explanations of why the tension Is 
Increasing. 
Considering that the Turkish government has no dominant strategy In either the 
International or the domestic Interaction, the specific media frame and the Impact It Is 
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expected to have on the public gives the government Incentive to remain longer In the 13 
strategy box, even when Greece responds with an equally defecuve move leading the 
two countries on the verge of war. Although, as mentioned above, there was a minor 
possibility that the Turkish newspapers would disseminate critical coverage, the frame 
the press conveys, which continues to offer a diagnosis that differs from Ozal's 
statements, and the dimensions It gives to the seriousness of the Issue turn 
confrontation Into a dominant strategy for Turkey. 
Therefore, we see Turkey proceeding with what would be described as an Irrational 
move, given its preferences over the rearrangement of the continental shelf through the 
negotiation process and Its disinterest In a military confrontation. The atmosphere that 
emerged In Turkey out of the national media appears as a logical explanation of why the 
government felt confident to take the adversary to the verge of war before stepping back, 
despite the International cost that such an outcome would generate. This of course does 
not Imply that Ozal overlooked the International cost embodied In the possibility of war, 
especially since this was the least preferred outcome. Turkeys preferences and Interests 
In this game rendered the possibility of war a very costly outcome for Turkey, which Is 
traditionally known as a rational player. However, the domestic payoff can be Interpreted 
as an Incentive the media gave to Ozal to stay In the same defective strategy longer 
(26'hand 27hMarch) and even reach on the brink of war before he finally stepped back. 
It Is at this stage that we can claim the potential Impact of the media frames In Turkey Is 
Inherent In what appears to be a suboptimal decision for Turkeys government, which 
proceeds with a strategy that was described as Incompatible Wth Its original 
preferences. 
The Turkish government decides to switch to strategy A only after the Intervention of 
Lord Carrington and British Foreign Minister Geoffrey Howe, who apparently gave Turgut 
Ozal Incentive to leave strategy 0 by reducing Its expected payoff. Ozal's decision to 
withdraw does not correspond to the Intense emergency climate reflected In the media. It 
Is again an optimal move, which would anyway occur but the external Intervention 
defined the timing of this strategy switch. Once the Turkish government has made its last 
move In this game, the Turkish press maintains the 'alarming' framing and reports 
'Hands on trigger: the army Is alarmed', 'The Aegean Is ready to explode' and 'If 
Papandreou tries to stop Hora, there might be a wae (Milliyet. 2813). A logical way to 
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explain the continuation of this same frame Is of course the desire of the media to remain 
In the cell of the matrix that yields the highest payoff. Given that the government has 
chosen to de-escalate the tension, which Is a move that does not meet the media's 
objectives, this is an attempt of the media to prolong their payoff. This observation 
enhances the media's pursuit of audience - driven news stories, even at a time when 
they had not yet turned into profit-making organisations. 
In this crisis, the Turkish government made only one move In the game matrix, switching 
from a suboptimal move that could lead to a Greek-Turkish war to a rational decision that 
corresponded to its original preferences. The short duration of the crisis, the clear-cut 
objectives of the Turkish governments and the reduced probability of the press to 
Proceed with a critical coverage lead to the Inference that what appeared as a 
suboptimal move of the Turkish government was a tactical decision and a bluff until that 
ended with the Intervention of Lord Carrington. That Is to say, there Is not enough 
evidence to support the hypothesis that the government's suboptimal strategy B was a 
result of calculating the domestic cost that the opposite strategy would have. There Is 
however enough evidence inherent In the exceptionally alarming diagnosis and 
prognosis conveyed by the press that could explain why Turgut Ozal followed the same 
strategy and escalated the tension to a dangerous stage, before an external Intervention 
raised the cost and led to the strategy change. 
6.6.2 The press coverage In Greece 
Looking at the overall coverage of the crisis by the Greek press, a first remark that needs 
to be made Is that there appears to be a lack of consensus In the coverage, partcularly 
after the tension has been resolved. This lack of a common line In the framing and 
analysis of the situation by the press Is ultimately Interpreted as the absence of a joint 
domestic pressure deriving from the media. This Implies that we should look for media 
influence In a diverse form. The second noteworthy point In the press coverage Is the 
relatively moderate frame that becomes more Intense only after the crisis has been 
resolved. This is another factor that raises questions as to the degree In which the media 
frame had a strategic Impact on the governmental decisions. 
In the Greek domestic Interaction, the preferences of the two players are as follows. For 
the media, these are shaped according to the domestic game template as described 
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earlier. Therefore, the Greek press will be better off to oppose the governmental policy at 
any time and strategy B Is the dominant one. As for the government. given that the 
media -state relationship In Greece develops differently than In Turkey, with the media 
maintaining the right to be critical and the power to exert pressure on the government, 
the dominant strategy for the government Is then strategy B. Strategy B here reflects a 
defective move and an act of confrontation, which will render the government better off 
Independent of how the media respond to It. 
Media 
Greece 
A: accept to negotiate 
13: attack the Turkish 
research vessel 
C: don't attack and 
refuse to negotiate 
A: Support B: Oppose 
4,1 1.4 
4.4 3,4 
4,2 2,4 
(2,5) 
(3, S) 
(3) 
(2,3) (4) 
Figure 6.7: The 1987 media - government Interaction In Greece 
Similar to the respective Interaction In Turkey, the player that moves first Is the 
government, demanding that Turkey does not send the research vessel out. This move 
Is obviously leaving the media better off and this Is also confirmed with the press 
coverage that follows. On the first day of the press coverage both newspapers appear to 
be reproducing the political frame, with regard to the diagnosis of the problem and the 
causal responsibility reporting, 'The Turks are threatening again, the Turkish provocative 
moves continued yesterday when two Turkish aircrafts violated the Greek air space' 
(E-Typos, 26/3); and 'There Is a need for national vigilance' (Eleftherotypla, 26/3). The 
Information the press disseminates and the frame through which It Is presented 
underlines the seriousness of the situation and also coincides with the political frame. On 
the one hand, the reproduction of the political frame may be understood as an overlap 
between the media and governmental Interests, since the political frame gave the media 
no Incentive to oppose the strategy. On this basis, the government and the media reach 
a mutually optimal outcome. On the other hand, and given that the specific game Is a 
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repetitive one, by reproducing the political problem definition the media also give the 
government Incentive to maintain the same strategy. Along with 'ratifying' the decision, 
the media create a certain degree of expectation for the government to maintain its firm 
position. Given that the government has created an alarmed atmosphere with the official 
warning made to the Turkish side, the media frame In this case enhances the expected 
audience and national cost In case Papandreou fails to successfully carry out the threat. 
The media diagnostic frame is followed by the Turkish persistence and the employment 
of the Greek deterrence strategy. The Greek Prime Minister decides upon the closure of 
the American basis In the evening of 26h March while on that same day the Greek 
Foreign Minister goes to Sofia for negotiations with the Bulgarian government. The 
government therefore remains In the defection box and so do the media. On 270' March 
Eleftherotypla reports 'The Greek armed forces are mobilised', War Is In the ale and E. 
Typos also reports, 'War challenge from Turkey, 'The tension Increases as Turkey 
decides to send Sismik 11 to the Aegean'. Both newspapers convey a similar diagnosis 
regarding the seriousness of the situation, which as mentioned earlier, overlaps With the 
governmental frame. Given that the specific strategy also corresponds to the 
government and the media's preferences, it Is then translated Into a mutually optimal 
decision. At this point, it would be useful to focus on the frame E. Typos conveys. The 
Opposition's paper attributes part of the responsibility for the crisis to the Greek 
government itself and states 'Turkey aims at exploiting the mistakes made by the Greek 
government In the handling of the situation' and 'The government Is leading the country 
to a national division' (27/3). It therefore moves to strategy B for the media, which entails 
a domestic cost for the government. The diagnosis conveyed by the opposition's 
newspaper appears problematic In the sense that although it diagnoses a serious 
situation Implying that the government has to do something, It also accuses the 
government of being the Initiator of the problem. 
What we see here Is a frame that on the one hand reproduces the political framing of the 
problem, which obviously serves the media's Interests for a controversial story, and on 
the other hand, a frame that attacks the government generating further controversy, this 
Ume between the media and the press, The combination of the two frames conveyed by 
the specific newspaper can only provide the government with further Incentive to remain 
firm to strategy B so as to 'rectify' Its mistake. The position of the specific newspaper 
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towards the government Is apparently Instigated by Ideological and partisanship 
Inclinations that demonstrate another aspect of the Incentives Inherent In the media's 
selection of frames. However, the Important aspect of this frame remains that It attaches 
more weight to the defective strategy that the government Is already pursuing by 
emphasising the 'damage' this same strategy has caused; and the need for an action 
with which the government will carry out the threat successfully In order to avoid not just 
the international cost but the domestic cost that failure to do so might generate. This cost 
would be the dissatisfaction of the public that would at this stage expect the government 
to successfully deter the adversary. 
On 27h March, Turkey switches strategies but the Greek government Is still In position 
for war. On 28'h March, the press still refers to the Increasing tension and what Is worth 
noting at this stage Is the speculation made by Eleftheros Typos that'Even If there Is no 
war, this crisis will have a great cost for Greece due to the huge preparaflon expenses 
and the decrease In the number of tourists' (28/3). The specific frame attempts a shift In 
a certain reference point that Is the cost of war. It produces a context within which the 
governmental decisions are costly with or without a war, and It works as a challenge to 
the Prime Minister to defect and act firmly In order to make this costly conflict worthwhile 
for the prestige of the country. It creates the Impression that the Internauonal cost cannot 
be avoided; but if Papandreou cooperates with Turkey, this will lead to an even greater 
reputation cost. According to our game - theoretic model an existing International cost Is 
transformed Into an expectation for a domestic cost; but what Is parUcularly Interesting 
here Is that the specific newspaper creates both the International and the domestic cost. 
On that same day the Greek government switches to strategy C, the dominant strategy 
In the International game, which corresponds to its original preferences and Interests. As 
for the outcome that the same strategy yields In the domestic arena, this 13 divided Into 
two different cells. Eleftherotypla remains In the strategy A cell and describes the 
handling of the crisis as a victory while E. Typos considers the outcome a 'sale of the 
Greek national Interests In the Aegean' (30/3). The different frame conveyed by the two 
newspapers reflects their conflicting Interests, In relation to their Ideological Inclinations 
and to their party preferences. This framing can be evaluated 83 being Instigated by 
Political Ideologies rather than commercial Interests, without however underrating the 
market - oriented motivations of the specific newspaper. According to the media 
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preferences over a controversial Issue that would generate a newsworthy story, the cdsis 
the two countries generated would have paid off for the media by meeting their Interests 
and therefore the 'discrepancy between the frames conveyed by the two papers Is a 
resultant of the different Ideology. 
Similar to Turkey, the Greek government remained firm to Its Initial strategy and stepped 
back only after the adversary had made the first move to de-escalate the tension. 
Considering the preferences of Greece as defined In the beginning of the game, the 
government moved rationally, Independent of the critical coverage It received from one 
of the newspapers. Besides, the selection of strategies at all points In the game 
appeared to generate high payoffs In both arenas even with some opposition from E. 
Typos. The examination of the press coverage In relation to the stable governmental 
moves, or to put it differently, with the absence of Irrational/suboptimal governmental 
moves demonstrates no obvious strategic Influence on behalf of the media, mainly due 
to an overlap between the Interests and preferences of the two parties, Looking at the 
domestic game matrix, one can see that for the most part of the crisis, the two parties 
were located In the B/A and BIB boxes that generated equally beneficial outcomes, while 
the second could also be described as equilibrium. Given that the specific outcomes 
Implied that none of the players had Incentive to switch to another strategy, a possible 
way to describe the media government Interaction In this crisis, for the Greek side, Is as 
a coordination of Interests. This could Imply a strategic action on behalf of the media, 
even without having led to a policy change. 
6.6.3 Summary of the media's strategic role In the 1987 oil-drilflng crisis 
In the section explaining the function of the domestic Interaction between the media and 
the government, we defined some preconditions that could signify a potential media 
Impact on the governmental strategies and the overall progress of the crisis. Having 
examined the preferences of the two governments and the action they adopted, one can 
notice that there Is no obvious deviation In their strategies, from the expectations 
generated through their motivations and preferred outcomes that could lead to 
Suboptimal decisions. This would ultimately signify the absence of those Conditions that 
would produce a media Impact from a first point of view. However. looking at the way the 
press covered the story, the main Inference to make Is that the press on both sides 
moved according to own motivations, which may have led to a subtle media Impact. As It 
Greek - Turkish Games and the Media as Strategic Actors 189 
will be explained In the following paragraphs, it Is possible that the media on both sides 
took part In the escalation of the tension by strongly supporting Confrontation. which as 
shown In the International game, was a preferred strategy for Greece but not for Turkey. 
In Turkey, it Is Ozal's decision to maintain a risky strategy despite the fact that It was 
known he would not Involve In a war. His extended preference over a strategy that, given 
Greece's reaction, was close to generating the worst possible outcome could be related 
to the domestic media frame. Interestingly, the Turkish press did not simply reproduce 
the political frame; but Instead It conveyed its own explanation making the Greek 
provocation loom larger than In Ozal's statements. The Impact of this lies In the frame 
effect on the public, which would then expect drastic acUon for these Greek 
# provocations, therefore explaining Ozal's stay in the defection box for longer. This 
impact can be explained particularly In relation to the causal attribution It disseminated. 
By framing Papandreou as 'mad' the Turkish press promoted a picture of the Greek 
politician as an Irrational player. The frame refers to one of the pecullariVes of the 
Chicken game that resolves around what has been called the political uses of madness. 
That Is to say, If a player Is seen by his opponent as Irrational or mad, he/she gains 
Paradoxical advantage In the game, given that people tend to stay well away from a 
madman (Colman, 1982: 100). 
Judging from Ozal's response who did not appear to be Intimidated by Papandreou's 
alleged 'madness', the Turkish media might not have exactly given the Greek Prime 
Minister an advantage; but they could have very well disseminated a causal 
responsibility that provided warnings and new explanations why war was Imminent, 
Providing Ozal with Incentive to recognise in the media coverage an 'obligation' to 
prolong its warning. The specific example also serves In demonstrating the difference 
between a cognitive media Impact on the Turkish government and a strategic one. A 
potential cognitive Impact of the causal responsibility disseminated by the Turkish press 
would have affected the Ozal's perception of the adversary's level of Irrationality In a way 
compatible to the effect of the political use of madness, as described above, However, 
Ozal's response Is closer to what we could describe as a 'strategie perception of the 
frame In the sense that he appears to calculate the Implications that failure to respond to 
the Greek provocations could have on his domestic reputation and hence, he acts 
accordingly. 
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In Greece, the government appears to follow a clear-cut strategy. It remains firm to Its 
preferences and moves out of its defective strategy only after Turkey has stepped back 
while the media largely reproduce the political frame. Given that both parties moved 
according to their preferences this Indicates an agreement In their Interests but It 
remains unclear whether It also Indicated a strategic action on behalf of the media. The 
critical coverage of the opposition's paper demonstrates another aspect of the media 
motivations, which derive from party preferences as well. 
Based on the domestic game structure, the absence of suboptimal moves on behalf of 
the government and the relatively common line between the political and media framing 
could be explained as a coordination of the two sides' Interests, since the strategies of 
the two governments provided the newspapers with frames that would meet their 
Interests. In needs to be clarified though that these Interests were mainly of a 
nationalistic nature stemming from national taboos that the media In both countries 
developed towards the adversary. The Issue of national Identity proves to be another 
significant factor In the coverage of such crises, and as Wodsfeld states, whatever the 
beliefs about the needs of objectivity, when It comes to Internal disputes journalists 
Interpret the world from a national - or even nationalistic- perspective, especially when 
they cover conflicts Involving their own country (1997: 40). Besides, In 1987 the press 
was under the state's control In Turkey while newspapers In Greece maintained 
#patronage' relationships with the government and other political parties that would also 
determine their Ideological line. Although this should not exclude a potential media 
impact, the possibility of a media tactical action Instigated by financial motivation Is here 
eliminated, as it was also theorised earlier. This of course could raise the question as to 
how differently this media-government interaction would have developed In the case of a 
clash of Interests between media and the government. In relation to this question. the 
analysis of the press coverage of the 1996 Imla-Kardak crisis provides some Interesting 
findings. 
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6.6 The 1996 Imia-Kardak crisis 
The 1996 Imla-Kardak crisis has been described In the Greek literature as a 'media 
war' '0 (Glalourldis, 2001; Georgoulis & Soltarldis 1996). Implying the fabrication of the 
crisis by the press. This Is an observation that reinforces our hypothesis for a strategic 
media role In It and provides the grounds to systernafically examine If and to what extent 
the press escalated the tension between the two countries. The specific crisis features 
two remarkably Important characteristics that pave the way for the justification of our 
hypothesis. Firstly, the revealing Interview of the HOrriyet Journalist, Cesur Sert, Is an 
unquestionable Indication of a press coverage that Is driven by journalistic practices that 
serve primarily financial Interests. It therefore clarifies the media's preference over a 
governmental strategy of confrontation and the press's Intention of diagnosing a crisis at 
such an early stage. Secondly, prior to the first official demand made by the Turkish 
government, which marked the escalation of the tension and the commencement of an 
overt confrontation between the two countries, the two governments were Involved In a 
bargaining process. This process Included the exchange of some verbal notes regarding 
the sovereignty over the Islets, which none of the two sides considered as too serious, 
and a media diagnosis about a serious national problem and even a 'crisis' that was 
about to flare up between the two countries. 
This press coverage Is particularly important considering that It actually Initiates an overt 
Interaction between the government and the media, or else it Initiates the domestic 
game, before the two countries proceed with their overt moves towards one another. 
This Is ultimately translated Into one additional moveloption for the government In the 
game matrix of the domestic game that derives from the media diagnosis of a serious 
national problem and the first response of the government to that. The two domestic 
games are examined below starting with the coverage of the crisis by the Turkish 
newspapers. 
6.6.1 The press coverage In Turkey 
The first step In the analysis of the coverage of the 1996 crisis and the strategic role of 
the press Is to Identify the preferences for both the actors, government and media In the 
two countries, as the tension begins to escalate. At this point it Is essential to start off 
10 The press In both countries played a leading part In nationalistic exaltation, creating what was described as a fabricated war atmosphere. This would ultimately bring the two governments before a fait accompli, leading to rash decisions. 
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with the media preferences and Interests, which determined the way the Turkish press 
framed the Issue. As mentioned above, the coverage of the flag replacement by HOrdyet 
In Turkey Is the main evidence of the media's Intention of meeting financial Interests. In 
addition to that and given that the media-government Interaction Is also a sequential 
one, watching the press 'moving' first and diagnosing a crisis before any governmental 
statement has been made, reinforces the employment of a strategy In pursuit of own 
incentives. The Interview of the Turkish journalist provides a confirmation of the media's 
preferences as demonstrated In the matrix of the domestic game, described eadier. It 
also provides evidence of the ongoing changes that the media-government relationship 
undergoes In Turkey. 
As for the government's preferences, these are shaped by Its International Interests. As It 
was eXpl3ined In the analysis of the International game, they are placed In the 'not 
att3ck' strategy, which Is also Its dominant strategy. Yet, considering the outcomes that 
the same strategies yield In the domestic M3tdX, It appears that the government's 
preferences do not pay off as they do In the International arena. There Is apparently a 
discrepancy between the government's preferences In the International arena and the 
way they are Interpreted In the domestic Interaction with the media. This provides a basis 
to Investigate how these preferences are shaped the government's action and whether 
the course of the game produces an overlap. 
The Interaction between the Turkish government and the respective media can be 
summarlsed In the following matrix. Given the early press coverage and media diagnosis 
Of the crisis, Turkey will first have to decide between choosing to 'do nothing' as strategy 
0 or do something, which represents moves A and B. Looking back at the International 
game matrix (figure 6.3) one can see that the Turkish government moved to three 
different boxes, starting from the one producing the outcome 5.2 for Greece. Given that 
the frame of the Turkish press had preceded the Turkish warning to Greece about 
lowering the flag, this Turkish move needs to be evaluated as a response both to the 
government's International preferences and to the media frame and the domestic cost or 
payoff it entailed. 
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Media 
Turkey 
0: do nothing 
A: demand the 
flag Is lowered 
and don't attack 
B: demand the 
flag Is lowered 
andlnvade 
A: Support 0: Oppose 
4.1 1.3 
4.2 2.4 
4.4 3,4 
(2,3) (3-6) 
Figure 6.8: The 1996 media - government Interaction In Turkey 
(2.5) 
(3) 
(3,5) 
The Turkish government completed Its first move by officially demanding that the Greek 
flag Is lowered on 29h January. On the previous and on the same day, the Turkish press 
diagnosed a 'Flag war In the Aegean' (Horriyet, 28/1) an 'Increasing tension between 
Ankara and Athens due to a rock' (Milliyet, 29/1) and 'a crisis being four days old' 
(Milliyet, 29/1). Most Important, on 26h January HOrdyet Identifies the new Prime Minister 
of Greece as 'doing his best to create a conflict between Greece and Turkey while the 
following day, the same newspaper reports thatthe Greek government has managed to 
create a crisis Immediately after coming to powee. These are some of the statements 
reported by the Turkish press, which have been Identified as a diagnostic frame. 
The Turkish newspapers In this case diagnose an existing crisis and Identify the Greek 
government as the main responsible for Its generation. The specific frame can be 
translated as an alarm to the government about a serious situation that has emerged In 
the Aegean due to the traditional enemy that Is Greece. In relation to the domestic game 
matrix, this diagnostic frame would be best located In the top right box (1,3), which 
would entail a domestic cost for the government. At this early stage of the crisis, the 
Turkish press creates a status quo, which, as framed by the newspapers, Greece alms 
at changing with the generation of a conflict. Although the frame refers to the 
International cost that a governmental Inaction may have, the press Is converting It Into a 
domestic cost too. This Is because the implication of such a diagnosis would be " 
creation of a public expectation for a defensive move In order for Turkeys sovereign 
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rights to be preserved, which would generate an audience cost If the government failed 
to respond. The decision of the Turkish government demonstrates Its adjustment to 
strategy A, which Is the dominant one In the International arena. Although this move Is 
not dominant In the domestic arena, It domestically leaves the government better off than 
strategy 0, which would mean Ignoring the media frame altogether. The Important aspect 
of the media-government Interaction at this early stage of the crisis Is the fact that the 
government makes its first move against Greece only after the press has diagnosed the 
crisis. 
A question that arises at this point Is whether Turkey would have acted at all had It not 
known the crisis diagnosis conducted by the press. Given that the media move first and 
the government second, the governmental move could be regarded as a response 
Instigated by the media frame, and even if It does not entirely conform to the domestic 
payoff, it can still be considered as the first step of a confrontation strategy and of a 
strategic media effect. With Greece not having moved yet, the Turkish government could 
also choose to do nothing but Instead it chooses to Initiate the International game by 
demanding that the Greek flag Is lowered. The Turkish move could be the outcome of 
Tansu pilfer realising that the generation of such an Issue could serve her domestic 
Interests but at the same time, It could be a response to what the government expected 
the media to do as a second move. 
This could be explained again by the concept of backward Induction (Hargreaves Heap 
& Varoufakis, 1997) according to which the actor calculates the payoff of her/his moves 
based on the estimation of the adversary's next move. Given the government's 
awareness of the media's Interests, Its declslon to act may be explained as a strategy 
that has predicted the next media move and that consequently derives from calculating 
the domestic payoff. As It was explained earlier, the Turkish strategies are combined 
moves that are completed In two stages. In this case, by making the official demand, 
Turkey completes the first stage of the move and as mentioned above, It chooses to 
react rather than stay Inactive. The main Idea here Is that when the media-government 
Interaction Is examined as a sequential one, Turkeys move appears optimal on both 
arenas and produces an outcome that serves the Interests of both the government and 
the medla. 
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After the response of the Greek government that refuses to lower the flag, we see a 
more drastic reaction from Turkey that threatens to attack and moves to strategy 0 and 
the box with the worst possible outcome. At this stage the Turkish government begins to 
act 'Irrationally' as this signifies what we described earlier as a move that deviates from 
the original preferences of the government. This move appears sensible If we consider 
the media frame that preceded. The media diagnosis of a serious situation that Is ready 
to lead to war maintains and on 30th January Milliyet reports 'the tension Is Increasing'. 'it 
is a dangerous situation' and Hardyet states 'Athens Is becoming paranoid'. Moreover, 
the attribution of responsibility for the escalation of the tension Is still on Greece while 
there Is an agreement In the recommended solution for the crisis between media and 
government. On 29th and 30'h January the Turkish press suggests that the two countries 
should find a solution through the negotiation process, which represents the main 
Interest of Turkey. At this stage, the media frame In combination with the threat the 
Turkish government disseminated to Greece places the government In the box with the 
highest payoff for the domestic game (4,4); and Interestingly, this Is a move that serves 
the media's Interests as well. 
This time, the International move of the government basically represents a confirmation 
of the assumption made above, regarding the media frame having Instigated the 
government's reaction to what the press framed 83 Crisis. The International cost that 
strategy B entailed for Turkey Is here translated Into a domestic payoff as the 
government enjoys the support of the media and, as an extension, the public approval 
as well. The media's strategic Influence In the game can be reinforced with the 
government's persistence to remain firm to the same suboptimal strategy and 
consequently the same domestic payoff, for a second day. This Is the effect of the 
repetitive game between the media and the government In the sense that the 
government starts off with a suboptimal move In domestic terms. through which It learns 
What media coverage to expect; and once the game 13 played for a second time, It 
reaches the outcome that pays off more and stays there. 
The government's persistence to that specific strategy, despite the International dsk and 
cost It entails, Indicates the selection of a suboptimal decision and can be more 
convincingly explained as Instigated by domestic preferences related to the media 
coverage, If we consider the very strong prognostic media frame the press disseminates 
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at this stage. On 3181 January Milliyet emphasises the anticipated cost In case Turkey 
steps back by reporting 'we cannot step back, even if it costs us' and 'if we do not 
defend this Islet, we will give Greece reason to come back again'. HOrdyet also conveys 
the conviction that Turkey would benefit from a military confrontation and reports, 'In 
case of a military conflict, we will definitely beat them'; 'if we attack first, we will win'. All 
In all, the Turkish press overplays the International cost that stepping back would have 
for Turkey and It even justifies the solution of war for the protecflon of the sovereign 
rights over the Islets. Considering the Impact that such a frame would have on the public 
mood, which would now be prepared for a drastic governmental action, the International 
Outcome produced by a Turkish withdrawal transforms Into a domestic cost that justifies 
Turkey's preference over a strategy that Is suboptimal on the International front but Is 
domestically 'ratified'. 
In the last stage of the game we see Turkey moving again In the International board, this 
time back to its dominant strategy A. it was said In previous sections of the chapter that 
the final decision of both countries Is best explained as a resultant of the US Intervention 
that gave the two countries incentive to leave the 1,1 box by rendering the cost of war 
higher than the domestic cost that a cooperative move could yield. What makes Turkey$ 
decision to move back to Its dominant strategy an optimal decision on both the 
International and domestic board, Is the estimation that under the US Influence. war 
would cost more than a potential media punishment at this stage. It Is a rational decision 
because It reflects a joint calculation of both the International and domestic Impact It 
could have and In this case, It proved dominant on both fronts. Besides, as It Is shown In 
the press coverage of this last stage of the crisis, the rationality In the government's 
decision Is confirmed by the at least partial approval by the press. 
To a large extent the government Is praised for showing determination and the soluflon 
of the game Is treated as a victory. This appraisal Is combined with some critical 
comments that describe certain moves of the government, such as the occupation of a 
second Islet, as Irrational decisions: and recognlse an exaggerated amount of Umo and 
effort that was put In this Issue while there were more Important problems to deal Wth. 
Le. 'The government must forget about Kardak and focus on the economy problems' 
(Milliyet, 1/2). The press coverage at this stage of the game reflects a combination of 
support and opposition to the governmental decision and could be placed between the 
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middle row boxes of the domestic game matrix, as the outcome of this nested game 
does not prove harmful for the government at any point. 
The Turkish government switched strategies twice In this crisis. moving from an 
Internationally optimal option to a suboptimal one, to go back to Its dominant strategy 
again before the end of the game. This shift appears to conform to domestic Interests as 
shaped by the outcomes of the government's Interaction with the media, which explain 
the selection of what appeared to be an Irrational move against Greece. The media 
coverage In this case functions also as a tool of analysis of Turkeys decision-making 
process during the crisis. This process reveals a coordination of the government's 
Interests between the international and the domestic arena, and demonstrates the 
government's consideration of the media coverage and the Impact this could have on the 
Public perception of the situation when deciding upon a strategy. 
6.6.2 The press coverage In Greece 
Similar to the analysis of the Turkish domestic Interaction and press coverage of the 
crisis, we will here Identify the preferences of the two players with the aid of the game 
matrix of their Interaction depicted In Figure 6.9. 
The preferences of the media develop on a basis similar to the preferences of the 
Turkish press. The Greek newspapers are after the fulfilment of economic Interests that 
would render strategy Ba preferred strategy since It could produce the desired 
newsworthy stories. The preference over strategy B 13 enhanced by the party 
preferences, at least for E. Typos that Is once again expected to criticise the 
governmental policies. The outcomes B/A, BIB. A/B and C43 are obviously preferred 
since they provide the highest payoff for the media. This contradicts the government's 
preferences In the International game, given that Greece Is Interested neither In war nor 
In negotiating. We also need to clarity that the added strategy 0 differs from strategy B. 
The former Is the case in which the government Ignores the media covorage but this 
does not signify defection against the adversary since Turkey has not yet made Its first 
move. The latter Is a strategy that addresses Turkey and Ignores Its domand for the 
lowering of the flag. Therefore, while strategy 0 Is the dominant one for the government 
here, strategy 0 pays off as low as strategy A that equals de-escalation. Moreover, the 
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matrix reveals a discrepancy between the preferences of the Greek government In the 
domestic and In the International game. In its Interaction against Turkey, the dominant 
strategy for Greece Is C, which however appears to be the second best In the domestic 
game. 
Modla 
Greece 
A: Support B: Oppose 
0: Do nothing 
A: lower the flag and 
accept to negotiate 
refuse to lower the 
flag or negotiate 
C: lower the flag and 
refuse to negotiate 
4.1 1,3 
4,1 1.4 
4.4 3.4 
4.2 2.4 
(2-5) 
(2,5) 
(3.5) 
(3) 
(3,75) 
Figure 6.9: The 1996 media - government Interaction In Greece 
Similar to the press In Turkey, the Greek newspapers covered the before- the- crisis 
bargaining process reporting the territorial claims made in the verbal notes. On 270, 
January E. Typos reports 'the territorial claim Turkey made over the Islet Is just 
ridiculous'. It also openly Identifies the Greek government as responsible for the 
unfounded claims by reporting 'the governmental dispersal gave Turkey the chance to 
proceed with further provocations. Comparing to the Turkish press coverage this Is a 
subtler frame, which however Implies an Issue that needs consideration. However, the 
government decides to Ignore both the territorial claims and the press coverage. which 
equals strategy 0, and places itself In the top right box of the domestic game matdx (1, 
3). At this stage the government acts rationally and decides according to Its original 
preferences. 
The essence in identifying this early stage of the media-government Interaction as part of 
the specific game lies In the expectation that the government should have of the media 
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coverage that Is about to follow. That Is to say, considering the media's preferences and 
Intentions especially In situations of Greek- Turkish tension, the Greek government 
should be prepared for extensive media coverage of the Issue with Intense nationalistic 
approach. Besides, this game the media and the government play Is repetitive not just in 
terms of the specific crisis but within the context of at least one decade, given that It was 
nine years earlier when the two actors were involved In a similar situation. In the 1987 
oil-drilling crisis. By Ignoring the coverage and refusing to recognise the existence of the 
problem, 'which might create further complications In the relationship with Turkey' 
(Eleftherotypla, 27/1), the government might make a rational move against Turkey, but In 
domestic terms it Is a rather risky move, the outcome of which Is confirmed In the next 
stage of the crisis and with the following move of Turkey. 
On 281h January Greece proceeds with the mobilisation of armed forces on the border 
with Turkey. The decision is made after the detection of a patrol boat In the Greek 
territorial waters and reflects a defensive move that Is Independent of the media frame. 
The Greek government Is still acting rationally In the sense that It appears to respond to 
the situation according to its international Interests. However, the specific decision 
provides Incentive for a further Intensified media frame both on a diagnostic and 
Prognostic basis. On 29h January Eleftherotypla reports 'The government Is very close 
to a general mobilisation' and E. Typos queries 'how can Pang3103 say there Is no 
issue'? On the same day E. Typos emphasises 'the weakness the government showed 
In handling the Initial Turkish provocation gave Ankara the green light to escalate the 
crisis' and expresses the fear that 'there will be more Turkish provocations In the future' 
and even 'future rearrangement of the continental sheir. Moreover, the Greek press 
emphasises the need for the government to resist and follow an Intransigent policy 
(Eleftherotypia, 29/1). Given that the frame Is disseminated the same day as the Turkish 
demand, It Is sensible to assume that it reinforces the International cost of Inaction and 
formulates a domestic context in which any strategy other than direct confrontation 
would be Immensely costly. 
On 30'" January the Greek government responds by adopting strategy 0, which Is 
enhanced with the Increase of forces In the Aegean, following Turl(ey's preparations for 
war. It therefore moves to the middle row boxes In the International game matrix, which 
13 the dominant strategy as shown In the domestic matrix. but Is a suboptimal ono when 
Greek - Turkish Games and the Media as Stratogic Actors 200 
considered within the context of the government's International preferences. What Is 
interesting to note though Is that the same strategy does not yet pay off either 
internationally or domestically. The press maintains Its opposing and c4itical stance. On 
the same day, apart from diagnosing an Imminent war, the Greek press continues to 
predict further deterioration of the existing situation unless the government resists. E. 
Typos speculates 'the government will lead the country to national defeat and 
humiliation' and 'Turkey will turn to Thrace next', while Eleftherotypla conveys the 
prognosis, 'Greece will be forced to commence negotiations not only for the Islet but the 
whole region'. This Is a frame that obviously serves the media's Interests and has 
generated an alarming climate In the country. Therefore the specific combination of 
moves places Greece In the 1,1 box In the International game. since Turkey continues 
to defect as well, and the 3,4 box In the domestic game, which demonstrates the payoff 
the media get from disseminating this prognosis. 
At this stage of the crisis the Greek government Is faced with the option to prepare for 
war, which Is diametrically opposed to its original preferences, and the option to step 
back, which even without accepting to negotiate, would be costly given the tense 
atmosphere that prevailed In Greece that time. When the government decides to prepare 
the fleet for a military confrontation on 31 It January, it signalled an attempt to meet the 
domestic expectations for a drastic move In order to avoid the verification of the 
speculation regarding Turkey's future attempts for claims over the Aegean. What Is here 
seen as an Irrational Greek decision - it was described as a spasmodic move even by 
the media - that opposes the government's preferences and does not appear to 
guarantee a payoff In either of the two arenas, signifies an effort to respond to a new 
status quo created In Greece, which the media frame had reinforced. Within this new 
situation any decision other than confrontation, even In the form of a war, would be 
perceived as compromise and stigmatise the new government's handling of the countryis 
foreign affairs. This was a lesson the Greek government had learnt from the past and 
remaining firm to the defective strategy was the best response to the situation. 
It is Interesting to see though that at this stage In the game, the Greek government Is 
engaged In a strategy that although pays off more domestically than Internationally, it is 
still not an optimal move since the media continue to criticlse, This might even explain 
the Immediate strategy change once the US government Intervened. The government 
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switches to Its dominant strategy C, as shown In the matrix of the International game 
(figure 6.3), under the same US pressure and conditions as Turkey, even If that signified 
a media 'punishment' and domestic payoff 2 against 4 for the media. Although the 
specific decision corresponds to the government's dominant strategy and produces an 
equilibrium solution In the International game, It Is a decision that reflects a reduced 
value of the domestic cost. It Is however a strategy that aims at avoiding a greater cost 
that has been Imposed by the US government, and even at escaping the suffocating ring 
that the media had created in Greece. What makes the Greek decision to comply with 
the US Intervention optimal Is also the fact that at that specific stage In the game and 
under the prevailing atmosphere In Greece, the government's sole option was to go to 
war against Turkey. The US government offered an optimal opportunity for Greece to 
avoid the worst possible outcome, which turned Into more costly with the US 
Intervention. 
Similar to Turkey, Greece decides to compromise after a calculation of both the 
International and domestic cost that a confronting strategy would have under the new 
conditions Imposed by the US government. However, and this Is contrary to the case of 
Turkey, the press continues to oppose the governmental strategy with a highly critical 
frame, reporting 'It Is a national defeat', 'The government sold our national Interests', We 
were humiliated' (E. Typos, 1/2), 1t Is a fact that the government was not at all prepared 
to deal with such a crucial crisis and remained Isolated from the Intemational diplomatic 
Circles' (Eleftherotypla, 1/2). Although, similar to the 1987 crisis, it Is E. Typos that 
disseminates more severe criticism, In this cdsis both newspapers disapproved of the 
government's handling of the situation. This Is another piece of evidence, analogous to 
the Interview of Cesur Sert, of the media's Interests In disseminating critical and 
opposing frames and their pursuit of controversy In their reporting, Independent of 
Ideological Inclinations. This type of coverage that takes place after the conclusion of the 
Crisis can be Identified as a 'blame frame', which reflects the process of attribution of 
responsibility after a failure or a Crisis (Samaras, 2002: 8). Although blame frames are 
mostly associated with the post coverage of armed conflicts, even In our example this 
blame frame projects the Image of media that are powerful enough to Impose costs on 
governmental decisions. 
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Similar to the Turkish action, Greece moved around the game matrices until It reached 
the strategy from which It no longer had Incentive to deviate. This move represents an 
attempt for the coordination of Its Interests on both the International arena, against 
Turkey, and the domestic arena against the 'random' moves made by the media. 
6.6.3 Summary of the media's strategic role In the 1996 Imla-Kardak crisis and 
comparison to the 1987 oll-drilling crisis 
The second Greek- Turkish crisis features certain characteristics In relation both to the 
action of the two governments and the press coverage that provide evidence of the 
model's validity and the media's strategic Impact on the progress of the action. 
With regard to the action taken by the two governments contrary to the first crisis, In 
1996 they proceeded with what we earlier described as a seemingly suboptimal decision 
and one that contradicted their preferences In the International game. That Is to say, the 
two governments escalated the tension In a manner that seemed unreasonable. They 
came closer to war than they had In 1987 and the absence of a concrete argumentation 
added to the Inherent Irrationality, since the two players failed to Justify their actions to 
the public. Therefore, the detection of what appeared as suboptimal decision-making In 
the International arena by both governments provides Incentive to look for a linkage 
between the International strategies and the media frames. 
The press coverage of the crisis also provides evidence of a medla Involvement In the 
handling of the Issue by the two governments. Cesur Sert's testimony constitutes the 
confirmation of the media's pursuit of controversial Issues and their Incentives In 
maintaining a critical approach to foreign policy decisions with a view to meeting their 
Interests. The former Joumalist of HUrriyet revealed the extent to which. media 
organisatlons that are considerably controlled by the state such as In Turkey can go In 
order to reach their objectives. At the same time, the severe media criticism the Greek 
government had to undergo once the crisis was resolved. not only does reinforce the 
above observation, It also demonstrates their power to convey public punishment. 
Although the Inferences these observations lead to, with regard to the media's potential 
In the coverage of political Interactions, have already been proved and discussed in the 
literature, the specific examples also verity the organisation of the media's Interests and 
preferences in the context of a strategic action, as shown In the domestic game matdx. 
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As for the domestic games that were produced for the specific crisis, the first Indication 
of strategic Influence they feature Is Inherent In the media diagnosis of a crisis before the 
two governments have proceeded with an official move. This transformed the bargaining 
game that had Initiated a month earlier and that remained tacit to a large extent, Into an 
overt crisis. As shown in the respective domestic game matrices, the first Turkish move 
to 'do something', which marked the escalation of the crisis, followed an Intense media 
diagnostic frame. In Greece, the government chose to Ignore the press' calls for some 
action and the criticism It received as a consequence, demonstrates the media and 
public expectations that this Initial coverage of the Issue had generated. 
In the second stage of the crisis one can notice a dramatic escalation of the tension with 
the two governments choosing suboptimal strategies that were later on described as 
spasmodic and that opposed their original preferences. The solution to the game was 
given by an external Intervention that created a new status quo, according to which 
withdrawing appeared as a better option to defecting. This new situation came to take 
the Place of another status quo that was previously created by the media and that turned 
war Into the only solution to the game, The endorsement with which the two countries 
welcomed the US Intervention Is an Indication of their escape from a situation that 
appeared to be rather Imposed to than decided on by them. 
Perhaps the way to get the full picture of the media's strategic Impact In the progress of 
this crisis Is by comparing Its effect with that of the US Intervention. The US government 
developed a separate Interaction with each government. which Included a warning 
regarding the Implications that confrontation and a war would have In each countrys 
relationship with USA. This was an Initiative that clearly defined the outcome of the 
game. Before the Intervention took place, another Interaction developed this time 
between each country and the national press, which Included both a direct warning 
regarding the Implication that not confronting the adversary would have on the 
relationship between the two countries, and an Indirect warning regarding the 
Implications that the same type of action, or better lack of action, would have on the 
public! s perception of the governmental handing of the traditional adversary. The Idea Is 
that from the moment the media can directly or Indirectly Impose costs on the 
government, they are causing strategic Implications. The media's diagnostid prognostic 
frame provides some similarities with the US warning. On the one hand, the US 
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government warns about the harm that action can cause to the relationship of each of 
the two countries with USA. On the other hand, the media warn about the harm that non- 
action can cause to the relationship of each of the two countries with the respective 
audiences. The media Impose a cost that until the US Intervention took place - by 
Imposing an even greater cost - appeared to have guided the reaction of the two 
governments. Having Identified specific Instances In the 1996 crisis when the 
government could have considered the costs Imposed by press coverage before acting 
enhances the above observation and highlights the strategic Impact that derives from 
this media action. 
The dimensions of the media's strategic Impact could be made more explicit through a 
comparison between the press coverage of the two crises. A significant inference 
derives from comparing the frames employed by the Turkish newspapers In 1987 and In 
1996. The difference In the Turkish press coverage from one crisis to the other Indicates 
a change In the degree of state control over the media, and the replacement with a new 
form of control since from 1995 the Turkish media have been In the hands of new'rulers' 
that were primarily Interested In profit Dogan Tiliq describes how within this new regime 
readers could notice the press coverage switching from supportng to criticising the 
government and vice versa. This Interchange In the frames towards the government was 
apparently Instigated by the satisfaction or the dissatisfaction of the media owners due to 
the government's lack of response to their commercial needs (Tilig, 2000: 143). In 
general, the 1987 press coverage embodied a certain degree of exaggeration In both 
countries, regarding the possibility of war, which could have affected the evaluation of 
the governmental decisions, but which derived from Interests more of an Ideological than 
Commercial disposition. This becomes obvious also from the fact that the discrepancy 
between the coverage of the two Greek newspapers In 1987 Is replaced by a relatively 
unanimous frame in the 1996 crisis. In the latter case the difference between the frames 
of the two newspapers was lying mostly In the Intensity rather than the dissemination of 
the criticism por so. 
Following the privatisation and commercialisation of media org3nisations first In Greece 
and then In Turkey, the media proceed with a purposeful employment of certain frames. 
which, In connection with the Impact on the public, affect the governmental strategy too. 
The largely common frame that both the media and the government followed In 1987 
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provides evidence of a much lesser strategic media Impact. What It does provide Is 
confirmation of the way In which the new regime In 1996 might have also affected the 
expectations the government had from the media, and It could justify the reasons that 
although the Greek government did not seem to be affected by the critical coverage of 
the opposition's newspaper In 1987, but was In 1996. This Is ultimately an outcome not 
just of the consensus In the media criticism but also of the governmental expectations of 
Implications that such a media frame would have. 
The analysis of the media - government Interaction In the two cAses and the two 
countries reveals the media action and Impact as it was theorlsed In the beginning of the 
analysis. The game - theoretic approach presupposed a certain degree of organisational 
media structure and the pursuit of primarily economic Interests for a strategic media 
Impact to take place. On this basis, the strategic action and Impact that was expected in 
the 1996 crisis was confirmed, contrary to the 1987 case where a similar effect was not 
anticipated and was not encountered either. This observation confirms the hypothesis 
that a media strategic Impact is more likely to occur when the media convey economic 
oriented and audience- driven frames. Moreover, the Investigation of the press coverage 
particularly of the 1996 Imia-Kardak crisis supports the hypothesis of the media acting as 
an extemality. Their Interaction with the government produced a diagnosis and 
prognosis that transformed an international decision Into a domestic cost. This 
Influenced the way the government would originally evaluate the Impact of the same 
decision and ultimately Influenced the outcome of the game as well. 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
There are two main objectives that the conduct of the current research aimed at fulfilling. 
Firstly, In pursuit of a more systematic analysis of the media-government Interaction, It 
sought to develop a game-theoretic model that would explain the media behaviour In 
foreign policy and conflict situations systematically and how this behaviour could result In 
media effects In policy outcomes. Secondly, the Inquiry Included the testing of the 
validity of the model by applying It to the Greek-Turkish territorial crises. Within the 
framework of theory development and testing, the thesis theorlsed and sought to 
demonstrate the media's strategic role and strategic Impact on the progress of the two 
Greek- Turkish crises: and to draw some general conclusions of the media's strategic 
'performance' and Influence on decision-making processes during situations of conflict. It 
Is therefore a process that would ultimately clarify whether the model can accurately 
explain media-government Interactions and whether the findings allow for further use of 
the model for the analysis of media effects In a variation of cases. 
The present chapter attempts to condense the findings of this research Into an 
evaluation of the extent to which the above objectives were met. It Is an attempt for an 
overall assessment of the media's role In foreign policy decision-making processes as It 
develops from both the theoretical and empirical findings of the research, and for the 
Identification of the contribution that these findings make In the wider theory of 
communications and foreign policy. 
The Contribution of Game Theory 
How functional and realistic has the game-theoretic model proved In the Investigation of 
the media-government Interaction and the pursuit of 8 unified media role In decision- 
making processes, In the domain of foreign policy? The employment of game theory for 
the analysis of the media-government Interaction In the Greek - Turkish conflict has 
Indeed Illuminated certain aspects of the Interaction that justify the utility and Input of the 
specific approach. Its contribution lies primarily In providing a very rigorous analysis of 
the media- government Interaction, Incorporating and highlighting the power Inherent In 
the media frames In a systematic manner as well. 
On a first theoretical level, the approach of the press coverago In terms of a strategic 
Interaction between the media, the government and the public In the context of a 'nested 
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game', allowed for a detailed structure of the governmental moves In relation to the 
Impact they would have or, to put it differently, with the payoff they would yield a) against 
the International adversary and b) towards the public and with the media being Its source 
of Information. It approximated the decision-making process on two separate but 
Interrelated levels and captured those key factors that would explain the governmental 
decisions and the media's Involvement In them as well. In particular, with the old of 
prospect theory, the analysis permitted the estimation of the Impact that the media 
diagnostic and prognostic frame was expected to have on the public! s perception with 
regard to the risk entailed In the government's decisions. In fact the game- theoretic 
model helped translate the media frames Into Indicators of risk for the two governments; 
while their alleged Impact on the public's perception of the situation and the risk entailed 
In It, transformed the media into sources of domestic cost and helped explain the 
governmental decisions In relevance to this cost. Moreover, by approaching the 
government as a player that seeks profit maximisation, the game-theoretic model 
highlighted the weight the governments would accord to the domestic cost and 
consequently, It highlighted the Importance of the media as an Integral part In the 
decision-making process and as an actor of strategic relevance for the government. 
To become even more precise, the game-theoretic model underscored the way In which 
the media's diagnostic and prognostic frames and their appeal to the public could 
generate expectations for a specific governmental reaction to the situation at hand. 
These expectations organised a new status quo that differed from the status quo 
generated by the moves, decisions and statements of the two governments: the reason 
was that It would embody the domestic cost the government would suffer If It followed a 
course of action the media frames had opposed to. The game- theoretic approach draw 
the attention to the government's response to this now status quo as one that would 
ultimately explain any risky and apparently Irrational moves. The conscious response of 
the government to this status quo would equal a conscious response to the media 
frames and would demonstrate the strategic Impact of the media. That Is to say, the 
media frames did not have to change the perception the government had of the risk 
entailed In a given decision; but they would 'force' the government Into calculating the 
media's domestic Impact before deciding upon an action. 
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On an empirical level and with Its application on the Greek-Turkish crises, the game - 
theoretic approach provided the basis for a correlation and comparison of the media 
diagnostic and prognostic frame with the official decisions made by the Greek and 
Turkish government. This analysis managed to detect In the decision-making of the two 
governments what the model had described as 'suboptimal' decisions, and to Identify a 
logical connection between the making of such decisions and the media diagnosis and 
prognosis. Critical and often dramatic media frames would In fact precede those 
apparently spasmodic governmental decisions, which risked jeopardising the countries' 
national Interest. The significance of the media frame lies In the fact that, what appeared 
as spasmodic or Irrational on the basis of the political framing of the situations and the 
governmental preferences shaped by that, begun to make sense when examined In the 
framework of the nested game and In accordance to the risk and cost the media had 
Imposed. The game-theoretic analysis traced a process through which the governmenVs 
risky decisions were explained and justified when the media frames and their 
implications on the public were also considered; and it did so by locating a 'hidden' 
payoff for the government In the media frames and their Impact on the public! s 
perception of the situation at hand. 
The game-theoretic model has In other words provided a closer and more systematic 
look Into the complexities that shape the media-government Interaction In the domain of 
foreign policy and particularly In conflict situations. And these complexities have 
revealed what the thesis defines as a 'strategic! media Impact on a theoretical basis. 
This strategic nature of the media effects on the decision-making process has also been 
proved empirically through the Investigation of the Greek-Turkish conflict. Chapter six 
concluded with the observation that a strategic media Impact did Indeed take place In the 
1996 crisis; while the same Impact was lesser in the one In 1987. The conclusion 
confirmed the expectations for a strategic media action and Impact developed as part of 
the game - model; and also confirmed the description of the Imla-Kardak crisis as a 
'media war', since scholars and journalists In Greece and Turkey considered the media 
responsible for creating fait accompli and leading the two governments to hasty moves. 
The game-theoret1c analysis of the media - government Interaction has In this case 
unfolded a rather complex Interaction that shed light on the media's power to 
strategically Influence decisions and policy outcomes: and It drew the attention to cortain 
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different conditions observed In the press coverage of the two crises. In fact, the context 
of the Imla- Kardak crisis demonstrates the contribution of the game-theoretic approach. 
The 1996 Imla-Kardak 'media crisis' 
Within the framework of game theory, the analysis of the media-government Interaction 
In the 1996 crisis justifies the media being amongst those forces that led to the 
escalation of the tension between the two countries. There are three stages In which the 
media could have turned the 'trivial' Issue that marked the beginning of the tension Into a 
crisis. 
9 Stage 1: while the two governments refer to the running aground of the Turkish boat 
as an unimportant Incident, the Greek and Turkish press diagnose a crisis, speculate the 
future Implications unless the respective government reacts drastically and suggest a 
radical solution, without excluding the possibility of war. 
9 Stage 2: the frame Is of course conveyed to the public, which, as It has already been 
explained, relies on the press for Information about the countrys foreign affairs. It Is at 
this stage that prospect theory proves useful In explaining the Implication that such a 
media frame could have on the public's psychology and perception of the situation, given 
the absence of other Information sources. The Impact of the media frame 13 Inherent In 
promoting a certain problem definition and a cost for the government In Its relationship 
with the adversary, unless the former acts drastically. According to the norms of 
prospect theory, the power of the frame lies In making this specific problem and the 
expected cost loom larger than It actually Is, In the eyes of the public. On this condition, 
the public would then be expected to become risk acceptant. This would translate Into 
becoming willing to accept a risk believing that failing to do so would result In certain 
losses. Ultimately, the public would expect the government to act accordingly. It Is this 
expectation that on the one hand the government Is aware of and on the other hand 
translates Into what I have called a domestic cost for the government. 
* Stage 3: the government faces a new status quo, one that differs from the situation 
generated by the running aground of the Turkish boat. The new status quo represents 
conditions according to which, accepting a limited defeat - such as. failing to show 
response to the ongoing 'media crisis' - will amount to punishment at the polls. At this 
stage, the government's decision to defect and further escalate the tension equals a 
decision to accept a greater International loss for a chance of no loss at all. and from the 
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standpoint of the Countr/s national interest it equals an irrational move. However, what 
matters at tWs stage is that the same decision becomes rational when seen from the 
standpoint of a Power-seeking government. 
It is the last stage of this sequence of the media impacts that encompasses the whole 
concept of the nested game. It clearly demonstrates the media's role as an extemality 
that develops an interaction with the audience and the government. The outcome of this 
interaction would then influence the progress of a separate interaction, between Greece 
and Turkey. Most important the impact of this extemality is portrayed in the readiness of 
the two governments to take an international risk that would minimise the domestic loss. 
The conscious decision of the government to purposely respond to the new status quo 
the media had created, illustrates the government's adjustment to conditions generated 
by the media frames. which equals a strategic impact of the media. 
The examination of the press coverage of the 1996 lmia-Kardak crisis proves the hypothesis 
set in chapter six with regard to the media's participation in the escalation of 
the crisis. But the contribution of the game theoretic approach is further enhanced when 
One considers the analysis of the media-government interaction in the 1987 crisis as 
well. Chapter six set the hypothesis that the media's strategic impact defined by the 
game-theorefic approach was expected to take place on the condition that the media frames were Produced to serve economic purposes; this would also increase the 
Possibility Of media Opposition to governmental policies and dramatisation of the events during situations of international crisis and subsequently the amount of pressure exerted 
on the government It is the comparison between the two crises that actually validates this hypothesis. 
as it reveals the correlation between critical coverage and the shift in the 
media Ownership and Preferences in the two countries. In Greece, the divided coverage 
Of the 1987 crisis was replaced with a unanimously critical reporting that the government 
received in 1996. A partisan press was apparently replaced by a still partisan but also by 
an economically and commercially shaped coverage that would employ an alarming frame, which would secure the attention of the public, The observation derives mainly from the coverage of the newspaper Eleftherotypia that, although was relatively well disposed towards the government in power at that time, it did disapprove of the official 
moves and along with the rest of the media, it intensified the domestic tense atmosphere. In Turkey. apart from the obvious motivations of the Turkish press, which 
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admittedly fabricated a 'flag war' for economic purposes, the 1996 coverage features a 
certain degree of criticism towards the government that was absent in 1987 and can also 
enhance economic forces that shaped both the coverage and its impact on the 
escalation of the Imia-Kardak crisis. 
Given the state ownership of the media that prevailed in 1987 and the structure of the 
game-theoretic model that was based on the media's organisational function, the 
expectation for a strategic media impact occurring in the 1987 crisis was automatically 
diminished. On the contrary, the highly commercialised interests of the media in 1996 in 
both Countries and their pursuit of dramatic and audience - driven coverage, rendered a 
media strategic impact more plausible. Hence, both the strategic impact detected in the 
1996 crisis and the smaller media impact that the analysis identified in the 1987 oil- 
drilling crisis are in line with the theoretical hypothesis set within the game-theoretic 
framework. Interestingly, the detection of a possible impact that the exaggerated 1987 
media frame could also have had on Ozal's protracted preference over a strategy that 
appeared to jeopardise the countrys national interest, could add to the reliability of the 
game-theoretic model as a way of understanding the media-government relationship. 
Game theory has in this case pointed to two fundamental factors with regard to the 
media's strategic action and impact. The first one is the importance of the domestic or 
national cost for the government and the second one is the organisational structure of 
the media, which is of course associated with the economic interests and objectives 
reflected in the coverage of a given news story. These two factors represent standard 
and universally acknowledged dynamics in democratic states. On the one hand, all 
governments in democratic states are concerned with issues of national interest and 
domestic cost, independent of international power and reputation. On the other hand, the 
increasingly commercialised news media nowadays constitutes an open secret. The 
Power inherent in media frames to affect the risk, payoff or cost entailed 
in given 
governmental decisions in association with their economic and organisational status 
compose the media's profile as a strategic actor and their relationship with the 
government as one that evolves on the basis of profit maximisation. On this 
basis the 
media are integrated in the foreign policy process and are constantly on the point of 
affecting Policy decisions. This could therefore render the existence of a media role that 
is cohesive and operates in all cases, plausible. 
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This is an inference drawn from a comparison made between the two crises. The 
employment of the Greek-Turkish conflict has also permitted a comparison between the 
media-government interactions as they developed in the two countries and a comparison 
between the coverage of the two newspapers within each country. The example of the 
Greek-Turkish conflict could ultimately offer a more complete picture of the contribution 
of the specific case study, also with regard to the deficiencies in the existing literature. 
The Contribution of the Greek-Turkish paradigm 
The garne-theoretic approach of the media-govemment interaction in the Greek-Turkish 
conflict offered insight into the significance of the organisational and economic factor in 
the news construction and the implication this could have on the government's 
perception of risk in decision- making. At the same time, the two territorial crises 
revealed how the economic preferences and interests of the media developed within a 
specific Political and social context, which would define the relationship of the media in 
each country with the respective government. There are certain features in the coverage 
of the two cases that are characteristic of the specific socio-political environment within 
which the media operate. Comparing the coverage of the two crises, one may notice that 
the largely supportive frame of the Turkish press towards the government maintained in 
both cases and the possibility of a highly critical coverage in Turkey remained small. A 
few critical comments were identified in the reporting of the second crisis, but the press 
would mainly approve of the governmental decisions. While in Greece, it was the 
element of partisanship that was present in both crises, reflecting a 'practice' to which 
the media in Greece would still stick on. 
The Position and role of the media in the two countries is obviously shaped according to 
norms that stem from the respective regime and political context and that would 
ultimately determine the media's behaviour. On this respect, it is obvious that the 
geographical context within which a media-government develops is associated with 
certain political, social and cultural conditions that would effectively define the scope of 
influence of the media on decision-making processes. Furthermore, the investigation of 
the two Greek-Turkish crises underlines the importance of national sovereignty, the 
sensitivity of the two players over territorial rights and their inclination to military 
Operations as a way of resolving their differences. The relationship of the two countries 
is dominated by an obvious and intense nationalistic element that is apparently reflected 
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in the coverage of both crises and in both countries as well. It is logical that it would have 
ultimately intensified the pressure exerted by the media for a drastic action and solution. 
It is particularly the weight of the national cost that the Greek - Turkish conflict draws 
attention to, the media framing of which could significantly affect the public's perception 
and consequently, the government's decision to respond or not to the domestic 
expectations. 
The contextual factors on which the media's role is conditioned would also include 
issues of ideology and political preferences of the media organisations as well, and of 
course the news frames that such preferences produce. The element of partisanship that 
prevails in Greece in both crises, underlines the importance of the ideological 
inclinations of the media and the degree in which the media's strategic impact is 
dependent on such inclinations as well. The difference in the party preferences the two 
newspapers adhere to, resulted in the production of diametrically opposing frames, 
especially in the 1987 crisis where there was no media impact the investigation of the 
crisis could detect. The coverage of the 1996 crisis reveals the shift the 
commercialisation of the news media has brought, which is reflected in the production of 
a still partisanship, yet more unanimous media frame. It is especially the comparison of 
the Greek media system with the one in Turkey that confirms the importance of the 
ideological preferences in the understanding of the media's role as conditional to specific 
contextual factors. The largely undifferentiated line the two Turkish newspapers followed 
throughout each crisis and the impact this is likely to have generated in both cases could 
at this point be an indication of the more compelling effect a unanimous coverage could 
become, in contrast to a partisan press. 
These observations signify how the media action and their potential for strategic impact 
should be investigated within the given socio-political context in which the media- 
government interaction develops. In this case, the media's intentions and purposeful 
action is subject to a number of variables and dynamics that relate to the respective 
Political and social environment, to the media's relationship with the respective 
government and the structure that the respective media system acquires in this 
environment. The examination of the two Greek- Turkish crises has of course highlighted 
the Purposeful media behaviour, the conditions of national cost that this can generate 
and have specified a causal mechanism showing why and how a given set of actors and 
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factors could produce the media's strategic Impact, but they have done so within a fairly 
specified context. 
This would therefore underscore how the norms under which media organisatlons 
operate, will vary with time and place. This observation Is In line with the theories that 
suggest a constantly evolving and fluctuating relationship between the media and the 
government given the fact that the relationship Itself Is subject to the specific political, 
social and cultural environment within which It grows. The Greek - Turkish crises have 
come to demonstrate how the relationship between the two countries Is also defining the 
relationship between the media and each of the two governments, and consequently the 
context within which the media form preferences and make decisions. 
The media as strategic actors: benefits and limitations 
The game-theoretic approach has drawn upon the conditions of domestic cost that the 
organisational structure of the media and the Implications of this structure on the shaping 
of media frames could generate. With the empirical verification of this assumption 
through the analysis of the Greek-Turkish connict. the model has provided an underlying 
principle why the media should be regarded as an unwavering actor and factor In 
decision-making processes In the domain of foreign policy. At the same time, the 
Investigation of the Greek-Turkish paradigm has confirmed the significance of contextual 
factors In the strategic action of the media In the making of foreign policy. 
But even if the media's Impact cannot be perceived without reference to the 
geographical and political context In which the media operate, the most vital contribution 
of this investigation lies In demonstrating how the media's Impact can still occur 
Independent of the policy context at hand. It Is particularly the causo-effect relationship 
between media framing and governmental decision-making that offered Insight Into an 
Interconnection between media frames and political frames that fluctuated throughout 
the crisis. The approach of media frames as conveyors of dsk and domestic cost In a 
strategic Interaction with the government revealed the fluctuation and often the 
unpredictability of dsks, gains and costs for both the media and the govemment and the 
way In which both players would adjust their moves and frames accordingly In an 
attempt to maxlmlse their profit. In this context, the Interaction betwoe n the media 
frames and the moves of the two governments demonstrated tho speed at which the 
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stakes In a conflict situation can change and can lead to successive policy changes. This 
would effectively raise questions with regard to the importance of policy certainty In 
preventing media effects to occur. 
Let us be more precise. The issue of policy certainty Is basically raised by the CNN 
effect debate as a prerequisite for the media effects to take place. As Robinson claims, 
after having revisited the US Interventions In Kosovo, Rwanda and Iraq. despite the 
existence of critical press coverage, the media were unable to alter the executive policy. 
The finding supported the hypothesis that media Influence Is Implausible when policy 
certainty exists (2001: 119). If the same hypothesis were applied to the media's role In 
the Greek-Turkish conflict, according to the theory of the CNN Effect the media's Impact 
would occur only In the 1996 crisis and only In Greece. where both newspapers clearly 
opposed the official handling of the situation. Moreover, considering the so- called 
4 spasmodic! decisions made by the Greek government the media's Impact would In this 
case be explained as an outcome both of the critical framing and of the lack of a settled 
policy as well. On this basis, the lack of an equally strong Impact In the 1987 crisis would 
be attributed to the more carefully planned governmental strategies. Such an 
explanation would however overlook the significance of the diagnosis and prognosis 
conveyed by the media and the way that these diagnostic and prognostic frames 
transformed Into risk Indicators and cost generators for the government, through their 
Implications on the public's perception of the situation. 
Even if we theorlse that the smaller strategic media Impact that was detected In the 1987 
crisis, compared to the Impact In 1996, was due to the existence of greater policy 
certainty, there are two arguments that could disprove this theory. FIrsVy, during the 
1987 crisis In Turkey, Ozal's Insistence In a policy, " which on the one hand contradicted 
his own Initial framing of the situation and on the other agreed with the Medl3 frames, Is 
In line with the concept of the strategic media Impact. Despite his settled policy, the 
maintenance of a risky and Irrational decision draws attention to the domestic benefit he 
would gain from that. Secondly, the Intervention made by NATO Is of key Importance 
here. It explicates the promptness In which situations change. or to put It differently, In 
11 It was explained In chapter six that Ozal Initially supported a peaceful handing of the Incident 
but changed his approach and became more aggressive at a lima when the Turkish press was 
strongly supporting a drastic response to Greece and a radical solution to the crisis. 
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which the players' stakes change and more Important, the way In which players tend to 
adjust their decisions and policies to the new situations. On this basis, Ozal's shift from 
a risky strategy to a compromise was a resultant of NATO's Intervention and the cost 
that this Intervention attached to his previous strategy. That shift Itself reveals the 
unsoundness of the settled policy argument. The argument remains Invalid even In the 
case of the Greek government's policy, as there are more sound reasons that explain 
the absence of a media Impact In 1987. None of the two newspapers suggested a policy 
different than the one adopted by the government; while the criticism conveyed by the 
Opposition's newspaper was anticipated and came mostly In the aftermath of the crisis. 
The 'setting' Is of course similar and perhaps more compelling In the 1996 case where 
the two governments 'swayed' between three different situations from their original 
framing of the Incident and respecVve preferences, to the status quo the media 
generated and finally to the new circumstances that the US government created. Each 
time there was a new force that gave the government Incentive to deviate from Its 
previous strategy. What Is particularly Interesting to note Is that In each case the 
governmental decision, which appeared Irrational from the standpoint of the old situation, 
was rational from the standpoint of the new one. The game - theoretic analysis showed 
In this case how the constant succession of risks, gains and costs could make 
apparently Irrational decisions look sensible. More Importantly, It explained why and how 
the media are amongst the forces that may cause similar changes and give players 
Incentive to deviate from their strategies fostering their ability to strategically Influence 
the outcome of a crisis. 
By resolving the Issue of policy certainty, the gamo-theoratic model provides a solid 
argument with regard to the media continuous presence and plausibility of Impact on 
decision-making processes In the domain of foreign policy, Independent of the policy at 
hand. Moreover, by demonstrating the media's potential to be among the factors that 
can cause policy shifts, the model provides evidence of the media's potenUal to affect 
not just the process of foreign policymaking, but decisions and policy outcomes as well. 
It therefore makes a step further than existing theories that emphasise a rather 
Instrumental and tactical use of the media by politicians for the achievement of 
diplomatic goals. It also overcomes the constraints of elite consensus and of a single, 
consistent political frame that Hallin (1986) and Wolfsfeld (1997) have put forward as 
Discussion and Conclusions 217 
conditions that prevent media effects from occurring In conflict situations. And of course, 
it Invalidates the Issue of policy certainty as Impediment in the ability of the media frames 
to cause policy changes. The game-theoretic model has 'erased' specific contextual 
conditions Introduced by previous theories that outlawed the plausibility of media effects 
In the making of foreign policy, creating scope for the formulation of a compound profile 
of the media as a strategic actor. 
The game-theoretic approach of the media-government Interacuon could be best 
described as an attempt to expand O'Heffernan's 'Insider model'(1991) and his theory of 
the co-evolution between the media and the government on a more general level. Given 
that O'Heffernan has drawn upon the media's economic and commercial motivations as 
a driving force in their selection and shaping of news stories and as a decisive factor In 
their autonomy from the government, the present thesis demonstrates how these 
motivations do not just render the media Independent actors but they also translate In 
Impact on policy outcomes. The specific approach can even prove useful for the analysis 
and understanding of political outcomes, when the media are Involved. For Instance, the 
close and rigorous Investigation of the 1996 Imla-Kardak crisis media coverage shed 
light on the motivations that led to that'Irrational war'. In this case, the media do not just 
influence the political environment, but they can also create It 
Nonetheless, It also needs to be clarified that by focusing on the media's purposeful and 
economically oriented media action, the present model has In essence limited Its scope 
in situations where the media are expected to operate under a StdCUy Org3nisational 
structure and within a competitive environment. The specific model presupposes the 
government's Interaction with profit-seeking journalists and has focused primarily on the 
media's pursuit of 'exploitation' of and 'opposition' towards the govemmenL rather than 
'Cooperation' with It. This Is also one of the reasons the specific model could function 
more efficiently In situations of connict, which Incorporate specifications that could 
encourage media frames that are critical and oppose the governmental decisions. The 
functionality of the model for the investigation of media effects primarily In Situations of 
connict Is also due to the association of the media's Impact with expectations of 
domestic/national cost for the government. This Is a variable the significanco of which Is 
reasonable to Increase In times of crisis and In cases where the national Interest Is at 
risk. 
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Moreover, rational choice and game theory compose a highly demanding approach that 
requires accurate knowledge and calculation of the decision-making process under 
Investigation. This Is also a reason why the specific model cannot surpass contextual 
factors that relate to the geographical and political environment within which a given 
media-government Interaction evolves. Therefore. the media's strategic role Is Inevitably 
dependent on the relevant soclo-political background, which should be fully 
comprehended and thoroughly analysed. 
This specification of the media's behaviour with regard to the given political, social and 
cultural environment does not of course limit the potential of the game-theoretic model 
for further application to additional cases. That Is to say, the model has highlighted the 
media's Importance as generators of conditions for domestic cost a dynamic, the 
Importance of which Is common to all governmental actors. Considering that all 
governments are after maximising their own payoff, they become more likely to carefully 
consider the media coverage before acting. The findings of this Investigation can enable 
the reconsideration and re-evaluation of the media's role In previously investigated 
International crises- for Instance, In humanitarian Interventions- and the InvestigaVon of 
still unexplored cases. It Is an Initiative that could bring additional and until now unseen 
media effects on the surface; and may ultimately offer a more accurate conceptualisation 
of the media-government relationship In foreign policy altogether displaying the media's 
power In Its true dimensions. 
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